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This dissertation chronicles battles over the U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s 
regulatory powers, which took place from 1969 through 1980. Following a scathing 
report by consumer activist Ralph Nader, Nixon revitalized what had come to be known 
as “the little old lady of Pennsylvania Avenue,” and transformed the FTC into the most 
powerful regulatory agency in Washington. During the period, consumer right’s activists 
pressured government officials to significantly strengthen the agency’s power to regulate 
the U.S. telecommunications system and the structure of the U.S. economy as a whole. 
The FTC’s policies initiated to make advertisers accountable for false claims, as well as 
those that would limit advertising to children, were all a result of vigorous debates about 
how the U.S. media should serve in public interest. Using Antonio Gramsci’s theory of 
hegemony as a theoretical lens, this dissertation reveals the ways in which the Federal 
Trade Commission’s regulatory renaissance was evidence of an important moment of 
hegemony. Congress cemented and extended the FTC’s power in 1975 through a series of 
extraordinary legislative actions. Bolstered by these new laws, in 1977 the FTC voted 
unanimously for rulemaking to significantly limit advertising to children. These changes 
mostly took business leaders by surprise, and corporate America found itself on the 
defensive side of a debate with far-reaching consequences. By 1980, the national policy 
agenda was increasingly pro-business and effectively reduced the expansion of the 
welfare state: it favored management over labor, dismantled social welfare programs, and 
deregulated major industries—a shift generally referred to as neoliberalism. Chapter 1 
describes the origins of the advertising reform movement, which began to ferment during 
the 1960s. Chapter 2 chronicles Nixon’s revitalization of the FTC. Chapter 3 begins with 
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Nixon’s second term when the FTC continued to gain bipartisan approval and public 
credibility. The time period of Chapter 4 overlaps somewhat with Chapters 3 and 5. This 
chapter describes the public relations tactics used by businesses to combat the regulatory 
reinforcement of the FTC and redirect policies in its favor. Chapter 5 describes in detail 
the most notorious aspects of the FTC during the 1970s when the FTC attempted to ban 
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INTRODUCTION: THE U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, WAR OF 
POSITION, AND A CRISIS OF HEGEMONY 
 
 
1968 was a remarkable year in American history. The number of U.S. soldiers in 
Vietnam peaked at 541,000. The Tet Offensive launched an attack on the American 
Embassy in Saigon, representing a major turning point in the war. Martin Luther King Jr. 
was assassinated, leading to uprisings in several major U.S. cities, and 46 deaths. Abbie 
Hoffman and his followers disrupted the trading floor of the New York Stock Exchange, 
and women’s liberation groups protested by burning bras outside the Miss America 
Pageant. Police officers beat and sent hundreds of antiwar protestors to the hospital 
during the Democratic Convention in Chicago. Because of these dramatic events, 1968 is 
commonly understood as the peak of progressive social movements during the 60s, after 
which the Left and the New Deal order slowly unraveled when Richard Nixon won the 
1968 presidential election by reclaiming independents and conservative Democrats in the 
South.  
 I argue that this view is inaccurate. Neither the demise of the New Left, nor the 
end of the New Deal order, nor the ascent of the New Right was inevitable by this point. 
Rather, the ruptures of 1968 opened up space where a wide range of possibilities for 
organizing the political economic order became possible. As a result, many of Nixon’s 
policies were very much aligned with the principles of regulated capital and social 
reform. He presided over the largest increase in government spending and regulation 
since the New Deal, including an expansion of Social Security and the expansion of the 
national food stamp program. Nixon signed into law measures to establish the 
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Environmental Protection Agency (1970), the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (1970), the National Traffic Safety Commission (1970), the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission (1972), and the Mine Safety and Health Administration 
(1973). 1 All of these new regulatory agencies were created to make private enterprise 
more accountable to public interests, but none would cut to the core of corporate power 
as the revival of one of the nation’s oldest regulatory agency: the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission.  
 With the exception of a few industries specifically regulated by other federal 
agencies, the FTC has wide-ranging authority to regulate the advertising industry and 
entire American economy. Despite these extensive powers, the FTC has been frequently 
regarded as an ineffective and inept agency throughout most of its existence. During the 
1960s, there was a notorious joke that there were three museums on Pennsylvania 
Avenue: the National Archives, the National Gallery, and the Federal Trade Commission 
building.2   
 But in 1970, after its long period of hibernation, the FTC began to awaken. This 
dissertation chronicles battles over the FTC’s regulatory powers, which took place from 
1969 through 1980. Following a scathing report by consumer activist Ralph Nader, Nixon 
revitalized what had come to be known as “the little old lady of Pennsylvania Avenue,” 
and transformed the FTC into the most powerful regulatory agency in Washington. 
                                                
1 Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich 
Richer—and Turned Its Back on the Middle Class (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 96–97. 
Hacker and Pierson argue that the “winner take all economy” did not occur under Nixon’s 
presidency. 
2 Arthur Applbaum, “Mike Pertschuk and the Federal Trade Commission,” John F. Kennedy 
School of Government Case Program, Harvard University, 1981, 2. 
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During the 1970s, the FTC was referred to as the “the policeman on the economic beat.”3 
The FTC’s most controversial activities focused on advertising practices and industrial 
concentration.  
 In 1970, the FTC created two new divisions: the Bureau of Consumer Protection 
and the Bureau of Competition. The Bureau of Consumer Protection put the advertising 
industry in the hot seat: it expanded definitions of false and misleading to include 
“puffery” and “implied uniqueness,” shifted the burden of proof to advertisers by 
requiring them to back up claims with scientific evidence, and forced advertisers to run 
corrective messages as a settlement for deceptive practices. The Bureau of Competition 
also targeted the ad industry, but in more structural ways by adopting a novel antitrust 
philosophy of “shared monopoly.” This bureau investigated powerful and well-
established corporations, scrutinizing the anticompetitive effects of concentrated 
structural arrangements. The overall political interrogation of the role of big businesses in 
American society was not on the decline by the mid-1970s. In fact, Congress cemented 
and extended the FTC’s power in 1975 through a series of extraordinary legislative 
actions. Bolstered by these new laws, in 1977 the FTC voted unanimously for rulemaking 
to significantly limit advertising to children. These changes mostly took business leaders 
by surprise, and corporate America found itself on the defensive side of a debate with far-
reaching consequences.  
 Existing scholarship has largely minimized the potency of these efforts by merely 
commenting on particular aspects of consumer activism and media policy within the 
array of this period’s political and cultural developments. For example, histories of 
                                                
3 “Business: A Regulator to End Regulators,” Time, July 7, 1975, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,913253-2,00.html. 
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consumer activism during this period have concentrated on the failed effort to create a 
Consumer Protection Agency in Washington,4 while broadcasting histories tend to focus 
on the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).5 In a broader way, American 
histories tend to overemphasize either the cultural or economic conditions of the 1970s. 
Because of the lack of attention to the FTC, this period’s important debates over 
advertising and industrial concentration have been missed. 
 I argue that this topic is of particular importance for communications historians 
and media reformers because of the FTC’s authority over advertising: the lifeblood of the 
communications system. The FTC’s policies initiated to make advertisers accountable for 
false claims, as well as those that would limit advertising to children, were all a result of 
vigorous debates about how the U.S. media should serve in public interest. More 
generally, the FTC is the agency within the U.S. federal bureaucracy that negotiates the 
relationship between the economic structure and the interests of the public. Thus, the 
FTC’s efforts to expand its authority in line with the demands of the public represented 
an important war of position during an overall crisis in hegemony.  
A Gramcian Historiography 
 I use these terms in reference to theories outlined by the Italian Marxist Antonio 
Gramsci. Gramsci’s theory of hegemony provides a lens through which to analyze the 
significance of the FTC within the array of this period’s political and economic changes. 
Hegemony helps explain how the struggle over the FTC was crucial to the broader 
changes that occurred within this historical period. In the words of communications 
                                                
4 Lawrence Glickman, Buying Power: A History of Consumer Activism in America (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
5 Examples include: Erik Barnouw, Tube of Plenty: The Evolution of American Television (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1975); William Boddy, Fifties Television: The Industry and Its 
Critics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993). 
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historian John Nerone, “Theory is a big story that can give more meaning to a lot of little 
stories.”6 Hegemony theory enunciates this study’s past and present-day significance by 
elucidating complex contours of power relationships while also accounting for 
antagonistic relations.  
 Gramsci emphasized the inextricable relationship between two important sites of 
investigation for this dissertation: economic and ideological forces. Gramsci suggested 
that these are interwoven: “material forces are the content and ideologies are the form, 
though this distinction between form and content has purely indicative value, since the 
material forces would be inconceivable historically without form and the ideologies 
would be individual fancies without the material forces.”7 According to Gramsci, 
capitalism is not simply maintained through force, but through ideas. Economic power is 
infused within culture and upheld through an ideology of “common sense”—what he 
called hegemony. Gramsci used the metaphor of a circulatory system, or “capillary,” to 
describe the complex and all-encompassing network of diverse systems such as media, 
popular culture, education, and even religion, in the maintenance of hegemony.8 This is a 
complex process. Hegemony is powerful because it is covert—it does not reject 
alternatives, but instead integrates destabilizing forces into capitalistic values and norms. 
Media studies scholar Stuart Hall described hegemony as 
the struggle to contest and disorganize an existing political formation; the 
taking of the leading position over a number of different spheres of society 
at once—economy, civil society, intellectual and moral life, culture; the 
conduct of a wide and differentiated type of struggle; the winning of a 
strategic measure of popular consent; and thus the securing of a social 
                                                
6 John Nerone, “Theory and History,” Communication Theory 3, no. 2 (1993): 152. 
7 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey 
Nowell Smith (International Publishers Co, 1971), 200. 
8 Ibid., 93. 
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authority sufficiently deep to conform society into a new historical 
project.9 
 
What is at stake in studying these relations of force, insisted Gramsci, “is not the 
reconstitution of past history,” but “the construction of present and the future.”10 This 
contemporary consequence is particularly crucial when studying a general crisis of 
hegemony. Although resistance to hegemony is more often than not appropriated without 
lasting consequence, a crisis of hegemony arises when the sociopolitical terrain is 
challenged to such an extent that it is reconfigured for generations.  
Gramsci outlined the conditions necessary for a crisis of hegemony. Compared to 
the conjunctural movements, which have “no far-reaching significance,” organic 
movements necessary for a crisis of hegemony “give rise to socio-historical criticism, 
whose subject is wider social groupings—beyond public figures and beyond the top 
leaders.”11 Such a movement stimulates a crisis of hegemony because it reveals 
“incurable structural contradictions” that have reached maturity. Intellectuals play a 
crucial role during crisis of hegemony. Although Gramsci considered all people as 
intellectuals, only a few were considered “organic intellectuals” who served as organizers 
of counterhegemonic resistance by establishing a war of position. These intellectuals are 
able to articulate structural contradictions, connect fragmented and subaltern movements, 
and ultimately offer viable alternatives to the status quo so that sociopolitical change can 
be realized.  
                                                
9 Stuart Hall, The Hard Road to Renewal: Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left (New York: 
Verso Books, 1988), 7. 
10 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 169. 
11 Ibid., 178. 
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In reaction to this exposed contradiction, according to Gramsci, “political forces 
which are struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure itself are making every 
effort to cure them, within certain limits, overcome them.” These political forces must 
establish their own intellectuals as “salesmen” of a new common sense. Following a 
crisis of hegemony, a “homogeneous politico-economic historical bloc, without internal 
contradictions, is successfully formed.” 12 This new historical bloc is successful, 
according to Gramsci scholar Thomas R. Bates, because it is able to “extend the 
worldview of the rulers to the ruled, and thereby secure the ‘free’ consent of the masses 
to the law and order of the land.”13 This new historical bloc is maintained through 
hegemony, until the contradictions inherent in capitalism are exposed again through an 
organic movement. 
The 1970s as a Crisis of Hegemony 
It is well known that the U.S. political economy changed dramatically by 1980. 
After the 1930s, the New Deal Order redirected government spending, taxation, and 
regulations to benefit many; but after 1980, these policies benefitted very few. Many 
scholars see the 1960s as the last possibility for real progressive change in the post-war 
period. Stuart Hall, for example, argues that the year “1969 represented the last moment 
when the ‘cultural revolution,’ as distinct from other strands of political struggle, might 
have crystallized as an autonomous political force.”14 I argue that the cultural revolution 
at the end of the sixties was not in decline; rather, it had become normalized within the 
dominant sociopolitical ethos during the 1970s. Corporate America was widely criticized 
                                                
12 Ibid. 
13 Thomas R. Bates, “Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony,” Journal of the History of Ideas 36, 
no. 2 (April 1, 1975): 353. 
14 Hall, The Hard Road to Renewal. 
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by many of the nation’s top leaders. Political scientist David Vogel argues, “from 1969 to 
1972, virtually the entire American business community experienced a series of political 
setbacks without parallel during the postwar period.”15 The reigning economic paradigm 
leftover from the New Deal suggested that industrial consolidation inhibited competition 
and was ultimately damaging to the economy. According to political scientists Jacob 
Hacker and Paul Pierson, “Nixon represented not backlash but broad acceptance of the 
liberal consensus.”16  
But by 1980, the national policy agenda was increasingly pro-business and 
effectively reduced the expansion of the welfare state: it favored management over labor, 
dismantled social welfare programs, and deregulated major industries—a shift generally 
referred to as neoliberalism. If there was not a crisis of hegemony during the 1970s, this 
major paradigmatic shift would not have taken place. Although communications 
scholarship often treats hegemony as merely a form of cultural power, Gramsci in fact 
argued that hegemony is exercised as a way to restore elite power by bringing relative 
harmony between the interests of the leading and subordinate classes.17 There are a 
number of strong economic indictors that the leading class made considerable gains after 
1980, a point I return to in more detail in this dissertation’s conclusion. The U.S. media 
industry, along with many other sectors of the economy, experienced a “mergermania” 
after 1980. This concentration has resulted in more commercialization, a decline in the 
                                                
15 David Vogel, Fluctuating Fortunes: The Political Power of Business in America (Beard Books, 
1989). 
16 Hacker and Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics, 98. 
17 For various critiques of the de-Marxification of Gramsci in communications scholarship, see: 
Lee Artz, Steve Mack, and Dana L. Could, eds., Marxism and Communication Studies: The Point 
is to Change It (New York: Peter Lang, 2006).  
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quality of journalism, and record profits for the largest media companies.18 Furthermore, 
the economic and political power of the wealthiest Americans was restored and 
intensified after 1980, and this long-term trend has not been altered by political or 
economic settings. From the post-war period until 1980, the richest 1 percent in America 
earned a stable 8 percent of the share of national income. This began to steadily increase 
after 1980, and today that share is nearly 25 percent. During the 1970s, the American 
public was told that markets were inherently rational and democratic, and that when freed 
of government regulation, profits would be shared by all. However, after 1980, the 
bottom 99 percent lost the ground they had gained during the post-war period.19 
I argue that the FTC’s transformation during the 1970s is a way to demystify this 
epochal transformation. The FTC’s renaissance is strong evidence these changes were 
hotly contested to such an extent that a crisis of hegemony occurred during the decade of 
the 1970s. By glossing over the significance of the FTC, this period’s crisis of hegemony 
has been missed. The FTC did not cause a crisis of hegemony, but this period’s political, 
economic, and ideological struggles cannot be fully appreciated without it.  
Battles over the FTC signify that this period constitutes a crisis of hegemony for 
three reasons. First, a powerful organic movement, with its own intellectual leaders, 
advanced the public’s dissatisfaction with concentrated economic power into the 
                                                
18 For a more detailed account of these changes see Robert W. McChesney, The Problem of the 
Media: U.S. Communication Politics in the Twenty-First Century, First Printing (Monthly 
Review Press, 2004); Robert W. McChesney and John Nichols, The Death and Life of American 
Journalism: The Media Revolution That Will Begin the World Again, 1st ed. (Nation Books, 
2010); Ben H. Bagdikian, The New Media Monopoly: A Completely Revised and Updated Edition 
with Seven New Chapters (Beacon Press, 2004); Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, 
Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (Pantheon, 2002). 
19 For an excellent overview of these dramatic economic changes, see Hacker and Pierson, 
Winner-Take-All Politics. The authors make a similar argument that clues to these changes can be 
found in the politics of the 1970s. 
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prevailing sociopolitical realm. Although consumer activism had been a powerful 
political force since the turn of the last century, many of the reforms initiated during the 
previous waves of consumer activism remained unsettled, and challenges to corporate 
power surged again during the late 1960s. Consumer activists articulated the public’s 
concern over corporate power in precise political ways, forming powerful public interest 
organizations to ensure that government officials would formulate policy in the public 
interest. Second, the FTC brought into focus and exposed structural contradictions within 
the established order and it offered alternatives to the status quo. The agency epitomized 
the ways in which the public interest movement had become normalized within the 
bureaucratic structures of government itself. The FTC’s policies to make markets more 
democratic represented a liberal consensus of the New Deal order, and the agency’s 
power was fortified and extended by leaders in both political parties throughout most of 
the decade. Finally, businesses responded to the FTC and the movement it represented by 
organizing a massive project to reestablish hegemonic power. Together, business leaders 
formed their own intellectuals and employed more sophisticated forms of public relations 
techniques, and these efforts were successful in defanging the FTC and the popular 
consensus the agency represented. Many of the methods that proved to be successful 
were used to usher in a new historical bloc by 1980. A new common sense held, and 
continues to hold, this historical bloc together: free markets are more egalitarian than 





The Maturation of an Organic Movement 
Waves of Consumer Activism 
Consumer activists played a central role in compelling government officials to strengthen 
the FTC during the 1970s. This dissertation helps to complete the narrative of U.S. 
consumer activism in the twentieth century. Furthermore, the broader history of 
consumer activism explains how the consumer movement during the 1960s and 70s was 
distinct from the pervious waves of consumer activism, enough so that it was important 
in generating a war of position during the overall crisis of hegemony. The U.S. economy 
had experienced three major stages of corporate consolidation: 1898–1902, 1925–1928, 
and 1967–1969.20 These periods have three major things in common. First, they were 
followed by surges of political activism, which directly targeted corporate power and 
consolidation. Second, in response to counterhegemonic forces, businesses marshaled 
resources to undermine these movements and therefore create a stable equilibrium. The 
birth of public relations itself, as Stewart Ewen details, was a response the progressive 
movement’s critique of corporate power during the early part of the century.21 Finally, 
the FTC was a major player in each period. The establishment of the FTC in 1914, and its 
extension of powers in 1938, are both testaments to the strength of consumer movements 
during these two periods. The oscillation of progressive and corporate power during the 
first and second waves has been documented in some detail, but the crisis of hegemony 
during the 1970s has largely been ignored. A closer look at the common thread in the 
                                                
20 Mark Green, “The Unmet Promises of Antitrust,” in Industrial Concentration and the Market 
System: Legal, Economic, Social, and Political Perspectives, ed. American Bar Association, 
(PUB INFO), 7; Mark Green, “Have the Antitrust Laws Promised Too Much and Accomplished 
Too Little—Answer: Yes,” Antitrust Law Journal 46 (1977): 752; E. Woodrow Eckard, “The 
Impact of the 1980’s Merger Movement on U.S. Industrial Concentration,” Antitrust Bulletin, 
June 22, 199. 
21 Stuart Ewen, PR!: A Social History of Spin (New York: Basic Books, 1996). 
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history of consumer activism—the FTC—reveals that many of the issues during previous 
waves were left unsettled, and they reemerged during the post-war period. 
As early as 1914, Walter Lippmann observed that consumer interests would be 
the “determining voice in government . . . destined to be stronger than the interests of 
either labor or capital.”22 Lippmann, however, did not account for strong opposition to 
the consumer movement’s demands. From the 1880s onward, businesses have been 
impressively skilled in adapting to, and capitalizing on, public criticism. Nonetheless, 
consumer activists have fought along a continuum of legislative battles, waging them 
particularly in moments of deep social and economic crisis. After the Civil War, the U.S. 
economy shifted from agriculture to large-scale manufacturing, and middle-class 
Americans organized around progressive ideals and instigated a wave of consumer 
protections, including for the first time federal regulations for food and drugs.23  
The Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 prohibited false claims on labels and the 
FTC Act of 1914 established the FTC to curb unfair trade policies, but these reforms did 
nothing to address false claims made in advertisements.24 In the 1930s, according to Inger 
Stole, consumer activists for the first time pushed for federal regulations to place 
substantial restrictions on advertising.25 Through the Tugwell Bill, consumer activists 
hoped to restrict false and “ambiguous” advertisements—a restriction that would have 
had serious consequences on advertisers’ ambiguous and emotional appeals—a key 
strategy in oligopolistic markets. The ad industry considered such proposals draconian, 
                                                
22 Walter Lippmann, Drift and Mastery, 54. 
23 Ewen, PR!: A Social History of Spin.  
24 Susan Strasser, The Making of the American Mass Market (Washington, DC: Smithsonian 
Books, 1989). 
25 Inger L. Stole, Advertising on Trial: Consumer Activism and Corporate Public Relations in the 
1930s (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006).  
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and responded with alternative legislation, along with broader PR strategies to discredit 
and smear consumer groups. Its efforts were largely successful in removing the teeth 
from the Tugwell Bill. A series of pro-industry changes and amendments were proposed 
and, with scant help from the Roosevelt administration, consumer groups were unable to 
resist them. The final result was the Wheeler-Lea Amendment, passed into law in 1938, 
which left the possibility of prosecution through the FTC, but only in a case in which an 
ad made an explicitly false statement. Stole notes that although the legislation did 
introduce restrictions, it did so in a way that actually bolstered the ad industry’s strategy 
of employing ambiguous and emotionally appealing messages.26  
Despite the increase in false and ambiguous advertising tactics, structural 
critiques of advertising rarely reached the mainstream of public debate during the 1940s 
and 50s. During the 1960s, another wave of corporate mergers and acquisitions occurred. 
What was different about this concentration was an increasing tendency toward 
conglomeration, whereby unrelated firms merged together. By the mid-1970s, 200 
companies controlled two-thirds of all industrial assets.27 In tandem with this increased 
concentration, the ad industry blossomed after the Second World War. Television, which 
was commercial from the start, brought a new form of advertising into the American 
home. The creative revolution in the ad industry during the 1960s meant that advertisers 
would supply even less information by using more ambiguous strategies. In addition, the 
onslaught of television commercials for cigarettes, a new type of “eco-advertising” 
alleging environmental responsibility, and a barrage of television ads on children’s 
programming provoked a public backlash. Starting in the late 1960s, discontent over both 
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advertising and industrial concentration began to ferment, producing intense and heated 
debates about corporate power and industrial concentration throughout the 1970s. The 
reigning logic leftover from the New Deal—that government should play a major role in 
regulating capitalism—moved these debates from the margins into the political 
mainstream by 1970.  
The Third Wave: A Public Interest Movement 
 Although there are a number of studies on consumer movements during the first 
two waves, very little work exists on the third wave of the consumer movement during 
the 1960s and 1970s. David Vogel explains the both the significance of consumer 
activism and the response by business interests. According to Vogel’s account, the 
consumer movement during the 1960s largely took businesses by surprise, and “In a 
remarkably short period of time, consumer and environmental organizations were able to 
take advantage of these changes to move from a peripheral position in American politics 
to become more active and effective participants in the making of public policies in the 
nation’s capital.”28 What made consumer activism more influential than consumer 
movements during the progressive and New Deal eras was institutionalization of 
consumer activism into a broader and more powerful public interest movement after 
1968.29 Consumer activists borrowed strategies of legal maneuvering from the civil rights 
movement, and this translated to direct forms of political action. Vogel attributes the 
strength of the public interest movement to economic prosperity for the middle class, 
demographic shifts toward greater numbers of younger college-educated Americans, and 
the extensive press coverage of corporate abuses.  
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 The public interest movement, according to Vogel, “transformed both the nature 
of the political agenda and the way in which administrative decisions affecting business 
were made. For the first time since the 1930s, business found its political influence 
seriously challenged by a new set of interest groups.”30 Even more striking was the 
various ways in which the public interest movement had become normalized by 1970. 
Vogel notes that stockholder meetings changed in tone during the 1970s. Rather than 
merely discussing ways to profit, corporate meetings “became a vehicle for politically 
oriented shareholders to challenge management’s commitment to the public interest.”31 
Because of the scope of his project, Vogel only gives passing mention to the ad industry 
and FTC among the array of other important developments.  
This dissertation discusses the public backlash to corporate power and the battles 
over the FTC in more detail. Starting in the late 1960s, the ad industry was the target of 
public criticism, but more importantly, the industry did not perceive itself as necessarily 
distinct from the countercultural movements of the 1960s. 32 In fact, the ad industry 
marshaled resources and talent to protest the Vietnam War, and several prominent ad 
industry leaders agreed that its industry had gone too far. This is not a simple debate 
between big business and progressive causes. Rather, it was a period when the popular 
consensus was that government was needed to make capital more responsive to public 
needs.  
   During the 1970s, the consumer movement more precisely articulated the 
public’s concern over advertising and corporate power. Led by organic intellectual 
                                                
30 Ibid., 112. 
31 Ibid., 95. 
32 Thomas Frank, The Conquest of Cool: Business Culture, Counterculture, and the Rise of Hip 
Consumerism, 1st ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). Frank makes a similar point, 
but he focuses mostly on the ad industry in the 1960s.  
 16 
leaders, particular public interest groups directly targeted the ad industry. For example, 
teams of young law students assembled by Professor John Banzhaf drove tobacco 
advertisers off the airwaves. But, more importantly, the debate over tobacco advertising 
signified a greater willingness on behalf of public officials to balance commercial with 
public interest. Ralph Nader was the epitome of an organic intellectual leader of the 
public interest movement. By the mid-1970s, Nader had amassed a “public interest 
conglomerate”—a legal team of seventy-five full-time employees and a budget of over $1 
million. Nader resurrected many of the strategies used by muckraking journalists during 
the Progressive Era by publishing biting reports on the meat processing industry in The 
New Republic.33 After he gained public support from his auto-industry expose Unsafe at 
Any Speed, the FTC was his first target. For Nader, the agency’s responsibility to ensure 
competition and protect consumers was even more pressing because of the “rise of the 
corporate state through the growth of conglomerates and shared monopolies into an 
oligopolistic structure.”34 Nader’s report on the FTC was also a scathing critique of both 
political parties, which in his view had turned the agency into a “dumping ground for 
political patronage” that fostered “an aversion or upsetting friends on Capitol Hill by any 
radical moves.”35 Nader exposed the ways in which the FTC was beholden to politicians 
and business interests, and after his report, the FTC became the most powerful public 
interest organization in the country.  
 By accounting for the totality of antagonist forces surrounding the FTC, it 
becomes clear that this is not a merely a story of the so-called rise of the New Right in 
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America, although politics played an important role in the FTC’s fortunes. Hegemony 
theory allows us to see that political parties function as agents, rather than makers, of 
hegemony. Political parties are important for this story because they carried out the 
national popular-collective will. By 1970, the counterhegemonic struggle had advanced 
alternatives into the dominant political realm. Nixon initiated the agency’s revitalization 
and, during his second term, he chose as the FTC’s chair Caspar Weinberger, a 
Republican and former aid to Governor Ronald Reagan. Weinberger re-staffed the FTC 
with a cadre of young lawyers, and reorganized the agency to make it more accountable 
to the public. By 1970, the counterhegemonic struggle had advanced alternatives into the 
dominant political realm. Throughout the 1970s, the FTC was at the forefront of decisive 
deliberations over government’s role in regulating the ad industry and the economy more 
generally. 
Challenging Advertising and Monopoly Power 
From our vantage point today, it is difficult to imagine that a sixty-year-old 
federal agency would offer alternatives to commercialization within the media system, or 
to structural arrangements within the American economy. Regulations and restrictions to 
advertising might seem relatively mild by comparison to the establishment laws for 
environmental standards, protections for workers, and safety standards for the 
automobiles, all of which were passed during the 1970s.  
Scholarly work in political economy explains the structural significance of 
advertising to modern capitalism. Karl Marx, in his labor theory of value, sees wage labor 
as the crux of capitalism. In a Marxian understanding, the pressure to pay labor as little as 
possible is both the driving force, and the inherent contradiction, in capitalism. 
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Capitalism was useful insofar as it created surplus, but the inequality between those who 
produced and those who owned the means of production made it ultimately 
unsustainable.36 Because of this inherent tension, a traditional Marxist historical analysis 
tends to focus on the class conflict created by organized labor. Although the labor 
movement was undoubtedly an important source of instability during the 1970s, it alone 
did not generate a crisis of hegemony.  
By accounting for the structural changes to capitalism since the time of Marx’s 
writing, it becomes clear that forms of power, resistance, and contradiction come in many 
forms. As firms moved from competitive to concentrated industries, advertising became a 
crucial element in the logic of capitalism. The selling of a commodity for profit—the 
most important step in capitalism—now hinges on advertising and marketing.  
 Baran and Sweezy explained the function of advertising in monopoly 
capitalism—an economic system characterized by industrial concentration, whereby only 
a handful of firms dominate in most markets. The rise of monopoly capitalism brought 
about distinct changes to selling practices. Advertising is a necessary outcome of 
monopoly capital, as firms constantly need to increase either private investment or 
consumption. Most notably, firms in concentrated markets no longer compete on the 
basis of price, and advertising instead maintains differentiation for existing products. 
Without competing by lowering prices, profits continue to rise, and thus advertising is the 
“very offspring of monopoly capitalism, the inevitable by-product of the decline of price 
competition” and it  “constitutes as much an integral part of the system as the giant 
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corporation itself.”37 Or, as Inger Stole puts it, “the rise of the oligopoly is the gasoline 
that fuels the flames of modern advertising.”38 Although consumer activists in the 1930s 
had challenged this structural arrangement, the debate was not settled by the end of the 
New Deal Era. I argue that challenges to monopoly capital surged again thirty years. The 
FTC honed in on the ways in which advertising contributed to concentrations of power 
and proposed measures that would dismantle the oligopolistic structure within a number 
of well-established industries.  
Statements peppered throughout the business trade press illuminate the 
uncertainty and alarm that business leaders experienced as a result of the public interest 
movement and the FTC’s vast expansion of regulatory power. As early as 1965, the 
government liaison from Proctor and Gamble observed that the consumer movement had 
“taken up permanent residence in our national political house.” By 1970, the FTC 
embodied the ways in which public interest groups had transformed Washington. In 
response to the FTC’s advertising regulations, the president of Pepsi-Cola stated, “the 
ultimate target is free enterprise itself” because advertising was “the highest silhouette, 
the most convenient aiming point.”39 Another business representative said that “the FTC 
has bitten off an enormous new theory of antitrust law, and if carried out, it would 
revolutionize the American economy and break up all kinds of industries.”40  The 
president of the Chamber of Commerce predicted that Americans would “witness the 
elimination of capitalism, and the substitution of state ownership of means of production 
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and a centrally planned economy.”41 Although these statements can be easily dismissed 
as alarmist, the massive project businesses produced to regain the political power they 
had lost suggests that this period was a crisis of hegemony.  
A New Historical Bloc 
When the FTC was finally defanged in 1980 through congressional legislation, a 
Democratic president was in the White House, and Democrats had majorities in both 
houses in Congress. What happened between these years to shift politics in such dramatic 
ways? Businesses recovered the political influence they had lost. In 1978, an executive at 
Proctor and Gamble put it best: “it doesn’t really matter a whole lot which party is runs 
things . . . when businesses start marching lockstep, the government apparatus hunkers 
down.” 
 This recovery of hegemonic power did not occur merely by influencing 
government officials, although this was an important part of the overall strategy. This 
project shows that business interests implemented a massive ideological project to 
reestablish hegemonic power, ushering in a new historical bloc by 1980. Gramsci did not 
live to see the development of more sophisticated ideological strategies in the 
maintenance of hegemony, particularly the dramatic growth of corporate public relations 
after 1920. Alex Carey’s work provides historical insight and a theoretical model for 
corporate public relations. In Carey's view, the growth of democracy and the growth of 
corporate power during the twentieth century clashed to such an extent that business 
leaders needed to protect corporate power against democracy through corporate public 
relations. The emergence of PR at the turn of the century, and the development of more 
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sophisticated techniques during the New Deal Era, supports the argument that public 
relations has been a powerful force in the politics of democratic governance. Carey 
viewed the 1970s through this theoretical lens.  
 The 1970s, Carey observed, “involved a great expansion of a more sophisticated 
form of propaganda” called “treetops propaganda, aimed at the leaders of society.”42 This 
new breed of propaganda came in form of private think tanks, which developed policy 
research for private organizations. The goal of these organizations was to recruit and 
assemble a new cadre of free-market economists, and Carey argued that think tanks 
“virtually created the neo-conservative movement of the 1970s.” Irving Kristol’s think 
tank, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), began in 1970 with a budget of $1 million, 
and by 1978, its budget grew to $7 million. The Heritage Foundation and the Business 
Roundtable followed suit, and these think tanks together coordinate research with more 
aggressive lobbying. “With this final twist,” Carey insists, “the New Deal comes in full 
circle . . . complete hegemony over the American mind was reestablished.”43  
 Carey also mentions the more sophisticated grassroots propaganda employed by 
businesses during the 1970s. For Carey, grassroots campaigns “contained little novel 
except for its scale and impact on U.S. politics.”44 A major player in this effort was the 
advertising industry, not only because of its vulnerability, but also because it was viewed 
as the most skilled in the art of persuasion. Carey is one of the few scholars who 
references the Advertising Council’s economics education campaign as important in 
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“persuading the American Public that their interests were the same as business’s 
interests.”45  
This dissertation chronicles the Ad Council’s economics education campaign in 
great detail. During the Second World War, the U.S. Advertising Council was created to 
legitimize the ad industry and build an alliance between government and private industry 
during a period of crisis and uncertainty for the ad industry and its corporate clients.46 
This alliance and popular consensus had unraveled by 1970. After 1975, powerful 
corporations and business trade groups put significant pressure on the Ad Council to 
address the FTC’s policy initiatives and the persistent anti-corporate attitudes the agency 
represented. In its “educational” campaign called the “American Economic System,” the 
Ad Council received more corporate donations than in any other time in its history, and 
its messages were disseminated on a massive scale, not only through mass media, but 
also through libraries, elementary schools, colleges, research reports, news articles, and 
nonprofit groups. The Ad Council helped coordinate treetops with grassroots efforts, 
which helped unite businesses around neoliberal ideals. A major goal of the ad industry’s 
crusade was to popularize a new brand of conservative economics, one that served as the 
basis for neoliberalism as a new historical bloc. Though influential, this campaign was 
extremely controversial. Together, a number of progressive groups organized a counter-
campaign and argued for their right to rebuttal. This dissertation’s analysis of corporate 
PR illuminates a war of position that took place during this period’s overall crisis. 
 By the end of 1970s, the success of these massive PR efforts began to pay off 
when the FTC attempted to implement strict regulations for advertising to children. 
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President Carter’s election gave a temporary boost to progressive causes and he 
appointed Mike Pertschuk, a long-time consumer advocate, to chair the FTC. With the 
blessing of Carter, Pertschuk made a bold promise to “bring the structure and behavior of 
major industries and indeed, the economy itself, more in line with the nation’s 
democratic, political, and social ideals.”47 To do so, Pertschuk and his fellow 
commissioners voted unanimously to pass rulemaking that would limit advertising to 
children, a practice he and his many supporters considered to be repulsive, unethical, and 
unfair. Major industries viewed it as an attack on all advertising, and a crucial test of the 
FTC’s powers to regulate unfair business practices. This regulatory empowerment 
threatened drastic changes for U.S. businesses, which marshaled significant resources to 
battle not only the FTC’s policy agenda, but also the existence of the agency itself. 
Advertising trade associations filed a lawsuit against Pertschuk to disqualify him from the 
rulemaking on children’s advertising. Congress launched an all-out attack on the FTC, 
and for the first time in American history, a regulatory agency was forced to close down. 
Shortly before he left office, President Carter was between a rock and a hard place: he 
could let the FTC perish, or sign legislation to preserve the FTC but strip it of the power 
it had gained throughout the 1970s. He chose the latter. These dramatic events imply that 
1968 was not the pivotal year in American history; it was ten years later, when business 
interests galvanized to finally displace policy efforts that attempted to structure business 
practices to be more in line with democratic principles.  
 Despite the eventual demise of the FTC’s regulatory renaissance, this remarkable 
story exemplifies the ways in which the 1970s was a period of great possibility for 
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change, both for the U.S. media system and for the political economy more generally. A 
Gramscian historiography helps to make connections with other theoretical and historical 
trajectories. Using Gramsci as connective tissue, this project also relies on studies of 
broader U.S. histories of the 1970s. Because of its importance for media history, this 
dissertation also draws on studies of media reform and the important economic role of 
information.  
Histories of the 1970s 
Social, Political, and Economic Histories 
 A major goal of this study is to connect the politics of the Federal Trade 
Commission to a grander historical narrative of the 1970s. Many histories of this period 
explain the ways in which those in power appropriated an emphasis on identity politics 
and individualism within social movements. A number of cultural histories argue that the 
social movements of the sixties created a more permissive and individualistic society, 
which fueled a conservative backlash and allowed for the ascendance of the New Right. 
Christopher Lasch psychologized this transition his 1979 bestseller The Culture of 
Narcissism. In Lasch’s account, the hedonistic egoism of the 1960s, combined with the 
political traumas of the 1970s, created a culture of individualism and selfishness, 
whereby “Americans have retreated to purely personal preoccupations.”48  
 More recent histories have elaborated Lasch’s theme, but also describe in greater 
detail the many political and cultural calamities of the 1970s. Decade of Nightmares, 
1973: Nervous Breakdown, and Nixonland all describe the 1970s as period when 
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rightward trends in American culture emerged shortly after Nixon took office.49 Bruce 
Schulman also sees the 1970s as an important historical period because of its great shift 
in culture and politics, when personal entrepreneurial freedom replaced the values of a 
“universalist vision.” In Schulman’s view, popular culture, through its emphasis on 
individualism and identity, helped reconstruct the nation into “congeries of many 
narrower units.”50 Jefferson Cowie sees the 1970s as a decade of possibility for the labor 
movement because the New Deal politics of the 1930s, combined with the social 
movements of the 1960s, had the makings for a “new era for the workingman.” But over 
the course of the decade, according to Cowie, the labor movement became fragmented 
and troubled with internal contradictions.51 More than economic factors like stagflation 
and deindustrialization, Cowie sees the eclipse of the labor movement as one derived 
mostly from the labor movement itself. Combined, these histories present a decline 
narrative of the decade, when political cynicism, identity politics, and fractured social 
movements provided a fertile seedbed for a new type of American conservatism to 
blossom during the 1970s.  
 In Pivotal Decade, Judith Stein pays closer attention to the political response to 
economic crisis during the 1970s. Stein argues that post-war liberalism of the New 
Deal—“assumptions that capital and labor should prosper together” and “high wages and 
regulated capital created and sustained U.S. prosperity”—was alive and well during the 
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first years of the 1970s. After the economic crisis of 1973, the New Deal “age of 
compression” was steadily replaced by the “age of inequality” through a series of 
opportunistic and shortsighted political decisions by those in power. By looking at the 
underlying economic paradigms of the 1970s, it becomes clear that the 1968 election was 
not the beginning of a new conservative era. In fact, as Stein points out, Nixon during his 
first term in office advocated for progressive taxes, environmental laws, and a host of 
other regulations for businesses. After 1973, Stein argues that this consensus unraveled in 
large part because of the failure of Keynesianism to predict and offer solutions to the 
economic crisis. The political economic void, according to Stein, was filled with a new 
paradigm of conservative economics, one that continues to shape the politics of our time. 
Stein mostly views the age of compression as one derived from the economic crisis and 
the ensuing elite policy decisions. This study relies heavily on Stein’s work, but it 
accounts for the wider public debate by important organic movements. I argue that the 
economic crisis of the 1970s made conditions more favorable for the changes that took 
place during the 1980s; however, it alone does not account for the wider ideological war 
of position during the 1970s.  
Neoliberalism 
David Harvey refers to this paradigmatic shift as “neoliberalism.” Although 
Harvey and Stein differ in terms, they both account for the ways in which this shift 
compressed the economic prosperity for the working class and greatly expanded the 
power of the wealthy. Harvey, more than Stein, sees this sociopolitical shift as one that 
was planned and executed by those in power in response to geopolitical struggle. Harvey 
argues that a “sea-change” took place in the political economy around 1972 that was 
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constituted by “the rise of postmodernist cultural forms, the emergence of more flexible 
modes of capital accumulation, and a new round of ‘time-space compression’ in the 
organization of capitalism.”52  
In the wake of these economic and cultural shifts, neoliberalism became the 
prevailing economic and political logic. Harvey defines neoliberalism as the “theory of 
political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by 
liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional 
framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.”53 
Harvey makes clear that the rise of neoliberalism was not a natural occurrence; economic 
elites gravitated toward neoliberalism as a way to restore their class power amid the 
economic recession. In many cases, neoliberalism supports government involvement, and 
the ideology has adapted to an overall preference on behalf of elites for technocratic rule 
over democracy. As a result, according to Harvey, public institutions have been stripped 
public of democratic values when it was advantageous for those in power. Despite the 
pervasiveness of this logic in global government policies, Harvey concludes that we have 
little understanding of “where neoliberalism came from and how it proliferated so 
comprehensively on the world stage.”54 Because of the scope of Harvey’s project, he does 
not examine important developments within communications policy and media activism, 
which were also important sites of struggle during this period of extraordinary political 
and economic change.  
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1970s Media Histories 
The Information Economy  
Dan Schiller, by considering the economic role of information, sees the 1970s as a 
decisive period in the telecommunications industry. According to Schiller, the years that 
followed 1970 were pivotal in exposing capital’s vulnerability: the manufacturing sector 
in the U.S. experienced a significant decline, and business leaders along with government 
officials touted the information sector as a solution to overproduction and stagnation. As 
a result, a process of accelerated information commodification took place and allowed for 
capital to be “freed to devise accumulation strategies for application across a much-
widened domain.”55 Schiller discusses the acceleration of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) as “the largest category of corporate capital 
investment,” and this inspired a “radical overhaul of the structure and policy of 
telecommunications.”56 Because of this shift, information-intensive services like 
entertainment, data processing, advertising, and marketing have played an “increasingly 
critical role in overall U.S. investment, employment, and international trade.”57 Rather 
than view media merely in terms of content or policy, Schiller accounts for the ways in 
which information is a commodity produced through the wage labor relationship and, 
more crucially, “an essential site of market growth” since 1970.  
 This dissertation considers the various struggles within this economic shift, 
beyond top leaders in government and business. The FTC’s transformation is one clue, 
among others, which exposes the origins of neoliberalism. The FTC is not simply an 
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agency that makes decisions over media ownership and content. Its powers are much 
broader. The FTC is responsible for ensuring that the entire economy is competitive and 
functions in the public interest. A powerful organic movement instigated the reform of 
the FTC, and after 1970, it created a number of policies to make business more 
accountable. The FTC’s regulations were offered amid economic crisis, political changes, 
and a shift toward investment in information communication. These broader uncertainties 
made the FTC’s policies even more foreboding for businesses. The FTC targeted 
advertising during this period when capital shifted from manufacturing to the information 
sector, and the agency honed in on the structural arrangements necessary for this 
accelerated commodification to take place.  
Critical Junctures 
 Although existing scholarship has analyzed the importance of communication 
industries and technologies within these larger economic shifts, the hegemonic struggle 
over the advertising industry and industrial concentration during the 1970s has not been 
investigated in detail. In addition, the FTC’s role in media policymaking has not been 
fully appreciated, as studies of the history of media reform have tended to concentrate on 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the agency established in 1934 to 
regulate media in the public interest. As Robert W. McChesney demonstrates, the 
creation of the FCC and the policies it first initiated were part of vigorous public debate 
over how to structure broadcasting during the late 1920s.58 Important public debates over 
media policy resurfaced within the FCC during the 1940s. Victor Pickard’s work reveals 
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the ways in which the FCC’s progressive policy initiatives again offered alternatives to 
the commercial media system during the 1940s.59  
 These debates constituted “critical junctures”—moments in which the entire 
media system is called into question when a combination of at least two of three elements 
converge: the rise of new technologies, dissatisfaction with the status quo, and broad 
social upheaval.60 Although a noncommercial broadcasting system would have 
fundamentally altered the U.S. public sphere, it would not have constituted, on its own, a 
complete reworking of the national political economy.  
  This dissertation aims to recover this important “crisis of consumerism” of the 
1970s by showing the ways in which the FTC’s advertising regulation policies proposed 
significant challenges for the livelihood of the U.S. commercial media system—the 
advertising industry—within this turbulent and formative decade. While the FCC has 
clearly played an important role in shaping the contours of the U.S. media industry and 
its practices, the lack of scholarly attention towards the FTC mirrors the broader elision 
of monopoly capital’s role that characterizes much of the communications field. This 
history points to more dramatic moments—battles for hegemony—when the entire 
structure of American capitalism and culture were up for grabs.  
 The FTC’s proposals—including its advertising substantiation programs, the 
scrutiny of advertising practices in concentrated markets, and the proposals to restructure 
entire industry segments—offered alternatives and challenges to the commercial media 
system. As advertising plays an increasingly central role under “digital capitalism,” 
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understanding the history of the FTC and its enormous potential is of crucial 
importance.61 Although in recent years the FCC has been stripped of its power to regulate 
cable and digital media content providers like Google, the FTC to this day has 
jurisdiction to regulate advertising and marketing practices online. Thus, this dissertation 
tells an untold story in media history—one that has bearing on contemporary media 
reform. 
Conclusion 
This critical juncture for media policy was an important destabilizing force within 
this period’s overall crisis of hegemony. The FTC represented widespread discontent 
over commercial media and corporate power more generally. Its policies illustrate a path 
not taken, one that would have made corporations more responsive and accountable to the 
public interest. The FTC represented an important policy juncture, but more significantly, 
the battle over the FTC occurred primarily on ideological turf. In response to the 
challenges to the status quo, businesses implemented a massive PR campaign to instill the 
idea that its interests were synonymous with democratic values. The enemy to democratic 
liberty, businesses insisted, was government. Although there were certainly other 
destabilizing forces, the FTC, which businesses eventually dubbed the “national nanny,” 
was the most powerful regulatory agency. Thus, this study reveals a path not taken in 
media and public policy and also exposes broader alternative understandings of the 
relationship between democratic governance and corporate power.  
 By looking at the potential for the reforms proposed by the FTC, it is apparent 
that the power of business became a central battleground in the war of position during the 
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1970s. From the perspective of the ad industry and major businesses, the FTC was by far 
the most formidable regulatory agency in Washington. The general failure of the reform 
efforts that sought to limit the power of advertisers, and the industry’s strategy that linked 
the free market to classical notions of liberty, brings this period’s crisis of hegemony into 
higher visibility. The battles over the FTC worked as an arena in which the ideological 
maneuvers that would prove to be successful were developed and auditioned. Thus, the 
disharmony of forces involved in U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s fortunes helps to 
demystify major shifts in the ideological temperament of American culture that very 
much remain with us in a new millennium. A Gramscian understanding allows us to see 
that while hegemony is powerful, it is not inevitable or permanent. Pluralization of the 
ideological terrain was possible during the 1970s, just as it is today. 
Sources 
This dissertation analyzes a number of important secondary and primary sources. The 
tensions and contradictions within the crisis that took place during the 1970s are clearly 
demonstrated in the business trade press, including The Wall Street Journal, Advertising 
Age, Broadcasting, and Editor and Publisher. Unlike more mainstream daily newspapers, 
the trade press reveals the extent to which the FTC’s proposals were threatening to the 
advertising industry, the commercial media system, and a number of established 
industries. The 1960s and 1970s has often been described as a “high water mark” for 
professional journalism. Because of this, major dailies and magazines covered the battles 
over the FTC extensively, especially during the early part of the 1970s. Without the 
excellent and comprehensive news coverage of the FTC, this dissertation could not have 
been written.  
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 In addition to press clippings, this project cites an array of primary government 
documents, including FTC press releases and reports, court cases, congressional 
testimony, and presidential addresses. Archival collections have also been essential for 
this study. The group Action for Children’s Television was pivotal in spearheading the 
children’s advertising regulations in the late 1970s and this dissertation relies heavily on 
papers from the Action for Children's Television Collection from Monroe C. Gutman 
Library at Harvard University. Michael Pertschuk was particularly important in 
strengthening the FTC’s powers as a top congressional staffer, and after he was appointed 
to chair the FTC in 1977, Pertschuk spearheaded rules to restrict children’s advertising. I 
rely on Pertschuk’s detailed account of his time at the FTC in the book Revolt Against 
Regulation, his personal papers from the Library of Congress, and my personal interview 
with Pertschuk. In addition, this project utilizes the Advertising Council’s papers at the 
University of Illinois archives to determine the dynamics between regulators and the 
advertising industry, as well as the industry’s public relations tactics. Proctor and 
Gamble, the largest advertiser in America, was at the forefront of debates over the FTC’s 
powers. Bryce Harlow, who was known as the “unofficial dean of Washington corporate 
representatives,” was instrumental in building close ties with regulators and uniting trade 
groups during the 1960s and 1970s. During the 1970s, Harlow took a leave from Proctor 
and Gamble and worked as a close aid to President Nixon. This project cites many of 
Harlow’s statements and speeches, which are available online from the University of 





 For the most part, the chapters in this dissertation are organized chronologically, 
with the exception of some topics, which overlap with the timelines of other chapters. 
Chapter 1 describes the origins of the advertising reform movement, which began to 
ferment during the 1960s. A number of social movements—the labor, civil rights, and 
feminist—drew attention to problems of advertising and commercialization. These were 
solidified when consumer rights gained legitimacy in Washington during the Kennedy 
and Johnson years. Bolstered by this political power, various consumer organizations 
drew attention to tobacco advertising on broadcast television, which set a bold precedent 
for counteradvertising under the Fairness Doctrine. Despite these accomplishments, the 
FTC—the agency responsible for regulating advertising—was written off as a corrupt 
and ineffective agency. In 1969, this all changed when Ralph Nader and his team wrote a 
scathing report of the FTC that resonated with President Nixon. 
 Chapter 2 chronicles Nixon’s revitalization of the FTC. Nixon’s appointees to the 
commission did not share Nader’s zeal, but they shared his conviction that the FTC 
should be gutted and reformed. It was during these first few years that the FTC would 
break new ground in advertising and antitrust reform. Using the tobacco case as a model, 
it ordered corrective advertising in cases of deception and greatly expanded its definition 
of “false and misleading” to include puffery. The FTC also targeted the concentrated 
structure within many industries, adopting a novel “shared monopoly” doctrine for its 
antitrust cases.  
 Chapter 3 begins with Nixon’s second term. Many in the business community 
predicted that Nixon would mollify the FTC’s initiatives, but the FTC stayed on course as 
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it continued to gain bipartisan approval and public credibility. During the mid-1970s, 
Congress cemented the FTC power through a series of laws. The FTC’s objectives were 
overshadowed by the political and economic traumas of the 1970s. As prices continued to 
rise, consumer activists and government officials turned their attention to lowering prices. 
This fixation on prices led to a landmark Supreme Court case in 1976, which ruled that 
advertising constituted free speech under the First Amendment. This left the FTC in a 
policy paradox. These troubles for the FTC were intensified when President Ford 
appointed commissioners who were less enthusiastic about the FTC’s continued revival.  
 The time period of Chapter 4 overlaps somewhat with Chapters 3 and 5. This 
chapter describes the public relations tactics used by businesses to combat the regulatory 
reinforcement of the FTC. Two mitigating factors—the cynicism in the wake of 
Watergate, and the challenge to the dominant economic paradigm following the 
economic crisis—provided an opportunity for business to redirect policies in its favor. 
Through the U.S. Advertising Council, the advertising industry helped to congeal various 
elements of “economics education” and set a template for a new type of conservative 
economics. The massive campaign on behalf of the Ad Council united businesses around 
neoliberal ideals, but created public controversy for the Ad Council. In response to the 
Ad Council, a diverse coalition of progressive groups created a counter-campaign called 
Americans for a Working Economy.” With the support of the FTC, a number of activists, 
prominent academics, and some high-ranking members of Congress fought for a right to 
rebuttal.  
 Chapter 5 describes in detail the most notorious aspects of the FTC during the 
1970s. Under Mike Pertschuk, the FTC attempted to ban advertising to children in its oft 
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called “kidvid crusade.” The kidvid controversy is the best-known episode of the FTC 
during the 1970s, having been described as a radical initiative taken up by an agency 
gone rogue. But in 1977, the FTC appeared to have support from both Republicans and 
Democrats for a children’s advertising rule when Pertschuk took over the agency. This 
chapter demonstrates that the failure of kidvid was a result of organized response by 
businesses, which had gained considerable ideological power and political influence by 
1978. By the end of the decade, Congress threatened the agency’s very existence. As a 
result, Washington regulators and lawmakers toned down their regulatory philosophies, 
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During the 1960s, criticism of consumer society began to ferment as feminist, civil rights, 
environmental, and labor movements called into question the social, economic, and 
ecological costs of consumer society’s most visible portrait: advertising. In significant 
ways, advertisers themselves embraced the countercultural movements during the 1960s, 
which opened up a space for social critique to become normalized within the ad industry. 
Many of the criticisms of advertising and consumer society were subdued by changing 
advertising strategies, but far more threatening to big business was structural criticism of 
advertising’s broader economic role. As members of the business community grappled 
with how to address mounting public antipathy, the new wave of consumer rights 
entrepreneurs like Ralph Nader and John Banzhaf created powerful public interest 
organizations, calling attention to deceptive advertising and dangerous products. By the 
end of the decade, the consumer rights movement, with growing support in Washington, 
solidified these varied critiques of advertising and forced government officials to take a 
hard look at the U.S. Federal Trade Commission—the agency responsible for regulating 
the advertising industry and unfair trade practices.  
 In many ways, the dramatic changes to consumer society during the post-war 
years set the stage for a backlash. The advertising industry blossomed after the Second 
World War, when manufacturers transitioned from defense manufacturing and began to 
produce a number of new consumer goods, ranging from automobiles to frozen foods.62 
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By looking at how consumer-based economy came to be viewed as part of American 
citizenship, Lizabeth Cohen describes ways in which the post-war era was unlike any 
other period in American history—consumption was embraced with seemingly no 
limitation. Consumer culture changed the entire physical, social, and political landscape 
in the United States: shopping malls replaced town squares and marketers divided people 
into profitable yet divisive segments along gender, race, and class lines.63 Television 
advertising revenues soared in the 1950s, bringing more and more advertising into the 
American home. By 1960, television had become the primary medium for national 
advertising, and revenues reached $1.5 billion. To maintain viewers’ focus, many 
television commercials used a repetitive hard-sell formula, and the onslaught of 
aggressive advertising had saturated the medium by 1960. Because of demographic and 
cultural shifts during the post-war era, the target market for advertisers during the 1960s 
was increasingly younger, better educated, and more affluent. 64  
Advertising and the Creative Revolution 
During the 1960s, advertisers began to solve the problem of clutter and at once appeal to 
the youth market by changing advertising strategies. Julian Sivulka comments that these 
changes resulted in “collages, psychedelic images, pop art blowups, and camp art 
parodies to sell everything from cars to catsup.”65 As advertising agencies began to use 
more innovative strategies, they also began to hire more young professionals from liberal 
arts backgrounds who were often sympathetic to the counterculture movement of the 
1960s. Thomas Frank argues that advertisers and business leaders embraced 
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countercultural elements in advertising messages and this helped to spur the creative 
revolution in the business world, leaving permanent changes in the advertising industry.66 
Bill Bernbach, a copyrighter at the agency DDB in New York, is credited with having 
launched the creative revolution in advertising in 1960 with a print ad for the 
Volkswagen Beetle. In stark contrast to the busy hard-sell ads for overly elaborate cars in 
the 1950s, the ad was filled with mostly blank space and featured a diminutive image of 
the car in the corner under the headline “Think Small.” These changes proved to be 
enormously profitable for the industry—advertising revenues in the first half of the 1960s 
were increasing about 5 percent a year. In 1964, advertising revenues rose to a record 
breaking $13.9 billion from $12.9 billion the previous year. In 1965, advertising revenues 
reached $14.7 billion, over 2 percent of the national GDP.67  
 While the ad industry enjoyed unprecedented financial prosperity, the new 
generation of young advertising professionals took liberties in speaking out on 
controversial issues, many of them wholeheartedly joining the countercultural movement. 
More than the new design ethic in advertising, advertisers’ embrace of the countercultural 
revolution is best epitomized by their active involvement in protesting the Vietnam War. 
Young professionals from top advertising agencies formed the group Advertising People 
Against the War (APAG) in 1969 after Nixon first sent troops to Cambodia. Top talent 
from major U.S. agencies, including Bill Bernbach of the Volkswagen “think small” 
campaign, worked during spare time to create eleven print ads and seven commercials.68 
Several agencies supplied materials on a volunteer basis, and funds were raised to run the 
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ads from antiwar organizations and several Democratic senators.69 One television 
commercial created by APAG portrayed a group of young boys playing in a field while 
an announcer reminded viewers that if the war continued, the boys could be one day 
fighting in it. Another print newspaper ad featured a photo of a flag-draped coffin below 
the headline “IT’S TOO HEAVY FOR ONE MAN TO CARRY.” Robert Colodizin, a 
member of the group, said their goal was to dispel the “great myth” that “only some 
Eastern radicals and long haired-kids are against the war.”70  
 Other advertising professionals aided the antiwar group called “UNSELL,” which 
was initiated by Ira Nerken, a 20-year-old undergraduate at Yale. With the help of agency 
president David McCall, the group created 125 posters, 33 television commercials, and 
31 radio spots. Those coordinating the effort estimated that over $1 million in time and 
expenses were donated in the first stage of the campaign.71 Among the most controversial 
ads featured Uncle Sam serving a pie to a black man, an elderly white woman, a white 
man in a hard hat, and a soldier.72 The soldier received three-quarters of the pie, while the 
others only a received a sliver. After the divvying was complete, the announcer said: 
Most of your taxes go to pay for wars, past, present, and future. What does 
your money buy? It buys you Vietnam. And inflation, unemployment, 
disunity and death. It buys you bombs instead of schools, defoliation 
instead of clean air and water, tanks instead of trains and destroys homes 
instead of building them. Isn’t it time we got out of their country and back 
to ours?73 
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The group sent letters to over 8,000 media outlets, asking for free time “just as the 
Advertising Council does in cases of voluntary projects.”74 The letter was signed by 
heads of top agencies, including James L. McCaffey, Maxwell Dane, Edward Ney, and 
Robert S. Marker. Other members of the business community formed the group Business 
Executives Move for Vietnam Peace and ran weekly antiwar ads featuring the week’s 
latest casualties in major newspapers. In 1969, the group vowed to continue running the 
ads as long as the U.S. was involved in the war.75 
Consumer Culture and its Critics 
 Advertisers’ endorsement of the youth revolution was overtly articulated by their 
involvement in antiwar activism and tacitly reflected by changes to advertising styles and 
strategies. Although the advertising industry embraced some elements of the youth-led 
cultural revolution, the feelings, by and large, were not mutual. Criticism of consumer 
society came from a variety of social movements in the 1960s, including environmental, 
civil rights, educational broadcasting, and organized labor. These broader movements 
offered critiques of advertising based on its tendency to saturate the media system, 
promote negative stereotypes, exploit materialistic values, and contribute to 
environmental degradation. Advertisers adapted to many of these concerns during the 
1960s, while others, by the end of the decade, continued to loom. 
 
The Mass Society Critique 
 As early as 1957, Vance Packard’s bestselling tell-all Hidden Persuaders 
encapsulated the core of the mass society critique. Packard exposed the unpalatable 
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techniques used by marketing researchers during the post-war era. These methods were 
inherently immoral to Packard because they preyed on consumers’ fears of inadequacy 
and acquisitive desire for status and wealth. His later book, The Waste Makers, lamented 
the throwaway culture created by planned obsolescence, which accelerated the plunder of 
natural resources. Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962)—the book often credited for 
spawning the modern environmental movement—also questioned the ecological costs the 
throwaway society promoted by advertising. The 1950s car culture, with its constantly 
changing styles, was a prime example of the planned obsolescence and excessiveness of 
the 1950s. Herbert Marcuse took the big three automakers to task in his book One 
Dimensional Man, contrasting the car’s “beauty, shininess, power, and convenience” in 
to its tendency to “deteriorate and need repair… its beauty and surface are cheap, its 
power unnecessary, its size idiotic.”76  
 The creative revolution in advertising was in many ways a response to the mass 
society critique. According to Thomas Frank,  
Marcuse might well have been writing copy for a Volkswagen ad. 
Although Volkswagen, no doubt, wanted consumers to experience a 
“rather pleasant feeling,” their ads aimed to push the “tension between 
appearance and reality” to the point of breaking a bond between 
Americans and the Big Three, steering consumers toward what they 
repeatedly described as a “better car . . . made for less money.” 
 
Because of the success of the Volkswagen campaign, other firms followed suit by 
jumping on the “think small” bandwagon. In 1970, Honda rearticulated the “keeping up 
with the Joneses” cliché with the headline “Onedownmanship” for its small coupe.77 
These anti-status-symbol strategies resonated with the environmental movement’s 
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concern with pollution and energy consumption. Advertisers also used less subtle 
strategies by using environmentalist messages in a new type of “eco-advertising.”78  In 
1969, utility companies spent $300 million on advertising, more than eight times the 
amount on pollution research. Madison Avenue’s attempt to greenwash its clients would 
come under intense scrutiny a few years later during the 1970s.79  
The Feminist Critique 
 Bestselling exposés about problems with consumer society also came from the 
feminist movement.80 In 1963, Betty Freidan’s The Feminine Mystique charged the 
advertising industry with exploiting women by 
diverting her guilt and disguising her growing emptiness. They have done 
this so successfully, employing the techniques and concepts of modern 
social science, and transposing them into those deceptively simple, clever, 
outrageous ads and commercials, that an observer of the American scene 
today accepts as fact that the great majority of American women have no 
ambition other than to be housewives. If they are not responsible for 
sending women home, they are surely responsible for keeping them 
there.81 
 
Freidan’s account gave momentum to the feminist movement’s critique of sexist 
stereotypes in advertising. The National Organization for Women gained national 
attention for the issue by staging sit-ins in the New York editorial offices of The Ladies’ 
Home Journal and disrupting annual stockholder’s meeting at CBS. In a meeting with ad 
agencies, Gloria Steinem remarked, “40 percent of all our subcultural intake comes from 
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advertising.”82 Women attempted to call attention to sexist stereotypes in advertising by 
placing stickers on publicly placed ads that said “This Ad Insults Women” and “This 
Exploits Women.”83 Ad agencies mostly dismissed the feminist movement’s outcry in the 
early years in the early 1960s, but near the end of the decade, advertisers took measures 
to avoid sexism by using agency checklists and hiring more female copyrighters. As a 
result of these internal measures, ads began to portray women in powerful managerial 
roles. Although many of these changes were inspired by the feminist movement, they 
also made economic sense because women were viewed by advertisers as the primary 
purchasers of household goods.84 
The Civil Rights Critique 
 The civil rights movement provided a model for ways to get direct government 
support though the creation of public interest legal teams like the NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund, which would fund important cases like Brown v. Board of Education. These public 
interest legal teams would serve as models for similar groups organized by the consumer 
movement. 85 The civil rights movement, itself, was critical of advertising’s role in 
promoting stereotypes. According to Julian Sivulka, more than any other force, “the civil 
rights movement enlightened the nation and led to more cultural diversity throughout the 
advertising industry.”86 In 1963, The Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) focused its 
attention on the lack of representation of African Americans in television commercials. 
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CORE threatened boycotts and organized a rally in Harlem, offering a silver dollar to 
each person in the crowd for every African American who appeared on screen. CORE 
was successful in convincing several advertisers to feature African Americans in several 
of their commercials, and their movement resulted in more diversity in television 
advertising and programming. The movement also successfully pressured companies to 
stop using unflattering stereotypes in advertising icons, such as Frito Bandito, Chinese 
Cherry, and Injun Orange.87  As advertisers began to make more specific appeals to target 
audiences, they conducted research on how best to appeal to the “black consumer.”88 
Thus, removals of these stereotypes were profitable concessions by the industry. 
 The complaints about the ad industry from the civil rights movement went well 
beyond issues of racial stereotypes in advertising. David Caplovitz’s book The Poor Pay 
More (1963) illuminated commercial exploitation in inner-city neighborhoods. Beginning 
in 1964, hundreds of thousands of African Americans staged protests throughout the 
nation in reaction to various commercial abuses, including high prices and credit interest 
rates, exploitative installment contracts, and fraudulent advertising.89 Pillsbury Co. 
responded to criticism by promoting enriched flour to combat malnutrition in inner-city 
African American neighborhoods, but this did little to address the totality of commercial 
abuses against the poor.90 In sharp contrast to criticism of advertising’s content, the 
movement’s more structural critique about the inherent inequalities of consumer society 
were not as easily addressed by tweaking advertising messages. 
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The Labor Movement 
 More than any other political force, the labor movement helped bolster consumer 
activism by institutionalizing consumer rights in Washington. Former FTC chair Michael 
Pertschuk comments that organized labor, “as the strongest organized political forced 
constituency” and dominant “source of campaign financing,” could, by the 1960s, turn 
“confidently to the pursuit of social welfare and consumer issues.”91 Since the 1930s, the 
labor movement had made significant strides in improving the workplace and promoting 
political candidates who were sympathetic to the labor movement’s cause. With relative 
security in wages and working conditions, the labor movement turned its attention to the 
need to improve the marketplace. David Vogel writes that “in the three decades following 
the New Deal, trade unions had represented the most important organized opposition to 
business” and had played “a critical role in the enactment of consumer-protection 
legislation during the 1960s.”92 Many unions began to create their own consumer 
information programs, and in May of 1965, the AFL-CIO organized a national 
conference in Washington, D.C., entitled “The Worker Is a Consumer.”93  
 The consumer movement was bolstered by the broader goals of Johnson’s Great 
Society Program. Historian Michael Katz argued that the new type of social democracy 
instigated by the Great Society program “launched a new generation of leaders in 
government and social service.” During the 1960s, government’s role changed: It assisted 
the poor, lifting them out of poverty; guaranteed food and healthcare; and reinforced 
government’s active role in preserving civil rights. These changes together, according to 
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Katz, pointed “unequivocally in at least one direction: the federal government has the 
resources and the administrative capacity with which to stimulate and sustain progressive 
social change.”94 
The Educational Broadcasting Movement 
 Propelled by broader criticism of commercialization and the principles of the 
Great Society program, government regulators began to grapple with ways to create 
noncommercial spaces in the advertising-saturated media landscape. Establishing a viable 
noncommercial media system dominated the media policy agenda in the last few years of 
the 1960s.95 Educational television was aligned with President Johnson’s Great Society 
programs, and Johnson, working with members of the U.S. Senate, led the charge to 
provide federal funds to public broadcasting with the National Defense Education Act of 
1958. With support from the Carnegie Foundation, the Educational Television Stations 
(ETS) held a conference in 1964 to launch a commission to study the potential for public 
broadcasting, and ETS was to report its findings to President Johnson. After a year of 
studying and reporting on the issue, the report titled “Public Television: A Program for 
Action” (1967) was given to Johnson, who endorsed many of the report’s 
recommendations.  
        The educational broadcasting community was so captivated with the possibility of 
public broadcasting that reformers ignored some of the potential obstacles faced by 
noncommercial educational media.96 Some of the report’s recommendations were 
watered down or sidestepped entirely. For one, lawmakers adopted language that was 
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supportive of the current system of commercial media supported by advertising, and did 
not maintain recommendations that would have made noncommercial media more viable. 
In the final act, there was no mechanism included to guarantee funding and, as a result, 
public broadcasting continues to struggle for its continued existence.97 
 In November of 1967, Lyndon Johnson signed the Public Broadcasting Act into 
law as section 386 of the Communications Act. This marked the first federal mandate to 
encourage public broadcasting through the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB).98 
Johnson celebrated the law, and referred to the CPB as “carefully guarded from 
Government or from party control. It will be free, it will be independent—and it will 
belong to all our people.” From our vantage point today, Johnson’s statement seems 
remarkably naive. Nonetheless, the creation of the CPB was unprecedented, and reveals 
the growing discontent with the commercial media system in the 1960s. Robert K. Avery 
comments, “when viewed through the forty-year filters of ever increasing 
commercialization of everyday life, ever-growing mass media concentration, and the 
continued deregulation of the communications industries, one cannot help but be amazed 
that the legislation—flawed or shortsighted as it might have been—ever made it into law 
at all.”99 Despite the regulatory success of the Public Broadcasting Act, it did not 
fundamentally challenge systemic problems with the consumer society and advertising, 
especially advertising directed to children. New consumer rights entrepreneurs, dedicated 
to quality educational broadcasting, began to call attention to problems associated with 
advertising to children. 
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Action for Children’s Television 
 The three networks began to concentrate children’s programming on Saturday 
morning during the 1960s, which resulted in more time devoted to commercials along 
with more aggressive hard-sell tactics. During the late-1960s, researchers, through the 
direction of Congress, began to study the effects of television violence. Although the 
main objective was not to study the effects of television advertising, the findings showed 
that children under the age of 8 had difficulty distinguishing programming from 
commercials, and did not understand the persuasive intent of commercials.100 In 1968, 
four women—Lillian Ambrosino, Judith Chalfen, Peggy Charren, and Evelyn Sarson—
organized a new group, Action for Children’s Television (ACT). The women watched the 
show Romper Room for one month and kept track of the time devoted to commercials. 
They found that broadcasters devoted over 50 percent of the broadcast time to 
commercials, and many ads promoted toys that were used in the show. ACT made 
headlines in 1969 when it staged pickets outside of CBS affiliates in Boston to pressure 
the station to devote more time to educational programming. Although the movement 
was initially concerned with promoting noncommercial educational programming, it 
brought attention to the issue of excessive advertising directed at children, and public 
debate over advertising to children would continue throughout the decade.101 
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The Broader Consumer Movement Gains Credibility in Washington 
 The wide-ranging critiques of consumer society contributed to the number of 
government officials supportive to the consumer rights movement in the 1960s. Mike 
Pertschuk has recounted his experience as a congressional staffer during the 1960s. 
According to Pertschuk, the early success of the consumer movement depended on the 
political climate of the early 1960s as a “fertile seedbed for the nourishment of consumer 
entrepreneurial politics.”102 Other progressive movements—labor, civil rights, and 
environmental—were strong, and big business was on the defensive side of the larger 
political debate. For the consumer movement’s success, Pertschuk credits strong 
consumer activists in the House and Senate, supportive journalists, a strong labor 
movement, and activists like Ralph Nader. The media helped reinforce the consumer 
movement’s cause. Pertschuk recalled that during his time as a staffer, “I could safely 
assume that virtually any national reporter assigned to cover the story of some piece of 
legislation or other would be unabashedly sympathetic with the aims of the 
legislation.”103 With the aid of sympathetic media coverage, the consumer rights coalition 
helped establish consumer rights in Washington during the 1960s.  
 During his campaign for presidency, Kennedy promised to institute a national 
consumer advisory board in the White House. Shortly after his inauguration in 1961, 
Kennedy wrote a letter to the Consumer’s Union praising the group for its product testing 
services and its “significant role in expanding the horizons of an informed public.”104 In 
1962, Kennedy delivered the first presidential address to Congress on consumer rights, a 
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ritual continued by Johnson and Nixon.105 Kennedy fulfilled his campaign promise and 
created the Consumer Advisory Council (CAC), and Lyndon Johnson continued to 
support Kennedy’s policies. Johnson referred to the contrast between the relatively low 
cost to taxpayers versus the savings for consumers “in dollars, in safety, and in peace of 
mind.”106 Johnson appointed Ester Peterson as his consumer spokesperson in the White 
House, and in his first consumer message to Congress, he continued to reiterate the 
importance of consumer regulations initiated by Kennedy: truth in packaging, truth in 
lending, new laws for cosmetics, and a stronger FTC.107 
 Consumer groups, however, felt betrayed in 1967 when Johnson replaced 
Peterson with television actress Betty Furness. During the 1950s, Furness had performed 
on the daytime television series Studio One to promote Westinghouse products. It seemed 
unlikely to consumer groups that an advertising icon could adequately represent 
consumers in the White House. In an interview with Advertising Age, Furness assured 
consumers that “If Lyndon Johnson intended to drop consumerism, he would not have 
given the job to someone with so much visibility.”108  Furness described consumer 
activism in the late 1960s as 
Growing more and more suspicious and more and more questioning. The 
myth that just because a product is on the market it has been tested and 
proved safe and okay has been exploded. Trapped by inflation and a 
growing awareness of pollution both personal and environmental, people 
are beginning to demand that the rules in the consumer game change. The 
consumer game is a game everybody plays whether they want to or not.109 
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In 1967, Johnson signed his first consumer protection bill into law: an obscure bill that 
created a commission to study product safety. Johnson arranged to sign the bill with TV 
cameras and well-known progressives like Upton Sinclair. As he signed it, he avowed, 
“This is the first consumer bill I have signed this year, it should be the twelfth.”110 One 
year later, members of the Consumer’s Union organized the Consumer Federation of 
America, which would serve as the larger umbrella organization for labor and other 
consumer interest groups, and it became “the hub of expansion in the consumer 
movement.”111  
 Senator Warren G. Magnuson, a Democrat from Washington, was an outspoken 
advocate of consumer rights in Congress. In 1968 he published the book The Dark Side of 
the Marketplace, illuminating the many plights faced by the American consumer. The 
book was most passionate about the commercial abuses against the poor: 
When the law lags behind the needs of society, we can expect some ugly 
consequences. And in the area of consumer protection, the evils of 
allowing legalized thievery to flourish are nowhere more strikingly 
evident than among the poor, especially minority groups in the ghettos. 
The exploitation of these people by unscrupulous local merchants and fly-
by-night operators is one of the silent shames of our country.112 
 
 
Mary Gardiner Jones, the commissioner to the Federal Trade Commission in 1968, 
shared many of Magnuson’s concerns, blaming advertising for keeping “poverty-stricken 
citizens” continually in debt with “constant urgings to buy now and pay later, with no 
money down or low weekly payments.”113 In December of 1968, under Jones’s 
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leadership, the FTC conducted nine days of hearings on ways to strengthen the FTC’s 
consumer protection programs with particular emphasis on minorities and the poor. That 
same year, the commission developed enforcement programs for fraudulent selling 
practices in inner city neighborhoods.114 Despite these efforts, the FTC was widely 
regarded as an ineffective agency. Ralph Nader, the intellectual and political leader of the 
consumer movement, would help to change this through his investigative work on the 
FTC. 
Ralph Nader and the Public Interest Movement 
 In 1965, Ralph Nader solidified the consumer movement’s various critiques of 
consumer society with the publishing of his bestselling expose Unsafe at Any Speed. The 
book quickly became a bestseller after it was featured on the front page of the New York 
Times. Although the book was polemical and vehement, it was thorough and well 
documented, and thus lent public credibility to the consumer movement’s cause. Within a 
year, Congress passed the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, calling Nader 
as a witness. In 1966, Washington Post reporter Morton Mintz broke a story that 
detectives hired by GM were stalking Nader. Nader sued GM for the incident, and he 
used the $450,000 settlement to establish the Center for the Study of Responsive Law in 
1969.115 The law team hired by Nader, termed “Nader’s Raiders,” would choose the FTC 
as its first raid.  
By the end of the 1960s, Nader had assembled broad support by what David 
Vogel refers to as a dual determination: “criticizing the irresponsibility of those who had 
abused their power and authority and calling upon the public to demand that they be held 
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accountable.”116 In 1967, Nader was present at Johnson’s signing ceremony for his first 
piece of consumer legislation. Upton Sinclair, Nader’s childhood hero, was also present. 
Nader said to Sinclair “we’re continuing your work,” to which Sinclair replied, “I see that 
you are, keep watching them.”117 Nader certainly did, but he went beyond what the 
muckraking journalists had accomplished during the Progressive Era by connecting 
consumer activism to direct forms of political action. Michael Pertschuk recalled Ralph 
Nader’s maverick-like influence on consumer politics: 
More than an investigator and scholar, drawing upon, but transcending, his 
lawyer skills, he was an advocate skilled at seizing the symbols of the 
debate—not a traditional advocate but one finely attuned to the uses and 
the needs of the media: the beats, the deadlines, and the need for fresh 
“copy,” for conflict, for heroism if available, but certainly for villainy, 
and, above all, for clarity and simplicity. . . . For a very broad segment of 
the U.S. public, his [contribution] has been the voice and persona of a 
contemporary Old Testament prophet, not a political radical, but like 
prophets, deeply conservative, calling society to account for its drift from 
its own professed morality.118 
  
 Nader was indeed widely popular among broad segments of the U.S. population, 
so much so that he was even praised by business leaders. The Chamber of Commerce 
named Ralph Nader among its list of “outstanding young men.” By 1967, the Chamber 
launched a program to initiate a series of local meetings between businesses and 
consumers to address areas of consumer discontent. In 1969, Winston H. Picket, the head 
of General Electric’s associate council, admitted that because of Nader’s work, 
“businessmen are taking consumerism very seriously and addressing themselves to it on a 
systematic and continuous basis.”119 Republicans and Democrats alike scrambled to show 
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their support for Nader and the consumer cause. The Democratic Study Group, an 
alliance of Democratic members of Congress, released a list of thirty proposed pieces of 
legislation for consumer protection, including vamping up laws for product safety, 
packaging and labeling, consumer credit, and insurance. Congressional staffers were 
making careers of consumer protection by drafting consumer protection bills and 
incorporating consumer rights into reelection strategies.120  
 For most of the 1960s and 1970s, Ralph Nader threw his support behind the 
creation of a Consumer Protection Agency (CPA) in Washington. Between 1962 and 
1972, versions of a bill to establish a CPA passed the House and the Senate five times, 
but it did not reach the president’s desk.121 Nader supported the CPA to establish 
government standards for product safety and to create more transparency in the 
marketplace, but his views on advertising were far from radical. In an interview with 
Advertising Age, Nader praised advertising as “critical to a free market system.” His 
objection was mainly with the type of advertising that “withholds vital information” and 
“deceives the consumer.”122  
 On the surface, Nader’s concern with the advertising’s failure to provide 
information seemed relatively mild. But in reality, very few ads actually provided 
tangible product information, especially in those markets where products were relatively 
nondistinct. Advertising had used ambiguous strategies since the 1920s, and these tactics 
increased during the 1960s when advertisers developed new creative strategies by using 
more images and less copy about price and product attributes. As the consumer 
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movement continued to gain traction in Washington around the issue of product safety 
and efficacy, some elements of American society were calling attention to more structural 
issues, including advertising in concentrated oligopolistic markets. 
Advertising and Monopoly Power 
 
 As people consumed more and more consumer products during the post-war era, 
the companies producing those brands grew more and more concentrated. The decade of 
the 1960s had the highest rate of mergers in American history. In 1965, there were 219 
mergers in the manufacturing sector. By 1968, there were 2,407 mergers. Business had 
engaged in horizontal and vertical mergers since the Industrial Revolution, but in the 
1960s, merger activity was more constituted by conglomeration—the consolidation of 
seemingly unrelated firms. Conglomeration represented 12 percent of merger activity in 
1960 and grew to 39 percent by 1970. During this period, the total profits of the nine 
largest conglomerates increased from slightly over $2 billion to almost $17 billion.123  
 Because of the increase in advertising and the decrease in the number of firms that 
advertised on a national scale, articles attending to advertising’s impact on the economy 
began appearing more frequently in academic journals during the post-war period.124 One 
view was referred to as “Advertising = Monopoly Power” was largely an outgrowth of 
the earlier work by Henry Simons from the University of Chicago School of Economics. 
As far back as 1948, Simons wrote “a major barrier to really competitive enterprise and 
efficient service to consumers is to be found in advertising—in national advertising 
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especially, and in sales organizations which cover great national and regional areas.”125 
The Advertising = Monopoly Power view was supported by a number of studies showing 
concomitancy between heavy concentration and high rates of return in industries with 
high levels of advertising.126 
 This anticompetitive effect of high-volume advertising was axiomatic, but the 
question remained: How does advertising operate in concentrated markets?  In 1958, 
University of California Economist Joe S. Bain published a study in The Journal of 
Marketing discussing the promotional advances of firms in concentrated markets through 
the mechanism of product differentiation. Because of the tendency for firms to promote 
similar products as distinct, Bain outlined policy solutions to regulate the advertising 
content:  
With unrestricted promotional effort, as at present, the pattern of 
promotional advantages of large firms supports and perpetuates high 
concentration even in the face of substantial growth of markets; this 
probably would not be so in an important degree if the bases of product 
differentiation were altered. In general, in these product-differentiated 
oligopolies, an effective and economical deconcentration policy would 
probably require some fundamental attack on the bases of contemporary 
product differentiation and sales promotion.127 
 
Baran and Sweezy, in their 1966 publication Monopoly Capitalism, described how firms 
in concentrated markets compete by “exercis[ing] powerful influence upon the market for 
their output by establishing and maintaining pronounced differences between their 
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products and those of their competitors.”128 Rather than engage in price competition, 
advertising maintains differentiation for existing products in oligopoly markets. 
 These views did not just linger in the ivory tower; government officials during the 
1960s were beginning to rely more on the monopoly view of advertising and 
competition.129 President Johnson appointed as U.S. Attorney General Donald F. Turner, 
a well-known economist and antitrust lawyer. In 1966, Turner made a speech before a 
conference on federal controls and blamed advertising for creating barriers to entry and 
conveyed his support for the use of advertising budgets in merger decisions.130 Turner 
held the advertising industry responsible for contributing to “high monopolistic prices” 
and launched antitrust investigations into several industries, including chemical, 
electronics, and soap and detergents.131 The investigation into the influence of heavy 
national advertising on market power in the soap and detergent industries inspired the 
FTC to dissolve a merger between Proctor and Gamble and Clorox. The FTC grappled 
with how Clorox was able to achieve its overwhelming share of market power because  
Clorox is not sold to the consumer at a lower price than other bleaches; on 
the contrary it is sold as a premium brand that commonly sells for several 
cents per quart more than regional, local, or private brands. Nor is Clorox 
a better bleach than other brands; all liquid bleaches are chemically 
identical.132 
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 The explanation for Clorox’s share, according to the FTC, lay “in the way in 
which household liquid bleach is marketed.” Using Professor Bain’s studies, the FTC 
reasoned that the heavy rates of advertising for both Proctor and Gamble ($80 million) 
and Clorox ($3.7 million) would create significant barriers to entry for competing 
products.133  The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the FTC’s reasoning in the case.134 
Although the FTC used this reasoning for the first time to prevent mergers, it did not 
apply the monopoly theory for consumer protection or advertising regulation. The 
prominence of this theory in economics, as well as signs that this view was beginning to 
be accepted by political leaders, was an ominous sign for advertisers. 
Alarm Bells for Advertisers  
 
 Compared to the ease with which advertisers had assimilated objections with 
problems of representation in advertising, more structural concerns were not easily 
addressed. Probing questions about advertising’s larger societal and economic role 
troubled advertisers. Major advertisers were the first among businesses to open up 
Washington offices following the establishment of the consumer rights coalition during 
the Kennedy years. Bryce Harlow helped to pave the roads of this migration. Harlow had 
been a close aide to President Eisenhower and knew the ins and outs of government. 
When Kennedy was elected, Harlow moved into the private sector to work as the 
congressional liaison for the nation’s biggest advertiser, Proctor and Gamble. Prior to the 
late 1960s, Proctor and Gamble “only observed and reported back what was happening 
on the federal level.” Under Harlow this changed, and by 1968 he was known as the 
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“dean of corporate representation” on Capitol Hill.135 Harlow was concerned with the lack 
of unity among businesses during the 1960s. In a speech in front of major manufacturers 
in 1965, Harlow referred to “our problem of unity” because of the ways in which 
businesses had advocated for “self serving deals” but “cynically scuttle others.”136 Harlow 
hoped that  
all of us may work toward that end with all whom we serve. Then we shall 
be doing what we should, each of us collectively, not simply to serve our 
own principals and ourselves, but more importantly, to serve our country 
by keeping what is really “great”—human freedom and limited 
government.137 
 
In January of 1967, approximately 400 members of the American Advertising Federation 
(AAF) met in Washington to discuss the growing discontent with their industry.138 
Attorney General Donald Turner spoke at the conference, and was introduced to the 
group as the man who gives “admen indigestion and apoplexy.” Turner’s speech to the 
AAF was relatively mild, and he dispelled myths that the Justice Department would limit 
amounts companies can spend on advertising, and instead focused on the tendency for 
some advertising to serve as a “negative benefit to the consumer.”139 
 Despite Turner’s assurance, his criticisms of the industry were wide-ranging. For 
Turner, advertising was guilty of two offenses. First, it “materially interfered with 
effective competition in a number of consumer goods markets”; and second, it failed to 
“provide consumers with anywhere near the kind of information they need in order to 
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make intelligent choices among competing products.” Turner cited examples of 
advertising’s anticompetitive tendencies, such as the radical decline in small breweries 
compared to growth in large national brands of beer. To solve problems with 
advertising’s inclination to create barriers to entry and provide useful information, Turner 
proposed ways to develop new independent sources of information for consumers 
supported by substantial research funds.  
In 1967, Representative Benjamin Rosenthal had made similar proposals by 
pressing for legislation to establish a National Consumer Information Foundation (NCIF) 
to test products and provide tangible information for consumer goods. The Senate’s 
minority leader, Everett M. Dirkson, strongly opposed such standards, stating his plans to 
obstruct the legislation “so far as feeble power will enable me to stop it.”140  The 
President of the National Biscuit Co., who attended the convention, opposed the NCIF on 
the basis that it would “take the fun out of shopping,” especially for women who “love to 
shop and express their taste—often in a nonmathematical and intuitive way.”141  
Not all members of the advertising community were as defensive. E. B. Weiss, 
former senior vice president of Doyle Dane Bernbach and a columnist for Advertising 
Age, referred to advertising’s triple economic threat: (1) advertising was a wasteful 
expenditure that increases prices without offering values, (2) advertising gives companies 
an unfair competitive advantage, and (3) advertising for identical products represents a 
large percentage of the product’s overall costs.142 Weiss cautioned advertisers against an 
intransigent attitude because of the possibility that regulations could “set advertising back 
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for years.” Instead, Weiss called for a “posture that combines piety with unyielding 
confrontation.” 
 Advertising trade associations were well aware of the potential for government 
regulations because of ever-increasing criticisms of their industry. As a response, 
advertisers began to focus their attention on government regulators. In 1968, two top 
advertising trade organizations—the American Association of Advertising Agencies 
(4As) and the American Advertising Federation (AAF)—opened offices in Washington, 
D.C. Howard Bell, the president of AAF referred to the opening of Washington bureaus 
by advertising trade groups as merely a “precursor of an organization [in Washington] 
representing all advertising.”143 4As president William J. Colihan was responsible for 
creating the Washington outpost. By the end of the decade, Colihan was hopeful, and 
reassured his members that “we don’t seem to have any more trouble in Congress. I used 
to scout 10 bills. Now only one: the Consumer Protection Agency.”144 Similarly, Bell 
referred to the consumer movement as “a fad that will soon pass. Throughout history, 
consumerism has had a tremendous influence on business and government. The only 
thing new is the label.”145 Bryce Harlow of Proctor and Gamble knew better. In May of 
1967, he warned advertisers about the  
rising crescendo across America. It is being argued that, while advertising 
may induce people to buy, while it may elevate the aspirations and 
improve the tastes of the less privileged, while it may even stimulate 
economic activity, it unavoidably falls critically short, because it fails to 
enable the consumer to discriminate wisely among products.146 
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Harlow’s admonition was prescient. During the last few years of the 1960s, new public 
interest organizations began to put more and more pressure on government to regulate 
advertising. 
Banzhaf’s Bandits and Nader’s Raiders 
 As the ad industry grappled with how to respond to the mounting public 
antipathy, the consumer movement’s broader focus on problems associated with product 
safety and efficacy translated to a direct response to the advertising industry. Cigarette 
advertising served as a felicitous example of advertising’s worst offenses, and the anti-
smoking movement began to pressure government officials to regulate the promotion of 
cigarettes. Robert F. Kennedy joined the anti-smoking crusade wholeheartedly and 
emerged as a leader, pushing for warning labels and bans on sponsorships of professional 
sporting events. John F. Banzhaf III, a young law professor at George Washington 
University, formed a consumer activist group called Action for Smoking Health (ASH). 
Banzhaf’s group sponsored a petition to the FCC to pressure broadcasters to give free 
time to anti-smoking messages under the Fairness Doctrine.147 FCC commissioner 
Nicholas Johnson agreed with this proposal because cigarettes represented “a 
controversial case of public importance.”148 The application of the Fairness Doctrine to 
this issue meant that broadcasters had to show anti-smoking messages at their own 
expense, and as a result, there was an overall decline in smoking and an increase in anti-
smoking attitudes in general. This was the first time that the Fairness Doctrine had been 
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applied to commercial messages. Reformers weren’t satisfied with this policy and pushed 
on for an all-out ban, but some argued that reformers failed to realize the potential of 
anti-smoking messages. For vastly different reasons, the industry preferred a ban on 
cigarette advertising on television because the anti-smoking messages were hurting their 
sales; for broadcasters, the time allotted to anti-smoking messages was costly. Thus, in 
1969, tobacco companies announced that they would pull ads voluntarily and President 
Nixon signed the ban into law in 1970.149  
 Although the ban was in some ways a concession to tobacco companies and 
broadcasters, the removal of an entire product category from the airwaves was 
remarkable. The success of Banzhaf’s student-led advertising reform group in the 
cigarette case inspired Time magazine to refer to them as “Banzhaf’s Bandits.” Following 
the cigarette ban, Banzhaf continued to push the issue of corrective advertising, but 
focused on deceptive, rather than controversial, advertising strategies. Banzhaf recruited 
law students from his class to join the group TUBE (Termination of Unfair Broadcasting 
Excesses) to petition the FCC to suspend licenses for any station airing deceptive 
commercials.150 Disenchanted by the FCC, two other Banzhaf-inspired groups—SOUP 
(Students Opposed to Unfair Advertising Practices) and Students Against Misleading 
Enterprises (SAME)—appealed to the FTC. The group SAME honed in on “uniqueness 
claims” in industries where products were relatively nondistinct, including aspirin and 
bleach.151 Banzhaf’s group SOUP intervened in the FTC’s provisional acceptance of a 
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deceptive Campbell’s Soup advertisement. The company made the soup appear as if it 
had more vegetables by adding marbles.152 In a 3-2 vote, the FTC rejected Banzhaf’s 
proposal for Campbell’s to run corrective ads for its deceptive image.153 Banzhaf was 
unimpressed with the somnolent FTC and thought the agency should be eliminated 
altogether.  
 Ralph Nader would draw more attention to the corruption and lassitude within the 
agency. In September of 1968, Nader along with six of his Ivy League–educated 
“Nader’s Raiders” decided to investigate the inner workings of the FTC. While 
conducting the study, the raiders made several public statements about the FTC, 
including charges of insufficient funds and unqualified staff to investigate false 
advertising claims.154 The FTC’s chairman Paul Rand Dixon responded furiously to the 
investigations. He threatened to bar Nader’s investigators from the building and slammed 
the door on John Schulz, a 29-year-old lawyer involved in the study.155  Commissioner 
Phillip Elman, who had long been dissatisfied with the agency, was less bellicose: he 
gave Nader’s team office space and access to his files. Elman, unlike Dixon, was 
convinced that an analysis of the FTC would “arouse the public attention it had lacked for 
so long.”156 
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 After much controversy, the report was finally released on January 1, 1969, after 
Nader spent New Year’s Day persistently delivering copies of the report to Washington 
bureaus of newspapers and magazines with early deadlines.157 The report was scathing. It 
disparagingly referred the FTC the “little old lady of Pennsylvania Avenue” because of 
its tendency to be “manipulated by the agents of commercial predators, impervious to 
governmental and citizen monitoring.”158 Although the report pointed out the ways the 
agency was used opportunistically by both political parties, it was most critical of the 
Democrats in more recent years. Out of the 500 FTC lawyers, Nader’s report found that 
only 40 were Republicans.159 The Nader report was particularly vituperative about a 
chairman Paul Rand Dixon, one of Kennedy’s appointments. Nader recommended that 
Dixon “resign from the agency that he has so degraded and ossified.” Among other 
things, it accused Dixon of political cronyism and opportunism because he had  
faithfully denned agency contributions to the Democratic party, listened 
attentively to signals or calls from the White House, and assiduously 
cultivated powerful trade interests by disseminating the myths that most 
large businesses are honest and law abiding, that the problem is the few 
unscrupulous hucksters who give industry and hucksters a bad image.160  
 
 The report was peppered with unfavorable vignettes. It described one incident in 
which the assistant of the general council was found asleep on the office couch with his 
face covered by the sports section of the Washington Post, and alluded to excessive 
drinking among commissioners.161 More serious claims included information from an 
unpublished study of the FTC by the Civil Service Commission, which included 
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allegations that many of the FTC’s positions were duplicative and thus unnecessary. The 
Civil Service report called attention to the lack of minorities on the FTC. Dixon 
dismissed Nader’s report, referring to the young lawyers involved in the study as 
“pipsqueaks” and “squirts.”162 Even more damning was Dixon’s fanatical response to the 
accusations: “Are they talking about Jews? We’ve got Jews all over the place. Are they 
asking about black people? I’ll admit we haven’t enough, but we’re doing our damnedest 
to hire them.”163  
 The heart of the Nader Report was criticism of the agency’s regulatory track 
record—its protracted and haphazard processing of complaints, acceptance of business’s 
voluntary codes, and its kid-gloves treatment of major corporations. The best example of 
its preoccupation with trivia was the FTC’s picayune textile and furs division. Although 
consumer complains had risen from 6,399 in 1966 to 9,000 in 1969, the report found that 
investigations during those years fell from 1,557 to 561.164 And, rather than initiate major 
investigations based on consumer complaints, the report concluded that the FTC’s 
primary means for detection was to “wait for the virtuous businessman to inform on his 
wicked competitor.” 
 The report was most passionate about the subject of deceptive advertising by 
flatly accusing the FTC of refusing to prosecute for flagrant violations of the law. Some 
of these false and misleading advertising messages, according to the report, were “far 
more damaging to contemporary America than all of the depredations of street crime.” 165 
Some examples of false advertising claims included: detergent makers repackaging old 
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products as new, cigarette advertising headlines comparing smoking to “fresh air and 
cool mountain brooks,” and a dog food advertisement claiming that butchers were unable 
to differentiate between its brand of dog food and high-quality beef.166 Many statements 
about advertising deception were similar to earlier criticisms by the feminist and civil 
rights movements. The most conspicuous victims of deception, according to the report, 
were “the ghetto dweller whose home has just been lost to a fraudulent aluminum-siding 
swindle. . . . [and] the American housewife exploited by games, gimmicks, and deception 
who is in need of protection.”167 
 Though the report’s focus was agency malfeasance and indolence, it called 
attention to the structure of inequality within the U.S. economy. The agency’s long 
purpose to reign in the excess of business was more pressing in what Nader called the 
“new marketplace”—a “rise of the corporate state through the growth of conglomerates 
and shared monopolies into an oligopolistic structure.” This wave of concentration, 
according to the report, delivered new forms of deception like “contrived distinctions 
between identical products.” 168 
By solidifying many of the critiques of consumer society, the Nader report gave 
new hope and momentum for advertising reform. Shortly after the study was released, an 
article from The Nation reported that  
The Schulz-Nader report may signal the beginning of the rise of a new 
social ethic in the United States. A group of young lawyers and law 
professors, inspired by a successful crusader against the untrammeled evils 
of business, have here taken their social responsibilities seriously and put a 
negligent agency on the spot.169 
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Although several newspaper articles made analogies between Nader and Progressive Era 
muckrakers like Upton Sinclair, Ida Tarbell, and Lincoln Steffens, Nader was more than 
an investigative journalist. Nader and his followers considered themselves to be a part of 
a larger social justice mission to “stop the violence of man against man.” One of the law 
students who aided Nader’s study of the FTC used the word “jihad” to describe their 
staunch support of consumer safety.170 
 Analogies to holy war aside, Nader was not up against fierce popular opposition. 
The FTC report was released against the backdrop of broad public support for Nader and 
the consumer movement’s cause. In fact, many business leaders responded to Nader’s 
FTC report with mild admissions of culpability and the need for more responsible 
business practices.171 
 Richard Nixon was sworn into office a week after the Nader report was released, 
and he appeared to be supportive of Nader’s mission. In one of his first addresses to 
Congress, Nixon affirmed, “Consumerism—Upton Sinclair and Rachel Carson would be 
glad to know—is a healthy development that is here to stay.” He went on to propose to 
Congress a “Buyer’s Bill of Rights”: 
The buyer has the right to accurate information on which to make his free 
choice. The buyer has the right to expect that his health and safety is taken 
into account by those who seek his patronage. The buyer has the right to 
register his dissatisfaction, and have his complaint heard and weighed, 
when his interests are badly served. This “Buyer’s Bill of Rights” will 
help provide greater personal freedom for individuals as well as better 
business for everyone engaged in trade.172 
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Nader publicly praised Nixon’s plan, commenting that the buyers’ bill of rights “would 
not have been approved by William McKinley.”173 Although Nixon, during the election, 
assured Wall Street that he would put an end to the “heavy handed” regulation of the 
Kennedy and Johnson years, Nixon did more for consumer protection than his two 
Democratic predecessors.174 For instance, Virginia Knauer, Nixon’s first consumer 
adviser, outlined a bill to allow consumers to bring class-action lawsuits into federal 
courts. 
 The Nader report fell on many sympathetic ears in Washington, and Congress 
immediately initiated hearings on the FTC. Congress encouraged President Nixon to ask 
the American Bar Association to study the FTC, and Nixon complied with the 
recommendations.175 The ABA responded quickly to Nixon’s requests and released its 
report in September of 1969. The ABA report was less derisive in tone than Nader’s, but 
the ABA echoed the major findings from the Nader report by pointing out the ways in 
which the FTC had “mismanaged its own resources” and filled top-level staff positions 
with “insufficient competence.”176 The report concluded that: 
…drastic changes were essential to re-create the FTC in its intended 
image. The case for change is plain. What is required is that changes now 
be made and in depth. Further temporizing is indefensible. 
Notwithstanding the great potential of the FTC in the field of antitrust and 
consume protection, if change does not occur, there will be no substantial 
purpose to be served by its continued existence; the essential work to be 
done must then be carried on by other government institutions.177 
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 One member of the ABA’s team, Richard A. Posner, had dismal hope for the FTC 
and recommended that the agency be phased out of existence. The other fifteen members 
of the ABA commission were more hopeful, suggesting sweeping reforms and the 
immediate resignation of Paul Rand Dixon.178 Many consumer activists and their allies in 
Washington assumed that the ABA’s report to Nixon meant that the FTC’s days were 
numbered. John Banzhaf was more hopeful, and predicted that the “sleeping giant is 
awakened.”  
Conclusion 
Maintaining the FTC in its current state appeared to be the least viable option. But 
whether the FTC would be dissolved or revitalized was ultimately up to President Nixon. 
Nixon was ambivalent about adopting some of the consumer movement’s demands, 
particularly the creation of a Consumer Protection Agency, which was strongly opposed 
by business trade groups, many of whom supported Nixon’s election. Nixon, however, 
was no friend of the ad industry. The ad industry’s public attack on the Vietnam War 
likely created a rift between the ad industry and the president. Furthermore, by 
strengthening the existing FTC, Nixon could throw a bone to powerful consumer groups 
and at once avoid marginalizing businesses. By commissioning the ABA report, it was 
clear that Nixon did not intend not ignore Nader and the influential public interest 
coalitions who backed him.  
The countercultural movements of the 1960s provided a critique of advertising 
and consumer society during a period of prosperity for corporate America that included 
the largest wave of conglomerate mergers in American history and an extraordinary 
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period of growth for the ad industry. Although the ad industry adapted to some of its 
critics, the end of the 1960s was not the end of efforts to reform and restructure corporate 
America. Nader swiftly became an intellectual leader of a broader political movement to 
make big business more accountable to the public interest. Advertising was a visible 
portrait of the worst types of consumer abuses: it promoted dangerous products, deceived 
consumers, and prevented competition. With fame and popularity on his side, Nader 
raided the agency responsible for regulating advertising and preventing anticompetitive 
and unfair business practices. More than a probe into the FTC itself, Nader’s report 
exposed the ways in which advertising practices and the concentrated structure of the 
American economy were incompatible with the public interest. If the FTC were to 
capably attend to these complaints, the change in government’s regulatory role would be 
significant for both businesses and consumers. Nixon chose to preserve and revive the 



















CHAPTER 2: THE LITTLE OLD LADY HAS TEETH: THE FTC TARGETS 
THE ADVERTISING OLIGOPOLY COMPLEX, 1970–1973 
 
“Advertisers have been engaged in a business in which there has been virtually no 
regulation. For the 50 years of the Federal Trade Commission’s existence, they’ve had a 
free ride. We intend to change that.”179  —Robert Pitofsky, FTC Bureau of Consumer 
Protection 
 
 President Nixon took seriously the advice from the Nader and ABA reports. In his 
consumer message to Congress, Nixon stated: “the time has now come for a reactivation 
and revitalization of the FTC.”180 The FTC’s regulations during the three years following 
Nixon’s mandate were unprecedented in both number and scope. The FTC offered three 
significant changes for major industries. First, the FTC greatly increased the number of 
advertising deception complaints. In many of these cases, the FTC required advertisers to 
back up claims with evidence and instituted corrective advertising for consumer redress. 
Second, the FTC expanded the definitions of deception to include “puffery” and “implied 
uniqueness” of a particular brand or product. Finally, the FTC addressed the 
anticompetitive nature of “shared monopolies,” including the ways in which advertising 
in concentrated markets creates barriers to entry. In both its advertising and antitrust 
actions, the FTC during these few years would blaze new terrain for regulation of 
advertising and the American economy as whole. Some leaders in the business 
community saw the wave of government regulations as a threat to their hegemony and 
began to etch out a long-term plan for ideological success. But for the most part, these 
proposals were still on the margins. During the first few years of the 1970s, businesses 
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were acquiescent and uncertain about how to respond to the wave of FTC regulations, 
leaving open a distinct opportunity for far-reaching changes for the advertising industry 
and the broader U.S. economy. 
Although the initial revitalization was certainly appealing to consumer groups, it 
went largely unnoticed. Their ultimate goal was to pass legislation for a separate 
Consumer Protection Agency (CPA), and during the years between 1970 and 1973, it 
would almost make it out of Congress. Nader hoped that the new agency would oversee 
all other government agency activity, making government as whole more accountable to 
the public interest. Lizabeth Cohen writes that Nader hoped it would level “the playing 
field between consumers and corporate America.” The bill was endorsed by over 200 
consumer groups and had the support of organized labor.181 Because of its implications 
for consumer rights, broad support, and narrow passage, the battle to pass the CPA has 
been chronicled by a number of scholarly studies.182 Though the FTC during the early 
1970s did not have the power over other regulatory agencies, it was transformed into an 
agency that represented consumer and public interest groups. More than any other 
government agency, public interest group, or political leader, the FTC would force 
private companies to be more responsive to public concerns. 
The FTC Awakens 
 To create an effective consumer watchdog out of the FTC, both the Nader and 
ABA reports advised Nixon not to designate any FTC incumbents to chair the 
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commission.183 The ABA called for the appointment of an “outstanding chairman,” who, 
unlike Paul Rand Dixon, personified “sufficient strength and independence to resist 
pressures from Congress, the Executive Branch, or the business community that tend to 
cripple effective performance of the FTC.” To fulfill this lofty role, Nixon appointed 
Caspar Weinberger, a California lawyer and former aid to Governor Ronald Reagan as 
his Director of Finance. In a personal conversation at the White House, Nixon told 
Weinberger to “go in there and clean it up and you won’t have any trouble from me.”184 
Weinberger was well known for enthusiastically supporting Reagan’s fiscal policies, and 
because of his pro-industry background, many in the business community doubted that 
Weinberger would embody the characteristics of an effective leader as outlined by the 
ABA report.185 
 The confidence on behalf of businesses was shaken when Weinberger 
immediately began to “clean up the agency” by closing some 600 trivial investigations 
followed by zealous reorganization and restaffing.186 He filled many of the positions with 
young lawyers from prestigious law schools. By cutting away the dead wood, Weinberger 
hoped the FTC would finally serve its intended purpose: to regulate trade in the best 
interests of consumers. A headline from an Advertising Age article in 1970 proclaimed, 
“Marketers Who Staved Off Old FTC Now Find ‘Little Old Lady’ Has Teeth.”187 The 
Wall Street Journal colorfully observed: “The little old lady was languishing with a bad 
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case of tired blood. But a recent transfusion has the old gal kicking up her heels like a 
liberated woman.”188 In addition to a complete restaffing, Weinberger reorganized the 
FTC by creating two new divisions: the Bureau of Competition (to look into the ways in 
which industrial concentration affects pricing, competition, and advertising) and the 
Bureau of Consumer Protection (to study deceptive advertising).189 As the FTC 
transformation began to appear more and more in the headlines, it caught the attention of 
consumer groups. Although the passage of the CPA was the ultimate goal, the FTC was 
viewed as a small step for consumer rights. 
 To the surprise of these skeptics and the disappointment of many in the business 
community, Nixon replaced Weinberger with Miles W. Kirkpatrick, the same lawyer who 
had headed the ABA’s study of the FTC two years prior.190 Kirkpatrick promised to 
continue to revive the agency, but cautioned that his role would not represent an anti-
business vendetta. Although Kirkpatrick’s rhetoric embodied caution, his immediate 
course of action was radical, at least from the standpoint of major industries. Rather than 
become entangled in trivia (as the FTC had been accused of in Kirkpatrick’s own study), 
he pledged to target major industries because they “touch more consumers than minor 
industries do, and the more consumers the commission ultimately touches, the more we’ll 
be enforcing the law. . . . You don’t give traffic tickets when the bank is being robbed 
down the street.”191 Kirkpatrick continued to retire and restaff the FTC, replacing a third 
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of the middle- and lower-level staff.192 By 1971, Nearly 200 FTC staff members were 
fired and replaced by young attorneys from prestigious law schools, many of whom were 
passionately committed to progressive causes.193 Kirkpatrick maintained the two bureaus 
created by Weinberger, and appointed New York University Professor Robert Pitofsky as 
the director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection and Alan S. Ward as the director of the 
bureau of competition. For the FTC’s top staff position of executive director, Kirkpatrick 
took a different approach by choosing Basil Mezines, a twenty-year veteran of the 
FTC.194 Mezines had a reputation for chastening top FTC staffers for “giving the 
commission’s corporate victims a hard time,”195 but nonetheless, Pitofsky and Ward took 
on their roles as leaders of the two new bureaus with fervor. 
 Consumer advocates like Banzhaf had long been critical of the FTC’s protracted 
process of investigating false claims—investigations that often only resulted in cease-
and-desist orders along with a signed consent by the advertiser not to err in the future. 
Pitofsky offered change: “Advertisers have been engaged in a business in which there has 
been virtually no regulation. For the 50 years of the Federal Trade Commission’s 
existence, they’ve had a free ride. We intend to change that.”196 Under the leadership of 
Pitofsky, the Bureau of Consumer Protection took tougher steps to curb false advertising 
by immediately forcing the withdrawal of false ads and requiring advertisers to publicly 
confess.  
Expanding Definitions of Deception 
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  In early 1971, the FTC adopted provisional consent orders to forbid three leading 
detergent makers (Lever Brothers, Colgate-Palmolive, and Proctor and Gamble) from 
making any stain-removal claims for one year. The FTC also ordered the detergent 
makers to include a list of specific stains the product will not remove on all packaging. 
Although Proctor and Gamble had initially planned to contest the charges, the company 
eventually decided that “no useful purpose can be served by prolonging a controversy 
about the interpretation of this advertising.”197 
Two well-publicized cases of deceptive advertising taken up by the Bureau of 
Consumer Protection included the order for Coca-Cola to stop advertising its drink Hi-C 
as a nutritional drink rich in vitamin C,198 and for Standard Oil to bring to an end its 
promotion of Chevron F-310 gasoline as nonpolluting.199 As a settlement, the FTC 
requested that the companies prominently include the FTC’s findings in 25 percent of 
future ads for a twelve-month period.200 The FTC also targeted an infamous television 
commercial for DuPont’s brand of antifreeze called Zerex. The FTC took an 
unprecedented step with the Zerex case by threatening to order the product off the market 
if DuPont did not comply with the FTC’s orders.201 Initially, DuPont’s executives 
responded to the allegations with vehemence because the product made DuPont $23 
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million in 1970. Most damaging for DuPont was the press coverage about the FTC’s 
complaint against Zerex. Although the FTC eventually dropped the charges against the 
makers of Hi-C and Zerex, the damage to the brands was already done.202 The FTC’s 
press department submitted news releases and held press conferences about Zerex and 
other cases in which the FTC had reason to believe that the law had been violated.203 
Because of the negative publicity, companies had strong incentives to settle cases with 
the FTC rather than engage in drawn out legal battles.  
The FTC’s complaint against ITT Continental Baking Co. was the most 
significant case of deception taken up by the bureau in its first year.204 The company was 
found to have falsely implied the uniqueness of Wonder Bread by emphasizing its 
nutritional value in a series of ads with the headline “That’s how big I want to be.”205 
This was deceptive, the FTC reasoned, because most enriched loaves had the same 
nutritional value.206 What’s more, Continental ads claimed the brand Profile was lower in 
calories than ordinary bread, but failed to mention that the slight difference was due to its 
thinner slice. Continental was alarmed by the FTC’s complaint:  
It now appears that the FTC has adopted a new theory which would 
prohibit a company from advertising any of the qualities of its product 
unless they are unique. This would effectively rule out much of today’s 
advertising, including nutritional advertising, since few foods are unique. 
                                                
202 John Revett, “Hi-C Ads Lauded as FTC Judge Rule They Didn’t Mislead,” Advertising Age, 
October 2, 1972, 80.  
203 Gilbert Burck, “High-Pressure Consumerism at the Salesman’s Door,” Fortune, July 1972, 
92–94; Stanley Cohen, “This Week in Washington: FTC’s Industry Rules Not Perfect, but Better 
Than Lawsuit Legislation,” Advertising Age, September 4, 1972, 17.  
204 “How Big Does the FTC Want to Be?” Fortune, February 1972, 107; Ray O. Werner and 
Dorothy Cohen, “Regulation of Unfair Competition,” Journal of Marketing 36, no. 3 (July 1972): 
78–82; Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost, accessed November 26, 2011.  
205 U.S. Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of ITT Continental Company, Inc. 
(Washington, DC, 1979). 
206 U.S. Federal Trade Commission, News Summary (Washington, DC, April 1971).  
 80 
In effect, the FTC now proposes to punish Continental for violating a 
concept which has never been expressed as a rule of law.207 
Although the FTC had considered implied uniqueness deceptive prior to the 1970s,208 it 
had not previously targeted such claims in entire industry segments, and advertisers were 
wise to be concerned about its wider implications. This concern was shared by University 
of Chicago Economics Professor Yale Brozen, a well-known critic of the FTC. In 
speeches presented to advertising trade groups, Brozen accused the FTC of broadening its 
definition of false and misleading to include a new “implied uniqueness doctrine.”209 
Barron’s purchased full-page ads in the New York Times with excerpts from Brozen’s 
vitriolic speech and distributed 35,000 copies of the text.210 After the release, the New 
York Times reported that Brozen was a paid consultant for public relations agency 
Harshe-Rotman and Druck, the same PR agency representing ITT Continental Baking 
Co.211 Despite his ties to the industry, Brozen correctly observed that the case against 
Continental signified a change in existing antitrust laws. If the so-called implied 
uniqueness doctrine applied to other product categories, it could potentially threaten the 
key advertising strategy in most concentrated markets with relatively nondistinct 
products. Although the Bureau of Consumer Protection was not explicitly targeting 
industrial concentration, it was essentially targeting product differentiation, a common 
advertising strategy. This tactic is perhaps best epitomized by legendary 1960s adman 
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Rosser Reeves, who is well known for holding up two identical shiny silver dollars while 
telling his copyrighters: “Never forget that your job is very simple. It is to make people 
think the silver dollar in my left hand is much more desirable than the silver dollar in my 
right hand.”212 Pitofsky cut to the core of this type of advertising when he said, “If the 
product had nothing going on for it but its advertising, if it is just a figment of its 
advertising manager’s imagination, I see no reason for its continued 
existence.”213Although Pitofsky scoffed at accusations of extremism, the implied 
uniqueness doctrine was indeed a radical concept, and advertisers grappled with how to 
respond to the FTC’s new guidelines.  
New Remedies for Deception: Corrective Advertising and Claim Substantiation 
 
Other advertisers currently under investigation by the FTC, including Chevron, Ocean 
Spray, and Hi-C, had used various legal loopholes to delay the FTC’s proposal for 
corrective ads. Continental was the first company to agree to run corrective ads in major 
national publications constituting no less than 25 percent of its budget for one year.214 
Continental’s concession set a precedent for corrective advertising as a viable settlement, 
worrying other advertising agencies. Walter Bergman, president of the agency Norman, 
Craig & Kummel, Inc., expressed his concern that Continental’s consent decree to the 
FTC would be “played back to us by the FTC many times in the future.”215 Despite this 
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possibility, Continental’s compliance was in some ways a welcome concession for the 
company because the FTC sought to ban the trademark altogether. 
 The Continental case did set a bold precedent. In December 1971, the FTC 
challenged the claim made by a sugar trade group, Sugar Assn., Inc, that eating sweets 
before meals can help control weight.216 The trade group had spent close to $1 million on 
the campaign from 1969–1971 in national magazines, including Life, Look, Seventeen, 
and McCall’s. The corrective advertising order in the sugar case was harsher than the 
settlement for Continental because the sugar trade group was ordered to run at least one 
retraction in each magazine in which the ad originally appeared, costing the sugar 
association about $20,000.217 Following this settlement, the FTC continued to pursue 
cases of explicit deception and ordered corrective advertising in cases where it found 
such deception occurred. The problem for the FTC, however, was determining what 
constituted deception because so many claims merely expressed subjective qualities 
about the uniqueness of a brand or product.  
 Despite a few success stories in the FTC’s orders for corrective advertising, the 
cases were time consuming and expensive. Although a few companies consented, others 
challenged the FTC’s complaints in court. One solution to this problem was to allow time 
for counteradvertising messages created by independent consumer groups under the 
Fairness Doctrine. This would fall under the FCC jurisdiction, and Kirkpatrick proposed 
a block of time (15–30 minutes a day) to the FCC for counter commercials. Fresh in the 
minds of advertisers and broadcasters was cigarette counteradvertising, which eventually 
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drove tobacco advertisers off the air. Two well-known nonprofit organizations began to 
prepare counter-commercials: the Center for Auto Safety, to criticize claims made by 
Chevrolet, and the Medical Committee for Human Rights, to express concerns about the 
overuse of analgesics.218 
 The advocacy group Stern Concern Center, representing Nader’s Center for Auto 
Safety, sought free air time for public service messages about a major recall of 
Chevrolet’s faulty engine mounts.219 The ads were provocative and took aim at the 
company’s failure to protect drivers: “Now General Motors has announced they won’t 
give you new engine mounts, but they will install a free safety cable. . . . I urge you to get 
to a Chevrolet serviceman—slowly.”220 Broadcasters, with little opposition from the 
FCC, turned down the groups’ fairness rationale, arguing that they had already covered 
the case in newscasts.221  
  Corrective advertising and counteradvertising were viewed quite differently by 
businesses. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce feared that counteradvertising would result 
in “vigilante action” with an onslaught of anti-business messages. While corrective ads 
were paid for and created by the individual companies and advertisers, 
counteradvertising, broadcasters predicted, would push advertisers off the air. NBC 
responded to the counteradvertising proposal, arguing that corrective ads were sufficient 
and did “not signify a need for intrusion by the FCC,” adding that if the FCC became 
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involved, “appeals should be made to Congress.”222 The National Association of 
Broadcasters put it more succinctly: “If the FCC is seriously entertaining any thought of 
implementing the FTC proposal, it would be emasculating the commercial base of the 
world’s finest system of broadcasting.”223 Robert Pitofsky scoffed at these dire 
predictions and warned members of the FCC that they “should be taken with a grain of 
salt.”224 
 Top aids in the Nixon Administration were split on counteradvertising 
proposals.225 Vice President Spiro Agnew and Pat Buchanan (Nixon’s top speech writer 
at the time) supported some extension of the Fairness Doctrine for “use against the 
networks to devise some kind of new antitrust doctrine to break up their control over the 
news.”226 Although Nixon found public broadcasting to be his true nemesis in the news 
media, Nixon was not a fan of the commercial networks either because of the negative 
press coverage and the antiwar efforts by the ad industry (see Chapter 1). At the FCC’s 
panel on counteradvertising, Nixon’s top telecommunications adviser, Clay Whitehead, 
voiced strong opposition to counteradvertising because he worried that the FTC was 
“trying to require the medium to become a vehicle of public education.”227 Robert 
Pitofsky responded facetiously: “I wasn’t aware that the FCC was supposed to regulate 
radio and TV with the welfare of the advertiser in mind. I assumed it was responsible to 
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the consumer.”228 FCC commissioner Richard Wiley agreed with Whitehead, stating his 
conviction that “the primary purpose of advertising is to sell . . . there is nothing sinister 
or malevolent about advertising per se.”229 The FCC consistently ruled that while some 
tobacco advertising constituted controversy under the Fairness Doctrine, most product 
advertising did not. 230 This, however, still left open the possibility that issue-based 
advertising would leave some room for counteradvertising under the Fairness Doctrine, 
especially because major advertisers were more and more addressing public policy–
oriented concerns through advertising.231 
The FTC Tackles Environmental Advertising 
The FTC’s targeting of Chevron’s antipollution claims represented the growing concern 
among environmentalists, consumer activists, and government officials that businesses 
were treating pollution as merely a public relations problem to be dealt with through 
advertising campaigns. A former advertising executive, Jerry Mander, drew attention to 
this new type of advertising, which he called “ecopornography” in an article in 
Communication Arts. Mander, admittedly regretful of his time as an advertising exec, 
drew attention to the ways in which advertising and public relations had become 
intertwined in new ways: 
Whereas corporate ‘institutional’ advertising used to show pictures of 
labor and capital shaking hands, now it’s “business and ecologists working 
together to control the environment,” as a bank ad recently put it. 
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Technology will take care of everything. Man’s ingenuity will win out. 
Even the Ford Foundation says so.232 
 
 The head of Carl Ally, Inc. reported that the ads were a reactionary response to 
the environmental movement, because “businessmen see their corporations threatened for 
fouling the environmental and realize that they have to do something about it.” 
Companies, however, were spending much more on eco-advertising than on eco-
responsibility. In 1970, utility companies had spent over $88 million in promoting “an 
environmentally responsible image.”233 Large national advertisers like General Motors, 
Shell, Westinghouse, International Paper, and Proctor and Gamble began to weave 
environmentalist messages into their advertising. The so-called “eco ads” caught the 
attention of public interest groups like the Council on Economic priorities, which found 
that energy and utility companies spent $21 million on pollution research and 
development compared to the $126 million on advertising and promotion.234 
 An advertisement from Potlatch Forests, Inc. featured an image of nature’s 
beauty—trees and blue skies framing a clear rocky stream, with the headline: “It cost us a 
bundle but the Clearwater River still runs clear.” The ad neglected to mention that the 
photo was taken 50 miles upstream from the company’s Ohio-based paper processing 
plant. The plant was notorious for polluting the Clearwater River with sulfur and other 
industrial by-products. In fact, the mill was reported to have installed a car wash for 
employee vehicles that were covered with industrial sludge after each workday. Another 
ad for a nuclear plant in Southern California featured a healthy-looking lobster with the 
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headline “He likes our nuclear plant.” A local marine biologist blew the whistle on the ad 
by explaining that the lobster was borrowed from his own research tanks.235 A television 
campaign by Standard Oil depicted a balloon filled with clear, clean exhaust from its 
Chevron Gasoline and compared it a balloon with dark grey exhaust from a competitor’s 
product with the message: “Cleaner air, better mileage, Chevron with F-310 turns dirty 
smoke into good clean mileage. There isn’t a car on the road that shouldn’t be using 
it.”236  
 Broadcasters were alarmed at the possibility of countercommericals because they 
worried “if the licensee were required to present any matter brought before it,” it would 
result in “a wholly different broadcasting system which Congress has not chosen to 
adopt.”237 The Chevron ad inspired the environmental group Friends of the Earth to 
petition the FCC for free time for its own environmental messages to counterbalance ads 
for gasoline and cars under the Fairness Doctrine. On May 12, 1971, the FCC turned 
down the complaint, stating: 
The Chevron F-310 announcements do not argue a position on 
controversial issue of public importance, but rather advance a claim for 
product efficacy. It is true that this claim relates to a matter of public 
concern, but making such a claim for a product is not the same thing as 
arguing a position on a controversial issue of public importance.”238 
 
FCC Commissioner Johnson, the sole dissenter in the Chevron decision, quoted a 
Chevron ad: “Standard Oil has taken a step toward solving a growing national problem. 
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Use Chevron gasoline with F-310. You’ll be doing your part toward cleaner air.”239 
Johnson found that the eco ads “practically shout that they are dealing with a 
controversial issue of public importance.”240 Johnson warned that supporters of 
counteradvertising faced strong opposition from nearly all fronts: 
My Colleagues have unanimously rejected even the proposal to open a 
proceeding to consider these and other suggestions. So I do not think you are 
going to see any changes or reforms being initiated by the F.C.C. … Yet, like 
the White House and the F.C.C., the Congress is also subject to powerful 
corporate pressures—including pressures from the drug industry. As a result, 
the people have a great fight ahead of them if they are truly to make their 
voices heard above the din of the special interests, if they are really going to 
recapture their government from the corporations that stole it from them.241 
 
 Despite Johnson’s lack of confidence, the revitalized FTC provided hope for 
advocates of counteradvertising. Stern Concern, the same group who had petitioned the 
FTC in its counteradvertisement for Chevron, created an ad that took aim at the “400 
industrial polluting plants in the country operating outside of the law.” The ad advised 
people to send in complaints about water pollution to the NRDC, because “the best way 
to fight pollution is to make your own waves.”242 An aide to the FTC interviewed by 
Newsweek said, “Many advertising campaigns are capitalizing on the new ecological 
concern, and our purpose is simply to make sure they are not misleading anyone.”243 
Kirkpatrick agreed, and viewed counteradvertising as a way to for citizens to “dispute 
claims with which they disagree. . . . Some broadcasters are saying that their right of free 
speech will be unconstitutionally burdened by requiring them to run counteradvertising. 
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The trouble with this argument is that it ignored the question of whose First Amendment 
rights are at issue.”244 Although Nixon had stated his aversion to counteradvertising, the 
proponents found support from congressional Democrats like Frank Moss. But, in the 
summer of 1972, the possibility became less viable when the Democratic Party 
announced its campaign platform without any endorsement of counteradvertising. Instead 
of explicitly throwing support behind counteradvertising and truth in advertising 
legislation, the Democrats avoided an advertising regulation plank altogether, and instead 
pledged to support the rights of consumers to initiate class actions suits for dangerous 
business practices.245 
 Although the concept of counteradvertising seemed to be defunct because of a 
lack of support by the FCC and both political parties, the FTC continued to pursue cases 
of explicit deception and ordered corrective advertising in cases where it found that such 
deception occurred. The problem though, for the FTC, was how to determine whether an 
advertiser made an explicitly false statement. Many advertisements simply used 
“puffery”—claims that expressed subjective qualities of the uniqueness of a brand or 
product. How would the FTC, with its limited resources, test and compile evidence for 
such claims? As the FTC grappled with such obstacles in substantiation, the advertising 
reform movement was questioning the broader societal impact of advertising, especially 
advertising to children. 
Advertising and Society: No More Kid Gloves for Sugar Coating  
 Consumer crusader Robert Choate played an important role in initiating 
investigations into the problematic aspects of advertising to children by the breakfast 
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cereal industry. Choate began his activist career in Washington in 1966 by working on 
anti-hunger programs. During the 1968 election, Choate served as a hunger-program 
consultant for Nixon, who later appointed him to the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare. In July of 1970, Choate testified at the Senate’s Consumer Subcommittee 
Hearings on the cereal industry. Choate came to the hearings with detailed studies on the 
marketing practices of the top U.S. cereal manufacturers, rating the top sixty cereals in 
terms of nutritional content. Most troubling for Choate was that those cereals ranked as 
the lowest in nutritional content were the most heavily advertised on children’s 
television. To Choate, advertisers essentially viewed people “not as beings to be 
nourished, but suckers to be sold.”246 As a result of the hearings, Senator Frank Moss 
asked both the Federal Trade Commission and the Food and Drug Administration to 
investigate the charges. General Mills swiftly responded with a press release by Dr. W. 
Henry Sebrell, the former director of the National Institutes of Health, insisting that 
“breakfast cereals are a significant contributor to the diet, particularly in the case of 
children and young people.”247 Despite the industry’s defense, Senator Moss was deeply 
troubled by Choate’s studies and promised to continue to investigate nutritional claims in 
advertising because “consumers have a right to be free from a barrage of misinformation, 
and they have a right to information about nutrition.”248 
 In early 1971, Senator Moss introduced a bill to the Senate to create a watchdog 
group called the National Institute of Advertising, Marketing, and Society within the 
federal government. Moss initially envisioned the group to be part of the U.S. Public 
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Health Service or the National Science Foundation. The final draft of the bill was watered 
down, but still gave the FTC authority to hold hearings on advertising, which it called 
“Modern Advertising Practices.” Under direct supervision of the FTC’s chair, the FTC 
would call witnesses and gather evidence to study the role of advertising on society as 
whole, including advertising and marketing as broad political forces and the impact of 
commercialization on other social institutions. Moss praised the FTC’s more aggressive 
approach to deceptive advertising, but said that the commission had “barely scratched the 
surface in developing new approaches to our consumer protection responsibilities.”249  
The hearings were necessary, said Moss, because “we are approaching the end of the 20th 
century knee deep in a marketing economy and a consumer culture which we barely 
comprehend.” Moss’s vision was to “make creative use of the vast store of data generated 
by private market research, and for the universities to develop an over-all picture of the 
role of advertising and marketing in our society.”250  
In October and November 1971, the FTC conducted fifteen days of hearings on 
advertising’s impact on society.251 In addition to delving into the economic aspects of 
advertising, the hearings explored the relationship between advertising and drug abuse, 
and advertising’s impact on the alienation, knowledge, and attitude of teenagers and 
children.252 Although a number of topics addressed at the hearings were relevant to 
broadcasting regulation, the FCC remained silent during the hearings, exposing a 
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widening rift between the FTC and FCC—one that had been developing since the FCC’s 
rejection of the FTC’s proposal for counterads. In fact, FCC Chairman Burch had been 
scheduled to testify at the hearings, but failed to appear.253 
 The lack of support from the FCC was good news for advertisers, but the scope of 
the investigations was nonetheless unprecedented. As soon as the possibility of hearings 
was announced, the advertising industry formed a top-secret joint taskforce—so secret 
that the ad industry’s witnesses were unaware of one another’s identities.254 A memo 
from Association of National Advertisers (ANA) president Peter Allport was leaked in 
the Washington newsletter Consumer Newsweek, revealing the extent to which the 4As 
prevented the FTC from scheduling critical government officials hostile to advertising 
during the hearings. Allport also claimed credit for having stacked the deck in 
advertisers’ favor by having docketed more than 25 percent of hearing time for opinions 
of the industry and having persuaded the FTC to take off the table questions about the 
relationship between advertising and industrial concentration.255 Advertisers were indeed 
allotted four days to present their views, including testimony planned by the 4As and the 
ANA.256 The 4As and ANA hired public relations expert Robert Mullen, who chalked up 
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the efforts on behalf of advertisers as successful. Advertisers also flooded news 
organizations with “reports heavily favorable to advertising.”257  
 Although the anticompetitive effects of advertising in concentrated markets were 
said to be off the table, this issue was raised during the fifteen-day hearings. Criticism 
focused on the techniques used by advertisers aimed to give products an allusion of 
distinction where there was often none. Since 1914, the FTC had consistently ruled that 
puffery by advertisers did not constitute deception.258 Comments between the FTC and 
advertisers at the hearings on Modern Advertising Practices showed a widening gap 
between advertisers and the FTC on what constituted deception. An advertising executive 
who testified at the hearings cited an ad with a ten-foot tall washing machine, arguing 
that the ad was merely using metaphor and was thus not intended to deceive. 
Commissioner Jones insisted because every claim in advertising was intended to be 
believable to some extent, “there is no such thing as puffery.”259 
 The Hearings on Modern Advertising Practices suggested that puffery’s legal 
status was untenable. This left open the possibility that regulations would force 
advertising to guide consumers with information instead of with ambiguous distinction. 
The FTC staffers, feared Allport, “hold the view that advertising’s only economic and 
social justification is to provide ‘information’ from which consumers make ‘rational 
purchasing decisions. . . . Persuasion or any appeal to emotion or sentiment and the like is 
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taboo.” If this view of advertising prevails, worried Allport, “admen had better start 
looking for new trades.”260  
The Burden of Proof Shifts from Regulators to Advertisers 
If the FTC was going to broaden its definition of “false and misleading” to include 
puffery, how would it manage to test the hundreds of thousands of such advertising 
claims? Despite the FTC’s attempts to foster more truth in advertising, the investigations 
into product efficacy and claim substantiation were time consuming and costly. A 
possible solution to this was to shift the burden of truth from the FTC to advertisers.  
 Prior to the FTC’s reorganization, the burden for proving a claim was true fell on 
the shoulders of the agency. This was still the case in the first few years of the FTC’s 
reorganization. Consumer activist groups from New York state were not satisfied with 
the FTC’s process of identifying false claims, and they pressured the state’s Consumer 
Affairs Department to take more drastic measures. The proposed regulation in New York 
would require all advertisers to keep on file sound, scientific evidence to support their 
claims. Ralph Nader spoke at the hearings in New York, referring to the initiative as “one 
small step to require advertisers to put up or shut up.”261  
 Inspired by the events in New York, the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection 
announced its plans in the summer of 1971 to launch an Advertising Substantiation 
Program. Under the new program, advertisers would be required to collect and to keep on 
file scientific evidence to support their claims, and they would have to make such studies 
public if the FTC questioned the safety, quality, or efficacy of their claims. Robert 
Pitofsky promised to “proceed in our legal capacity with litigation” if the FTC found any 
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unsubstantiated claims.262 Rather than deal with ad substantiation on a case-by-case basis, 
the FTC made clear that it would use its authority to challenge broad advertising 
strategies within entire industries. In total, the FTC asked for evidence to support more 
than fifty-seven claims made by automakers, including Volkswagen’s “89 ways to tell an 
old one from a new one” and Ford’s “700 percent quieter.” “We chose auto first,” 
reasoned Pitofsky, “because they are a consumer’s major expense and because they make 
a good deal of factual claims.”263 Although shifting the burden of proof to advertisers was 
a dramatic move by the FTC, Chairman Kirkpatrick saw “nothing radical or 
controversial” about the advertising substantiation program. Rather than view the new 
program as a way to regulate businesses, Kirkpatrick instead framed the issue as a way to 
“replace, to some extent, the need for government intervention with free-market 
incentives in the form of greater consumer awareness and sophistication with regard to ad 
claims.”264  
 By September 1972, the FTC received documentation for advertising claims from 
makers of various products, ranging from autos and tires to electric razors. In the FTC’s 
staff report to the congressional consumer subcommittee, the FTC found that, of the 232 
substantiations requested by the FTC, 60 percent were either inadequately documented or 
found to be too technical for consumers to understand.265 The Advertising Substantiation 
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Program identified a number of unsubstantiated claims in auto advertisements.266 For 
example, GM claimed that its Chevrolet Chevelle had ten advantages over competitors to 
keep the car “from becoming old before its time.” Many of these so-called advantages in 
GM’s studies were required by law and thus similar to features in other models. 
Similarly, a Chrysler ad claimed that its suspension gave the vehicle “ease in handling,” 
but the studies submitted used language like “braking attitude test chart” and “dynamic 
beam and twist” that was incomprehensible to members of the FTC.267  
 One of the most widely publicized instances of claim substantiation by the FTC 
was its allegations that the three leading makers of pain relievers (American Home 
Products Corporation, Bristol Meyers, and Sterling Drug, Inc.) had not offered proof of 
any real difference among analgesics.268 For example, although Bayer aspirin made 
claims of superiority, the FTC maintained that all aspirin was the same. The FTC also 
charged analgesics makers for making unsubstantiated claims that the drugs “relieve 
nervous tension and similar symptoms and will enable persons to cope with the ordinary 
stresses of everyday life.”269 The FTC suggested stiff penalties: the three drug companies 
would have to spend 25 percent of their advertising budget for two years to correct false 
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claims. The corrections would cost a total of $40 million.270 The analgesic makers 
contested the settlement in court.271 
 The FTC also targeted Warner Lambert, the manufacturer of Listerine, for 
misrepresenting its mouthwash to prevent colds and as a remedy for sore throats. The 
FTC relied on Warner Lambert’s own studies and found that its evidence did not support 
claims that people who gargle with Listerine twice a day have fewer and milder colds.272 
Initially, Warner Lambert belittled the FTC’s complaints as mere “harassment.”273 
Listerine had made cold-fighting claims for decades, and while the FTC and FDA had 
investigated such claims since 1944, the transparency of the substantiation program 
allowed the FTC to finally put an end to Listerine’s cold-fighting fabrication.274 Despite 
of company’s appeal, the courts maintained the FTC’s order for corrective advertising.275 
The FTC made a similar complaint against the makers of Lysol Spray for touting the 
product as a way to prevent colds and the flu. Although the spray disinfected household 
surfaces, studies showed that most cold and flu germs are airborne. Both the makers of 
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Lysol and Listerine promised to continue to fight the FTC’s consent order for corrective 
ads in courts, but the companies modified cold-fighting claims voluntarily.276 
 Although the Nixon administration had initiated the reorganization of the FTC, 
not everyone in the Nixon administration was satisfied with the FTC’s aggressive agenda. 
Herbert G. Klein, Nixon’s communications director, publicly announced his 
dissatisfaction with both the FTC’s ad substantiation program and the commission’s 
hearings on the impact of advertising on American society. Klein conveyed his 
apprehension at the Public Relations Society of America, telling members of the business 
community that the FTC’s new initiatives could possibility lead to “further restrictions on 
an economic basis of the press and broadcast industry” without considering the dire 
economic impact for the media system and the advertising industry.277 Klein worried that 
advertising reforms would “be a very great danger to a free press.”278 Despite hesitation 
from Nixon’s communications director, the Senate Commerce Commission was working 
on bills to cement the FTC’s new authority.279  
 The ad substantiation program, however, caught the attention of consumer groups 
and public officials. Senator Frank Moss, a Democrat from Utah, was an outspoken critic 
of the ad industry. Moss had led the movement to require warning labels on cigarette 
packages and the ban on advertising for cigarette commercials on TV and radio. Moss 
charged advertisers with “wide spread and flagrant” use of deception and saw the report 
as a key piece of evidence to support a truth in advertising bill, and he formalized a “truth 
in advertising” bill, which would require advertisers to send substantiation directly to 
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consumers and to include references to relevant studies in advertisements themselves.280 
During July of 1972, Moss’s consumer subcommittee held hearings on the proposed 
Truth in Advertising Act and explored the findings of the FTC’s ad substantiation 
program in detail. After reading the FTC’s report, Moss concluded that the program “has 
been successful, indeed startling, in revealing the widespread and flagrant absence of 
adequate substantiation claims and the overriding need for a systemic means of holding 
advertisers’ feet to the fire of public scrutiny.”281 Senators Moss and Warren G. 
Magnuson also sought to extend the FTC’s power with a Warranty/FTC Improvement 
Bill. Among other extensions of the FTC’s legal power, the bill would allow the FTC to 
get cash settlements for consumer redress and write industry-wide trade regulation rules. 
With crucial amendments for consumer protections, the bill was overwhelmingly passed 
in the Senate, 72-2, in November 1971. Although this was a hopeful sign for consumer 
groups, the Consumer Protection Bill had passed through the Senate by a vast majority, 
only to be stifled by the House. 4As president William J. Colihan assumed that the Truth 
in Advertising and FTC Improvements Bills would evaporate in the House like the 
Consumer Protection Bill.282  
 In addition to legislative confirmation, the U.S. Supreme Court was increasingly 
“redirecting the law of the future in favor of the consumer.”283 The Court validated the 
extension of the FTC’s authority in March 1972 in Federal Trade Commission v. Sperry 
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and Hutchinson Company.284 This ruling suggested the FTC could act as a “court of 
equity” and consider “public values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or 
encompassed in the spirit of anti-trust laws.”285 This ruling was significant for two 
reasons. First, it permitted the FTC to prevent a business practice even if it did not 
explicitly violate existing antitrust law, and, second, it gave the FTC discretion in 
defining “unfairness” and “public values.”286 
Taken by Surprise: Apprehensive Advertisers Join the Fray 
The possible extension of the FTC’s power through Congress and the courts sent shock 
waves throughout the business community. The FTC’s more aggressive approach to 
regulating advertising occurred amid other uncertainties for the ad industry. In 1970, 
agency profits began to slow for the first time in twenty years, and agencies cut an 
estimated 10 percent of the workforce.287 In its investigation of claims in the market for 
drugs, automobiles, food, and home cleaning products, the FTC was targeting the 8 of the 
nation’s top 10 advertisers.288  
Advertisers and the businesses they represented expressed deep-seated fear that 
regulations of the $20 billion ad industry would lead to dramatic changes to established 
selling practices, and many, like the president of Pepsi-Cola, feared that “the ultimate 
target is free enterprise itself” because advertising was “the highest silhouette, the most 
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convenient aiming point.”289 Edward L. Bond, the chair of the ad agency Young and 
Rubicam, spoke at the 1971 Conference Board in New York. He invited those critical of 
advertising to:  
Show me a country without a free enterprise system and I will show you a 
country without free art, free elections, free speech. The wealth of our 
society—much of what we give in foreign aid and in assisting developing 
nations—is due to the ingenuity found in such profusion in our 
marketplace.290 
Advertising was indeed the most visible portrait of free enterprise, but proselytizing for 
the free market was not enough to quiet consumer activists and their allies in the FTC. In 
the words of marketing executive E.B. Weiss, “The public is saying that industry—and 
especially the ad industry—has abused this freedom.”291 An op-ed in the June 1972 issue 
of the Commercial and Financial Chronicle epitomized the defeated mindset of major 
business after the first two years of the FTC’s agenda:  
The business community has suffered serious and perhaps irreparable 
harm from the criticisms and lack of internal organization to counter the 
current thrusts. All too often it accepts the proposed orders of the FTC 
without resorting to its maximum legal recourse, and this has had serious 
impact on goods, services, and morale in several industries.292 
Advertisers like Richard Lord, the president and creative director at a New York agency, 
admitted that advertising had simply gone too far:  
Consumerism isn’t a vengeance movement. It is a reaction, long overdue, 
to the arrogance of the marketplace. The consumer (you, me, they) wants a 
dollar’s value for a dollar surrendered. The consumer wants claims 
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substantiated, promises kept and products to perform the way he, she, we 
have been led to believe they should.293 
Advertising was so unpopular that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce distanced itself from 
the industry, issuing a formal “Statement on Advertising” on July 11, 1971: “The 
business community and consumers alike are the losers when advertisers use tactics and 
appeals which impeach the good standing, repute, and credibility of the business world.” 
In addition to its plea for advertisers to be “truthful, accurate, informative, and relevant,” 
the Chamber expressed its support for the FTC’s advertising substantiation program and 
called for advertisers to be prudent by making accurate claims.294 The president of Ford 
Motor Co. echoed this sentiment, saying that the FTC’s concern “has made top 
management more responsive to pleas for more straightforward, honest ads.”295 
Some advertisers themselves admitted that the industry had taken too many liberties. 
Creatives who spoke at the 4As meeting in October 1971 blamed the ad industry for the 
consumer backlash and expressed favorable views of government regulation. Mary Wells 
Lawrence, the head of Wells, Rich and Greene, said she was delighted about the FTC’s 
ad substantiation because it will “increase our credibility with the public.”296 John 
Emmerling, a creative director at New York’s Richard K. Manoff, was troubled by 
advertising’s bad reputation among young people: “I’m 32 years old and plan to spend 
about the next 30 years of my life hanging around advertising agencies. Now it appears 
that the time has come for regulations. As someone who has a lot of years left in this 
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business, I’m actually looking forward to it.”297 Cliff Einstein, also a 32-year-old creative 
director, saw the “youth revolution” as largely instigated by the advertising community. 
These same young people, he said, will “bring us to our senses” and will force advertisers 
to “return to digging deeply into a product to find its human personality.”298 
Other advertisers were less acquiescent. In a speech before the Magazine 
Publishers Association, James L. McCaffrey, the chair of the 4As, took the FTC to task:  
And through all this, we’re forced to listen to the ever-increasing 
quackings of people whose view of life in America as it really is makes 
Don Quixote sound like history’s most practical man. They at [the FTC] 
lack any semblance of what a Bahamian friend of mine likes to refer to as 
“mother’s wit.”299 
Who was responsible for what McCaffry referred to as the “ever-increasing quackings”? 
To a large extent, advertisers blamed the news media for fanning the flames of the 
advertising reform movement by publicizing the FTC’s complaints. Advertisers 
recognized that the FTC’s hot line news releases were getting the attention of the press 
and the public, and the negative publicity was affecting the public’s view of the industry 
as a whole.300 A study backed by the National Association of Broadcasters exposed a 
sharp increase in those who agreed with the statement: “I would prefer TV without 
commercials.” The increase in negative feelings about advertising was more substantial 
among younger, college-educated audiences—the same audiences most attractive to 
advertisers. Thirty-eight percent of college-educated individuals found advertisements to 
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be offensive.301 There was also change in the way people felt about government’s 
regulatory role. In 1970, one-fourth of those polled supported some form of government 
regulation of the advertising industry.302 A year later, a study backed by the 4As found 
that more than half of college students favored more government regulation of 
advertising.303 Sol Goldin, chairman of the trade group Brand Names Foundation, 
credited the “forces marshaled against advertising” for “shifting the previously favorable 
opinion it once enjoyed.”304 The ad industry was amid a public relations crisis not seen 
since the 1930s.  
Edward M. Thiele, the vice chairman of Leo Burnett, spoke at the 4As meeting on 
March 4, 1972, advising advertisers to open a dialogue with the press before “the 
chirping of crickets drowns out the sweet music of free enterprise.”305 Theile pointed out 
the joint interest between advertising and the press in preventing the FTC from regulating 
the industry and had some advice for the advertising community:  
Since we are in the business of persuasion, one of the basic tasks facing us 
is to persuade the media that, if they want advertising to be better, and 
public life to be better, then they cannot hold themselves exempt from this 
demand upon all of us. This persuasion cannot be achieved by cursing or 
whining. It can only be done, ultimately, by insisting that the press begin 
to scrutinize itself and its own professional standards with the same cold-
eyed candor with which it scrutinizes every element of our society.306 
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Dan Seymour, the president of J. Walter Thompson, also held the news media responsible 
for contributing to advertising’s “great wasteland of cynicism,” and added that advertisers 
had made a grave mistake by “turning the other cheek” because “not to fight has been our 
basic error.” Seymour called upon members of the advertising community to lead a 
massive public relations campaign to combat the advertising reform movement.307 
Howard Bell, the president of AAF, agreed with Seymour’s proposal to improve the 
public impression “to tell the positive story of advertising,” but in doing so, he stressed 
the need first for advertising trade groups to improve “government relations” through 
consolidation of 4As, ANA, and AAF into a central Washington headquarters.308 Bell’s 
proposal for a centralized advertising trade group received support from Carl Nichols, the 
head of New York’s Cunningham and Welsh, who spoke at an AAF meeting and said:  
The time has now come for us to forget our parochial interests as members 
of individual associations and really come together as an industry to 
combat crippling legislative and regulatory proposals at the federal and 
state levels—proposals which would deprive us of the freedom which is 
basic to our ability to serve both our clients and the public.”309 
Some in the ad industry voiced skepticism of Bell’s unification proposal, because “the 
egos at the top of those organizations are fantastic.”310 Others were unconvinced because 
they feared it was simply too late to articulate a response to the FTC.311 The advertising 
industry clearly saw the negative publicity as a significant obstacle, but disagreed on 
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whether it would be possible to consolidate resources and talent to revamp advertising’s 
image.  
Self-Regulation by Advertisers 
One solution that unified advertising and business trade groups was the potential for 
instituting formal self-regulations to obviate further FTC action.312 In 1971, the three 
leading advertising trade associations (AFA, 4As, and ANA), in cooperation with the 
Council of Better Business Bureaus (CBBB), announced the creation of a National 
Advertising Review Council (NARC).313 Offices of the NARC around the country began 
accepting complaints about advertising from consumers. If the complaint was found to be 
legitimate, the NARC’s review board (NARB) would attempt to convince advertisers to 
correct the claim or to drop the offensive ad and to provide feedback to advertisers in 
creating new campaigns.314 In 1974, in response to growing criticism of advertising 
targeted to children, the NARC added the Children’s Advertising Review Unit 
(CARU).315 
The ad industry hoped that the industry’s self-imposed guidelines would bolster 
its reputation and make obsolete the FTC’s regulations. The economic woes within the ad 
industry made placating the FTC and the pacifying the anti-advertising sentiments a 
pressing matter. Elisha Gray II, the chairman for the CBBB, made no pretense about the 
goals of the self-regulation organizations, stating, “It is pure, unadulterated self-interest. 
This discipline must be made effective if only to reduce the outrageous discount rate that 
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our customers now put on our advertising messages.”316 Neal W. O’Connor, a member of 
the NARB’s steering committee, expressed his hope that “these complaints will be settled 
in private,” adding, “If we really work well the public won’t know we’re around.”317  
Some regulators in Washington were hopeful about the ad industry’s own 
guidelines, including FTC commissioner Mary Gardiner Jones, who saw potential for 
self-regulation to help solve many of the problems with deception in advertising, 
particularly advertising to children. If industry could assume a “high level of 
responsibility,” she hoped it could solve problems more efficiently and unilaterally, by 
comparison to the notoriously slow FTC.318 Other government officials were less 
optimistic. Nixon’s consumer affairs adviser, Virginia Knauer, had reservations about the 
NARB because of the lack of significant representation from the public. Knauer, 
however, suggested that she could be sold on the idea if the group better represented 
interests of consumers by changing the group’s composition to give the public equal 
footing and by releasing its reports to the public.319 Advertisers were opposed to equal 
public representation, but they adopted some recommendations, including a policy to 
provide public announcements of all decisions in cases involving truth and accuracy.320  
 Not surprisingly, consumer activist Ralph Nader saw little hope for advertisers’ 
self-regulation efforts and threw his support behind the FTC’s new tough standards for ad 
substantiation. As was typical of Nader’s scrutiny of business associations, he noted that 
several influential companies currently under investigation by federal agencies for 
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deceptive practices (Lever, Ford, General Motors, Bristol-Myers, and Sterling Drug) also 
happened to be members of the NARC’s board of appeals. Young and Rubicam had 
several of its employees on the Council for Better Business Practices (the group 
sponsoring the NARC), but the agency was also responsible for the deceptive ad for 
Excedrin currently in question by the FDA. “If the Four A’s was serious about enforcing 
their own code,” said Nader, “the group would have taken action on Y&R and other 
advertising agencies responsible for the deceptive ads.”321 Even if the NARC could 
potentially weed out some false claims made by advertisers, it would not solve, according 
to Nader, problems associated with “product differentiation, otherwise known as 
competitive ferocity over profound trivia, which can have, as in autos, serious 
anticompetitive effect.”322 Although self-regulations had united advertising trade groups, 
intellectual leaders like Nader were not satisfied with advertisers’ willingness to 
compromise. Leaders in the powerful consumer movement maintained pressure on the 
FTC to stay on course.  
The Powell Memo 
 As a response to these pressures, some other intellectual leaders in the business 
community began to advocate for an aggressive and organized effort to combat the forces 
driving government regulation. In August of 1971, Lewis F. Powell, a prominent 
corporate lawyer and member of the boards of eleven powerful corporations, wrote a 
memo to the chair of the education committee at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce titled 
“Attack on American Free Enterprise System.” Powell’s began his memo stating, “No 
thoughtful person can question that the American economic system is under broad 
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attack.”323 Powell characterized consumer advocate Ralph Nader as “the single most 
effective antagonist of American business,” and went on explain more fully the 
“dimensions of the attack” on the “free enterprise system”: 
There always have been some who opposed the American system, and 
preferred socialism or some form of statism (communism or fascism). 
Also, there always have been critics of the system, whose criticism has 
been wholesome and constructive so long as the objective was to improve 
rather than to subvert or destroy. But what now concerns us is quite new in 
the history of America. We are not dealing with sporadic or isolated 
attacks from a relatively few extremists or even from the minority socialist 
cadre. Rather, the assault on the enterprise system is broadly based and 
consistently pursued. It is gaining momentum and converts. . . . Many do 
enter the enterprise system—in business and the professions—and for the 
most part they quickly discover the fallacies of what they have been 
taught. But those who eschew the mainstream of the system often remain 
in key positions of influence where they mold public opinion and often 
shape governmental action. In many instances, these “intellectuals” end up 
in regulatory agencies or governmental departments with large authority 
over the business system they do not believe in.  
 
 
Powell was strongly critical of what he saw as the “apathy and defiance” of the many 
business trade groups, which in his view had “shown little stomach for hard-nose contest 
with their critics, and little skill in effective intellectual and philosophical debate.” 
Powell’s alarmist tone did not differ from what others in the business community were 
expressing at the time, except that he understood the scope of the problem, and the 
solution, in broader hegemonic ways. Powell suggested that the Chamber “consider 
establishing a staff of highly qualified scholars in the social sciences who do believe in 
the system. It should include several of national reputation whose authorship would be 
widely respected—even when disagreed with.” Powell suggested a massive ideological 
campaign to influence college campuses, through scholarship in academic journals, 
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conferences, textbooks, faculty hires, and graduate programs. In addition to higher 
education, Powell proposed that the Chamber create “high school education Action 
programs.”  
 Powell, like others, saw the news media as a major obstacle because it often 
included “the most insidious type of criticism of the enterprise system.” His idea was to 
monitor and influence changes in news content: 
This monitoring, to be effective, would require constant examination of 
the texts of adequate samples of programs. Complaints—to the media and 
to the Federal Communications Commission—should be made promptly 
and strongly when programs are unfair or inaccurate. Equal time should be 
demanded when appropriate. Effort should be made to see that the forum-
type programs (the Today Show, Meet the Press, etc.) afford at least as 
much opportunity for supporters of the American system to participate as 
these programs do for those who attack it.  
 
 Powell worried about the “anti-business views now being expressed by several 
leading candidates for President of the United States.” The unelected leaders on the 
Courts, however, offered “the most important instrument for social, economic and 
political change.” This massive program, according to Powell, would require time, tough 
commitment, and deep pockets: “if undertaken long term and adequately staffed, it would 
require far more generous financial support from American corporations than the 
Chamber has ever received in the past.”  
Powell ended his memo with a call for “American business—which has 
demonstrated the greatest capacity in all history to produce and to influence consumer 
decisions—to apply their great talents vigorously to the preservation of the system itself.” 
He admitted that his ideas were “tentative and suggestive” and emphasized the 
preemptive need for a “thorough study.” “But this would be an exercise in futility,” 
Powell concluded, “unless the Board of Directors of the Chamber accepts the 
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fundamental premise of this paper, namely, that business and the enterprise system are in 
deep trouble, and the hour is late.” 
 Two months after Powell sent the memo to the Chamber, Nixon nominated 
Powell to the Supreme Court, where he served until 1987. Powell’s memo has been 
credited for “marking the beginning of the business community’s multi-decade collective 
takeover of the most important institutions of public opinion and democratic decision-
making” by essentially “inspiring the founding of many conservative think tanks, 
including the Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute and the Manhattan Institute.”324 The 
true influence on the memo remains unclear; but later, during the mid-1970s, his idea 
would be fulfilled through the group both most threatened by regulations and most well 
equipped to persuade: the ad industry. But in the early part of the decade, advertisers and 
many powerful trade groups remained relatively submissive, uncertain of how to respond 
to government regulations. During this brief phase of uncertainty and disorder on behalf 
of businesses, the FTC continued to confront the structural fundamentals of the ad 
industry and the U.S. economy. 
Cutting to the Core: The FTC’s Bureau of Competition  
These structural critiques came to fruition through the FTC’s new Bureau of 
Competition. The FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection’s new guidelines for advertising 
puffery were certainly threatening to the status quo, but the newly formed Bureau of 
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Competition addressed more fundamentally the concentrated structure in which puffery 
thrived.325 Alan Ward, the director of the bureau, expressed his commitment to 
determining whether industries constituted by only a few companies “tend to compete 
through advertising gimmicks rather than price.” If these industries were not responsive 
to competitive pressures, “then I am certain that the FTC will wage increasing and 
effective warfare against such industrial concentration.”326 In its preliminary studies of 
seven major industries (cereals, drugs, automobiles, steel, electrical machinery, 
chemicals, and energy), the bureau found that fewer than 100 companies were 
responsible for 75 percent of the advertising industry’s expenditures.327 As a response to 
the rising fuel costs, two Democrats—Senator Philip Hart from Michigan and 
Representative Joe Evins from Tennessee—prodded the FTC to investigate the 
anticompetitive practices in the energy industry. The study launched by the FTC was 
broader than antitrust studies conducted by the U.S. Department of Justice, because it 
went beyond isolated cases of mergers within the energy industry to investigate the 
consequences of having only a few companies control nearly all of the nation’s reserves 
of natural gas, uranium, coal, and oil.328  
 In April 1972, the FTC pursued complaints against the “big four” breakfast cereal 
makers (Kellogg, General Mills, Quaker Oats, General Foods) for representing a “shared 
monopoly”—a structure that created barriers to entry by artificially promoting different 
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brands through advertising.329 The commission chose the breakfast cereal industry as its 
first target not only because of its high level of concentration, but also because children 
were a major target of its advertising. The cereal report reflected the larger questions of 
structural concentration in other American industries, as well as the ethical problems 
associated with advertising to children.330 The FTC relied on several instances in which 
the companies created new brands of cereal by artificially promoting differentiation 
between similar products. For example, between 1950 and 1970, the big four created 150 
new brands and increased annual advertising budgets from $26 million to $81 million. 
Although there were 150 new brands, the cereal industry had become heavily 
concentrated and exercised “monopoly power” by keeping prices artificially high. 
Barriers to entry were also represented by the collusion between the big four and grocers, 
who gave them a privileged place on supermarket shelves. The companies were also, 
according to the FTC, employing unfair methods of competition by targeting children. 
Some of this advertising made claims that certain brands of cereal, would, among other 
hyperboles, make children better athletes.331 The commission wanted the two biggest 
companies—Kellogg with 45 percent, and General Mills with 21 percent—to divest some 
of their holdings in the market. Kellogg, under the FTC’s plan, would be required to 
create three new competing companies with its brands Special K, Product 19, and Cocoa 
Crispies; General Mills would do the same with Total and Wheaties.332 
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Conclusion 
Needless to say, the implications for the suit against the big four went well beyond 
breakfast. Business Week ran an article on the cereal suit titled “FTC Declares a War on 
Oligopoly.” One industry executive responded to the FTC charges against cereals 
makers, stating “The FTC has bitten off an enormous new theory of antitrust law, and if 
carried out, it would revolutionize the American economy and break up all kinds of 
industries.”333 By the end of 1972, the advertising industry was shaken to the core by its 
critics who had strong allies in the FTC. In the first two years of its reorganization, 
advertisers had only contested 40 of the more than 450 complaints issued by the FTC. 
The real threat to advertisers was not individual cases of deception, but the FTC’s 
targeting of industrial concentration and its symbiotic relationship with the type of 
advertising in which it thrived. “The danger to advertising,” said ANA president Gilbert 
Weil, is that it “has reached a point critical to its continued existence.”334 The head of a 
large agency in California prepared a tongue-in-cheek “ad of the future” that he said 
“Eliminates everything that’s ever been attacked in advertising.” The ad was a large grey 
square with the words “for sale.”335 The future of advertising was indeed grey. It seemed 
that the decks were stacked against advertisers, and despite various attempts to bolster 
their image, the FTC was largely untrammeled and advertisers were on the defensive side 
of a debate with far-reaching consequences. Thomas De Baggio, the editor of the 
Washington newsletter Consumer Newsweek, said it best: “What was once only puffery is 
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now seen effrontery.”336 Demand for more accountability from advertisers was on the 
surface minor, but major questions loomed for the FTC, the ad industry, and the major 
businesses it represented. For advertisers, had they simply pushed too far and already set 
the stage for a major backlash by the FTC? For the FTC, would its allies in Congress, like 
Senator Moss, extend the limits of the FTC’s power to regulate advertising for entire 
industries? And for major businesses in concentrated markets, if advertising was viewed 
by regulators as merely a tool to maintain a semblance of competition where little 
existed, would advertising messages become limited to straightforward information and 
thus compromise the privileged and powerful position of major corporations? 
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CHAPTER 3: THE FTC IN POLITICAL PARADOX: STRENGTHENING 
REGULATORS AND PROTECTING COMMERCIAL SPEECH, 1973–1976 
 
“Today, the FTC is, for all practical purposes, a brand-new organization, established in 
1914, but reborn in 1969. In three controversy packed years it has become a militant 




 At the beginning of 1973, the FTC was the epitome of post-war liberalism’s faith 
in regulated capital. In the first three years of the 1970s, the FTC had evolved from the 
“little old lady of Pennsylvania Avenue” to the “policeman on the economic beat.”338 The 
Bureau of Consumer Protection targeted advertising practices that had been 
commonplace for decades. In three years, the commission investigated more cases of 
advertising deception than it did during the ten years prior.339 Prior to 1970, cases of 
deception were settled with a slap on the wrist. After 1970, the FTC began to order 
companies to run corrective ads, and advocated for counteradvertising created by 
independent consumer groups. As these cases progressed, the commission expanded the 
definition of false and misleading to include advertising puffery, and demanded that 
advertisers back up their claims with evidence. With broader definitions of false and 
misleading, the FTC began to target entire industry segments, including automobiles, 
over-the-counter drugs, and a variety of foods. The ad industry heralded the FTC’s 
Hearings on Modern Advertising Practices as a success for the industry, but the hearings 
also left open questions about the obligation for advertisers to consider the larger societal 
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effect of commercial messages, particularly those aimed at children. Consumer crusaders 
like Robert Choate helped mobilize support for regulations to advertising to children and 
also drew attention to industrial concentration in the cereal industry. By charging the big 
four cereal makers with monopolizing market power, the FTC’s Bureau of Competition 
confronted the hegemony of oligopoly structure in the U.S. economy. Both of the new 
bureaus in the FTC were challenging the most valuable asset of the major U.S. 
corporation—its selling practices—during a period when companies were shifting their 
investments from production to marketing and advertising.340  
 By 1973, the FTC’s renovations were remarkable but tentative. The continued 
vigor of the FTC depended on a number of factors, including FTC budget appropriations, 
validation of the FTC’s authority through legislation and court decisions, and last but not 
least, the continued appointments of FTC commissioners who were sympathetic to the 
consumer movement’s progressive principles. Business had not yet articulated a coherent 
response to the FTC, which continued to gain momentum through congressional action 
after 1973. The Magnuson-Moss FTC Improvements Act (FTCIA) of 1975 would the 
greatly expand the power of the agency. The law gave greater representation to the public 
by allowing consumers to file class action suits through the FTC. Prior to the passage of 
the law, the FTC was restricted to regulating explicitly false and misleading practices by 
single firms. FTCIA cemented the agency’s jurisdiction over broadly defined “unfair” 
businesses practices, and provided the FTC carte blanche to issue sweeping trade rules 
for entire industries.  
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  During the period between 1973 and 1976, however, the FTC’s objectives were 
complicated by an oil crisis and economic stagflation. Government officials came to a 
rough consensus for combating inflation through wage and price controls, tax reforms, 
and federal monetary policies, but the economic crisis also produced debates over 
industrial concentration. Along with riders to the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline Act, The Hart–
Scott–Rodino Act of 1976 strengthened the FTC’s role in regulating mergers and 
acquisitions. Coinciding with the FTC’s legislative reinforcement over issues of 
deceptive advertising and antitrust, the landmark Supreme Court decision Virginia 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Council was initiated by consumer advocates with the goal of 
promoting price competition through advertising. Ironically, the Court’s decision left 
constitutional uncertainties for the sweeping trade regulation rules granted by the FTC’s 
legislative reinforcement.  
A Decade of Contradictions 
 This paradox for the FTC occurred in tandem with this period’s broader political 
incongruity. The 1970s was an interregnum in the history of U.S. politics, and Nixon was 
swept up in this decade of contradictions. In the words of historian Jefferson Crowie, 
“Richard Nixon was simultaneously the last president to work within the logic of the 
New Deal material politics, the first post-war president to try to recast the ways in which 
workers appeared in American presidential strategy, and the last to court labor 
seriously.”341 Nixon won 60.7 percent of the popular vote in the 1972 election, the largest 
margin of victory in a presidential election in American history.342 Although his victory 
was unambiguous, it was in no way an ideological triumph of the New Right. Historian 
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Judith Stein refers to the 1972 reelection of Nixon as a referendum on McGovern, not a 
rejection of New Deal ideology.343 Despite the Republican presidential victory, 
Democrats maintained control of both houses of Congress. And while Republicans 
gained twelve seats in the house, most of them were for liberal Republicans.344  
 Nixon’s second term win was not a clear victory for businesses either. A startling 
majority of Americans, many of whom voted for Nixon, supported the basic tenet of the 
New Deal. For example, a Gallup poll in 1973 revealed that 72 percent of Americans 
agreed with the statement “the federal government has a responsibility to do away with 
poverty in this country.”345 The poll also revealed that a majority of the public thought 
that Nixon, more than McGovern, would “keep big interests from having too much 
influence over government.”346 And businesses, in some respects, were supportive of 
government’s role in regulating the marketplace in the interests of consumers. In fact, the 
president of the Chamber of Commerce stated that consumer advocate Ralph Nader 
helped make “the free-enterprise system work.”347 The complex political struggles during 
the years between 1973 and 1976 reveal the ways in which competing visions of 
marketplace regulation were not yet determined. The FTC’s transformation by Nixon, 
and its support by a number of prominent Republicans in 1973, attests to the fact that 
there was nothing natural or inevitable about the rise of neoliberalism and the New Right.  
 
 
                                                
343 Ibid,, 73. 
344 Ibid., 73. 
345 Ibid., 72. 
346 Ibid., 72. 
347 Quoted in ibid., 72. 
 120 
Stagflation Takes Hold 
 Debates over the possibility of more advertising regulations were eclipsed by the 
political economic imbroglios that coalesced in 1974. Judith Stein refers to the oil crisis 
as the “alchemy that transformed optimism and gloom to doom”348 and the recession as a 
development that “destroyed the rough consensus of affluent society.”349 The dual 
troubles of high prices and stagnant growth created, for the first time in America’s 
history, stagflation. Between 1972 and the end of 1974, the stock market lost half its 
value, and rising oil prices increased the cost for many household goods, particularly the 
price of raw agricultural food sources. In 1974, food prices rose 13.3 percent and energy 
costs increased 31.3 percent.350  
 In 1973, there was a rough consensus, even among the most conservative 
economists, that government needed to solve the problem of inflation. Nixon’s wage and 
price controls imposed in 1971 were failing. Furthermore, Republicans realized that price 
controls had cost them key constituents in the farm states. And, for consumers, prices 
rose despite price controls. The reasons for the failure of price and wage controls are 
complex and varied. For one thing, Nixon’s control policies were difficult to sustain 
along the entire chain of production. For example, processors lowered supply by killing 
livestock rather than selling at lower prices. In 1973, labor responded to higher prices 
with demands for higher wages, resulting in the highest strike rate since 1959.351  
 In order to reduce energy consumption in the short term, laws were swiftly passed 
for yearlong daylight savings times, reduced speed limits for large vehicles, and mileage 
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standards for new vehicles. In 1974, Nixon signed legislation to create the Federal 
Energy Administration, assigning government authority over oil inventories, distribution, 
and consumption.352 Despite these measures, by mid-1974, inflation was close to 13 
percent, creating a 16-month recession and nearly 9 percent unemployment, a level 
higher than any other period during the post-war era.353 The rough and muddled 
consensus, by 1975, appeared to be more government control of the energy industry. The 
Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 lowered the price of oil, but allowed room 
for the president to raise prices to spur production. It also required some conservation 
standards, such as mileage settings for new vehicles. Congress also attempted to lower oil 
prices by increasing domestic supplies, including the multibillion-dollar Trans-Alaskan 
Pipeline project. These did little to address to what many in Washington thought was the 
root of the problem: the concentrated structure of the oil industry. Two bills were 
introduced by Congress to break up the oil industry, and the FTC’s power over antitrust 
cases would be expanded.354  
A New Term, a New Commissioner 
 In 1970, Nixon appointed Miles Kirkpatrick to chair the FTC amid uncertainty 
from consumer groups and businesses, but Kirkpatrick proved to be an unequivocal 
advocate for consumer protection during his term. The Washington Post commented on 
Kirkpatrick’s crucial role in transforming the agency: 
In 1969, after 8 years under the Democrats, it was hard to find an agency 
that could match the Federal Trade Commission for ineptitude and 
addiction to trivia. Consumer protection was something consumers did for 
themselves, with little help or guidance from the commission. Yet, 4 years 
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later, the FTC has experienced a remarkable conversion, a turn toward the 
public interest that has seen the birth of solid achievements and a new 
attitude. Much of the credit for this institutional renewal is owed to Miles 
W. Kirkpatrick.355 
 
This praise was certainly deserved—Kirkpatrick played an essential role in the FTC’s 
renaissance. But this was a double-edged sword. If the strength of the FTC depended 
heavily on regulatory appointments, selecting commissioners with less enthusiasm for 
consumer rights could easily enervate the FTC. And this ball was in Nixon’s court. 
 In 1973, consumer groups were hopeful that the new Congress would pass a law 
to establish a Consumer Protection Agency, but second on their agenda was legislation to 
broaden the FTC’s powers.356 Despite the FTC’s efforts under Kirkpatrick, a member of 
Ralph Nader’s team said, “there’s a feeling generally that Kirkpatrick has been too pro-
consumer or pro-antitrust, but in our view he wasn’t pro-consumer or pro-antitrust at all.” 
Mark Silbergeld, the head of the Consumer’s Union Washington Office alleged that the 
FTC’s advertising cases had “little effect on the economy,” and added that “more 
attention should be directed at monopoly situations.”357 Nixon was under intense pressure 
by consumer groups to stay the course and preserve the FTC’s regulatory vigor.  
 Despite these pressures, many powerful forces in the business community hoped 
Nixon would move in a new direction. Businesses had in some ways acquiesced to the 
FTC during the first three years, but the FTC’s proposals had stirred the ire of advertisers 
and businesses. During the beginning of Nixon’s second term, the Watergate Scandal was 
merely a murmuring and the newly elected Democratic majority in Congress was “at a 
low ebb.” President Nixon was described as being at the “height of his power” and 
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businesses predicted that he would soften his appointments to regulatory commissions.358 
An article from the New York Times forecast that “of all regulatory agencies, the Trade 
Commission, under sharp attacks by advertisers, broadcasters and other business interests 
for allegedly overstepping its authority, appears to be the most likely second-term 
retrenchment target.”359  
 It came as little surprise then, when on the morning of January 10, President 
Nixon’s press secretary Gerald Warren announced the resignation of FTC chairman 
Miles Kirkpatrick with a half-hearted “appreciation of his contribution.”360 Warren 
conveyed no regret on behalf of the president, which created suspicion that Kirkpatrick 
had been coerced to resign. Consumer groups demanded an explanation. President Nixon 
responded by releasing a letter he had written to Kirkpatrick expressing both admiration 
of Kirkpatrick’s time in the FTC and his deep regret about the resignation. Nixon’s press 
secretary took the blame for the mishap and made a public apology to Kirkpatrick.361 
 Regret or no regret, many consumer advocates feared that Kirkpatrick’s 
replacement would moderate the FTC’s brief period of regulatory strength. These fears 
were validated when Nixon appointed Lewis Engman, a long-time Nixon loyalist and 
staff member. Although Engman had been part of Nixon’s Office of Consumer Affairs 
and a member of his Domestic Council, little was know of him publicly. His age and 
credentials fit well with the new blood in the FTC—he was 37 years old and a graduate 
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of Harvard Law School and the London School of Economics.362 An article in the New 
Republic predicted that the appointment signified 
an extension of presidential command and control to the theoretically 
independent regulatory agencies, beginning with the FTC. It is difficult to 
associate Nixon command and control with the vigorous policing of the 
market that the FTC attempted under Kirkpatrick, to the intense 
annoyance and discomfort of some of the President’s most formidable 
corporate and individual constituents.363 
 
 The skepticism was shared by members of Congress, who grilled Engman 
relentlessly before his appointment was finally confirmed two weeks later. Senator Frank 
Moss, who considered the continued vigor of the FTC as the “solemn duty” of Congress, 
set the tone of the confirmation hearings by praising the agency for providing a “credible 
countervailing public force to the enormous economic and political power of huge 
conglomerates which today dominate American enterprise.” Republican Senators largely 
echoed Moss’s sentiment. Alaskan Republican Ted Stevens expressed hope that Engman 
would “become a real zealot in terms of consumer affairs” and concern that “some of 
these big business people will complain to us that you are going too far.” Moss reminded 
Engman that he had a tough act to follow because both Weinberger and Kirkpatrick had 
“taken on new life, beginning with the search for strong and rigorous developers and 
enforcers of the law and reaching out with innovative programs to restore competition 
and make consumer sovereignty more than chamber of commerce rhetoric.”364  
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 As Moss had indicated, the real test for Kirkpatrick was whether he would replace 
the FTC’s top staff—Robert Pitofsky and Alan Ward. To the dismay of consumer 
advocates, Pitofsky resigned after a few months and was replaced with Paul A. Jamarik 
as the Director of Consumer Protection. Pitofsky’s bluntness had given him a notorious 
reputation among advertisers, and the replacement, to some, signified mitigation.365 
Engman, however, maintained Alan Ward’s position as head of the Bureau of 
Competition, and in an interview with Time, Engman expressed his commitment to 
strengthening the FTC’s role to keep in check businesses that claimed to “love free 
enterprise but hate competition.”366  Engman was under intense pressure from nearly all 
fronts to continue to serve the interests of consumers, and he assured them that the FTC 
“fully endorses” projects begun by Weinberger and Kirkpatrick, and added, “I expect 
we’ll be even more vigorous.”367 
First on Engman’s Agenda: Curb Children’s Advertising 
 Part of this pressure came from a new advocacy group, Action for Children’s 
Television (ACT), which was beginning to make headlines by calling for stricter 
guidelines for advertising to children.368 ACT formed in 1968, and by 1970 had nearly 
1,000 members.369 During the period between 1970 and 1974, the group mostly sought 
regulations to children’s advertising through the FCC. By 1974, ACT had garnered public 
support for regulations to children’s advertising by posting flyers and sending press 
releases to major newspapers.  
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 Stanley Cohen, the Washington editor of Advertising Age, asked “If you were 
Engman, fresh into the chairmanship of the Federal Trade Commission, anxious to build 
an image for the new regime, where would you start?” Cohen predicted that “advertising 
to children would be a prime candidate.”370 The FTC continued to make use of testimony 
from the FTC’s 1971 Hearings on Modern Advertising Practices. Two professors who 
were involved in initial hearings—John Howard and James Hulbert—prepared a report 
for the FTC in 1973 entitled “Advertising and the Public Interest.”371 Drawing on 
evidence from the hearings, the report concluded that complaints about stereotyping of 
women and minorities were best left to advertisers’ self-regulations, but recommended 
that the FTC take more seriously the issue of advertising targeted to children.372 Because 
children under the age of six represented a “special audience” that has “less capacity to 
discriminate, both perceptually and cognitively” the report recommended an hour of 
noncommercial programming on Saturday morning staggered among the three television 
networks. 373 
 The FTC invited both advertisers and well-known members of consumer groups, 
like Robert Choate, to offer suggestions for writing specific codes for children’s TV ads. 
Initially, businesses objected to the FTC’s decision to allow consumer groups to take the 
initiative in writing the code, but they eventually conceded. The new guidelines offered 
by Choate proposed restrictions on children’s advertising, including bans on: 
testimonials, celebrity endorsements, cartoon characters, children as salespersons, ads for 
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vitamins, over-the-counter drugs, claims about enhanced stamina or growth from edibles, 
and ads with racial or gender stereotypes.374  AAF president Howard Bell referred to the 
proposals as “very controversial” because they were threatening to the “underpinnings of 
an entire industry—particularly broadcast advertising.”375 In response to the intensified 
public scrutiny, the advertising industry extended role of the NARB—its self-regulation 
group—to include guidelines for children’s advertising. Companies who advertised 
heavily to children, including Coco-Cola, General Mills, M&Ms/Mars, and McDonalds 
all had representatives in the NARB and they worked together to write the new 
guidelines.376 Chester La Roche of the 4As saw potential for the NARB to demonstrate 
the ad industry’s willingness to cooperate to improve children’s advertising, but 
consumer advocates were skeptical and continued to support FTC guidelines as a 
supplement for industry self regulation.377 
 Engman praised self-regulation, telling the 4As that he thought the NARB had 
been “great.”378 The industry’s self-regulation, however, was not without its critics. 
Dissatisfied with the FCC’s support of industry self-regulations, Robert Choate wrote a 
passionate letter to Engman in 1974, outlining his concerns about advertising to children, 
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most of which had been unaffected by self-regulation.379 In his response, Engman praised 
the “NARB’s actions with respect to advertising to children” and made a case that 
“important progress has been made.”380  
 Peggy Charren, the head of ACT, arranged a personal meeting with Engman in 
1974 to discuss the FTC’s role in regulating advertising to children. After listening to 
Charren’s concerns, Engman, filling his pipe, said, “Well, I have a seven year old, so I do 
know what you are talking about, but I don’t have much time to watch television.” In 
response, Charren reminded Engman that few parents have time to supervise every 
minute of television that their children are watching, thus making it even more important 
for broadcasters to be held accountable. Engman ended the conversation with ambiguity: 
“This is one area we’d like to get into . . . one we might introduce in rule making . . . but 
we shall wait for the court decision first.”381 
Trade Regulation Rules for Entire Industries 
 Engman was referring to the FTC’s legal right to make a trade regulation rule 
(TRR) for an entire industry, which was tied up in Appellate Court. Although he praised 
some industry self-regulations, Engman still wanted to pass a TRR to ban the promotion 
of premiums—often in the form of trinkets or toys in cereals—from children’s television 
commercials. Although this seemed like a minor change to children’s advertising, the 
initiative faced sharp criticism from television networks, the cereal industry, and 
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advertising agencies. Cereal manufacturers spent about $60 million per year on premiums 
and premium promotions were a major part of their overall marketing strategy. The 
industry also feared that the premium rule would be a slippery slope for other restrictions 
of advertising to children, like the use of cartoon characters. The promotion of premiums 
in general had increased due to the economic woes, as sellers began to use new 
promotional selling techniques. If the FTC went beyond cereals and approved restrictions 
on premiums altogether, it would effectively suspend, as one estimate suggested, a $5–10 
billion industry.382 
 Businesses made less-than-compelling arguments to oppose the premium ban. For 
example, the president of a large manufacturer of premiums wrote a letter to Engman, 
saying, “Perhaps you and Mrs. Engman can control the TV which your lovely children 
watch—but TV is a way of life and a Saturday baby-sitter for many working mothers.” 383 
Despite businesses efforts to defend the practice, consumer advocacy groups had been 
successful in pressuring Engman to take a stand on the issue. Premium promotions, 
according to Engman, were a hard-sell technique that deceived children.384 In June of 
1974, the FTC’s commissioners voted unanimously to ban references to “a premium, 
such as a prize, toy, game, or other promotional device having significant appeal for 
children under 12 years of age and unrelated to the merits of the product or service being 
promoted.”385 
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 Because this type of broad rule would require further validation of the FTC’s 
authority, the issue of regulating children’s advertising was temporarily put on hold. 
While the issue of TRRs were being settled by the Courts and Congress, Charren’s 
advocacy group maintained its pressure on the FCC to formalize guidelines, but ACT 
would later become a key player in FTC children’s advertising regulations in the last few 
years of the 1970s (see Chapter 5).  
 Trade regulation rules in advertising began with inquiries by the FTC’s Ad 
Substantiation program, which continued to target major advertising themes within entire 
industry segments after 1973. The Courts had been inconsistent on the constitutionality of 
broad trade rules by the FTC. The FTC’s two earlier TRRs—care labels on all clothing, 
and Octane ratings for gasoline—were successfully changed in 1971 only to be later 
reversed by the court of appeals.386 In 1973, the Ad Substantiation program ordered the 
eight largest manufacturers of deodorants and antiperspirants to submit data to 
substantiate claims. Because of problems interpreting the data submitted in the past, the 
FTC requested that material be put in “plain language so the average consumer will be 
able to understand it.”387 For example, the FTC’s ad substantiation program ordered 
eleven makers of shampoo and conditioner to substantiate their claims. The Wall Street 
Journal paraphrased some of the FTC queries, which included: 
How much and what kind of juice is in that “average lemon” that Gillette’s 
Lemon Up shampoo supposedly contains? What are those “crinkles” that 
Clairol says its Great Body protein-conditioner shampoo helps get rid of? 
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What are those “very special organic proteins” in RK organic shampoo that 
provide “maximum conditioning,” and what proof does Redkin 
Laboratories have for that claim?388 
 
Although the FTC had increased its scrutiny of entire industries, it still used traditional 
case-by-case adjudications, which, according to Engman, was on par with “trying to kill 
flies with a rubber ice pick. It was hard to get them; and it was hard to hurt them when we 
did get them.”389  
 In 1975, Congress answered Engman’s pleas for support with the passage of the 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-FTC Improvements Act (FTCIA). The law shored up the 
power in a number of ways. First, it broadened the FTC’s authority in the original FTC 
Act by supplanting the words “in or affecting commerce” for the original “in 
commerce.”390 This meant that the authority was no longer limited to interstate activities 
and could apply to activities within a single state. Second, the law expanded the FTC’s 
authority to investigate corporations, including individuals and corporate partnerships. 
Third, it granted the FTC the authority to pass rules for entire industries with respect to 
unfair or deceptive practices.391 Thus, the FTC would not have to prove that an act was 
deceptive or unfair, but that a trade rule—as broadly defined by the FTC—had been 
violated. This, according to marketing professor Pricilla La Barbera, was “the most far-
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reaching extension of the FTC’s power to affect marketers since the FTC Act was passed 
in 1914.”392  
 Finally, the law specified the procedures for FTC rulemaking in three significant 
ways. The first part would create more transparency and public participation, requiring 
the commission to publish notices, allow all interested parties to testify, cross-examine 
witnesses, and submit all relevant data. This abolished the chance for companies to settle 
a consent decree before the complaint was released to the public. Second, the FTC would 
be responsible for legal and witness fees for those who could not afford costs of 
participating in the procedures. Third, the commission could go directly into federal court 
to bring civil penalties for its own legal costs and seek large sums money for consumers 
in class action settlements.393 Senator Moss described the significant and historic 
implications of the FTCIA: 
As early as 1938, a minority of the House Committee reporting on the 
Wheeler-Lea Act criticized the inadequacy of the limited enforcement 
powers of the Federal Trade Commission. The recent awakening of the 
agency to its consumer protection responsibilities has made this lack of 
adequate regulatory tools even more apparent. The law will give the 
Commission the tools it needs.394 
 
 Engman concurred with Moss, stating that the new law signified a change in the 
“entire thrust of consumer protection law enforcement.” 395 Following the law’s passage 
in 1975, the FTC unveiled a ninety-five-page report for new trade regulation rules within 
specific industries. As part of the new effort for industry-wide rules, the FTC issued 
guidelines for endorsements and testimonials in ads. Experts used in ads must, according 
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to the rules, have expertise in evaluating the specific products or features. Every 
endorsement had to also “reflect the honest views of the endorser” and be a “bona-fide 
user of the product.” When actors or other paid endorsers were used, the advertiser had to 
disclose any connections that might “materially affect the weight or credibility of the 
endorser.”396 Although the FTCIA had extended the FTC’s powers, some were skeptical 
of whether celebrity endorsement rules signified a major change. To verify the fact that 
endorsers were actual users of a product was hard to prove, and furthermore, as an article 
from Time stated, “Does anyone really care? The hype of advertising works on such a 
different plane from conventional truth that it is a form of American Dada.”397  
Bolstering the FTC’s Antitrust Enforcement 
 The rising prices and oil shortages consumed the nation’s political leaders during 
the years between 1974 and 1976, overshadowing many of the FTC’s concerns over truth 
in advertising. The political debate over the Alaskan pipeline project redirected the 
economic debate from price controls and environmental protection to issues of industrial 
concentration and monopoly privileges. According to historian Joshua Ashenmiller, the 
pipeline debate “continued a heated argument that had raged since the administration of 
Theodore Roosevelt, a time when corporate monopolies were making most of the 
nation’s infrastructure decisions.”398 To help prevent the pipeline from creating an 
unregulated monopoly, Democratic Senator Henry Jackson from Washington pushed for 
greater antitrust enforcement and jurisdiction by both the Interstate Commerce 
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Commission and the FTC. Nixon, though less enthusiastic about antitrust issues, was 
under pressure to take swift action on the oil crisis and signed the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline 
Act (TAP) into law along with the riders to amend the original FTC Act. Prior to TAP, 
the FTC’s antitrust cases were not authorized to secure an injunction for a proposed 
merger in district court. In essence, the law filled this void, allowing the FTC to seek 
injunctive relief in district courts using its own attorneys. The law did not increase the 
FTC’s jurisdiction over antirust cases, but it provided a way for the FTC to move more 
quickly and effectively in cases where it found violations of the law. Language in the law 
made it clear that the law was not intended to “impose a totally new standard of proof 
different from what is required.”399  
 The TAP’s deliberation over industrial concentration and monopoly privilege was 
merely the beginning of a wave of new antitrust proposals. Lewis Engman was a staunch 
supporter of the FTC’s role in fighting industrial concentration. In a speech to the 
Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, Engman conveyed his commitment to 
investigating the ways in which concentrated industries contribute to price inflation. He 
added that the solution is “tough enforcement of the antitrust laws” in order to “attack the 
abuses of economic power.”400 In June of 1973, the FTC’s antitrust chief James 
Halverson conducted a report on the seventeen largest U.S. oil companies. The report 
found that the seven largest firms—Texaco, Gulf, Mobil, Standard of California, 
Standard of Indiana, Shell, and Atlantic Richfield—ranked in the top 25 of Fortune 500 
companies, had assets of $76 billion, and profited $4.6 billion in 1972. The report also 
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found that these companies were vertically integrated to such an extent that they 
controlled refining and distribution, allowing the industry to “maintain and reinforce a 
noncompetitive market structure.” Most troubling to the FTC were the ways in which the 
oil industry used depletion allowances and tax regulations to profit enormously amid 
anxiety for consumers over rising prices and shortages.401 Although the report did not 
charge the oil companies with conspiracy, it did accuse the companies of “conscious 
parallelism” by coordinating price, production, and marketing. Senator Phillip Hart, a 
Democrat from Michigan, went a step further and introduced the Industrial 
Reorganization Bill to provide a new legal basis for breaking up concentrated industries 
in a number of sectors, including automobiles, iron, steel, metals, chemicals, drugs, 
machinery and equipment, computing, and energy.402  
 The Senate’s Republican minority leader, Senator Hugh Doggett Scott from 
Pennsylvania, cooperated with Hart and Democratic Representative Peter Rodino to 
strengthen the FTC’s antitrust authority. The Hart–Scott–Rodino Antitrust Improvements 
Act (HSR), passed into law in 1976, added a section to the Clayton Act requiring parties 
seeking mergers or acquisitions to file notifications to the FTC and the Justice 
Department for approval. HSR went a step further than TAP by removing the opportunity 
for parties to seek informal advice from the FTC prior to official notification and gave the 
FTC the power to delay mergers while it considered the mergers’ competitive effects. 
The required “Notification of Report Form” would include full disclosure of all financial 
information related to the planning and transaction of the proposed merger. The act also 
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gave the FTC the discretion to enjoin an “early termination” of the merger prior to a full-
scale hearing.403   
 Congress, through the FTCIA, TAP, and HSR, had considerably bolstered the 
FTC’s regulatory authority. Although Democrats lacked a clear economic platform, they 
profited from the recession during the November 1974 elections by gaining forty-three 
seats in the house and three in the Senate. Many, like Democratic Senator Henry “Scoop” 
Jackson, had earned political capital by blaming the oil companies for profiting from 
false crisis.404 Republicans, under political pressure to support smaller refiners in the 
Midwest, mostly supported efforts to reign in the excess of big oil.  
Criticism of Institutional Advertising 
 The public’s faith in oil companies was at an all time low, and oil companies were 
trying to win over the public with institutional advertising. This was not an easy task. 
According to Stein, “not since the days of Ida Tarbell were oilmen raked over the coals in 
this manner.”405 In January 1974, six members of Congress petitioned the FTC to 
investigate ads by energy firms that claimed they were combating the energy crisis. 
Representatives Benjamin Rosenthal and Les Aspin charged the energy and utility 
companies with launching “an unprecedented campaign designed to convince the 
American people that they are innocent of responsibility for the current energy crisis and 
aren’t trying to undercut the environmental movement.” They added “we are very sure 
some of them . . . should be taken off the air.” Members of Congress pressured the FTC 
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to require substantiation of claims of environmental responsibility and to issue specific 
guidelines for corporate-image advertising more generally.406 
 Senator Thomas J. McIntyre, a Democrat from New Hampshire, asked the NARB 
to establish a policy on energy advertisements in light of the energy crisis. Rather than 
endorse a formal censorship program, the NARB’s chair Edwin D. Etherington defended 
the right of energy companies to continue to run image advertisements but cautioned 
against “taking advantage of current national concern over the energy matter in such a 
way as to increase an apparent sense of public mistrust of statements from those who 
have economic interests tied to energy production, sales, and consumption.”407 He 
suggested some guidelines for energy ads, but ultimately defended such ads, claiming 
“that strict observance of the First Amendment guarantees the best assurance of ultimate 
public enlightenment. I say this knowing some people argue that the First Amendment 
does not cover advertising.”408 Etherington was correct. In 1941, the U.S. Supreme Court 
drew a clear distinction between commercial and other forms of protected speech when it 
established the Commercial Speech Doctrine. By 1975, however, the issue of free speech 
rights for advertisers began to be tested from unlikely sources and strange bedfellows.  
Promoting Price Competition through Advertising 
 Engman’s commitment to ensuring competition did not come from a lack of faith 
in free enterprise, but instead from an Adam Smith–like faith in competition. An article 
from Time in 1975 aptly described Engman’s regulatory philosophy: 
                                                
406 “Ads by Energy Firms Come Under Attack by Six Congressmen,” Wall Street Journal, 
January 10, 1974, ProQuest Historical Newspapers. 




In his two years as chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, Lewis A. 
Engman, 39, has adopted what seems like a wildly improbable posture. On 
the one hand, he is an outspoken champion of the free enterprise system 
and is leading a frontal attack on the federal bureaucracy that he believes 
is subverting it. At the same time he is an aggressive regulator of business. 
Yet Engman’s self-appointed role as a sort of Ralph Nader out of Adam 
Smith involves no serious contradiction. He simply believes consumers 
are best served by a highly competitive business community, and happens 
to be in a job that allows him to press that case forcefully.409 
  
Although Engman’s dual faith in consumer protection and free enterprise did not appear 
to be contradictory, the promotion of price competition through advertising would 
eventually create a paradox for the FTC. Where competition existed, Engman believed 
that advertising promoted price competition and helped guide consumers to make 
informed decisions.  
This view of advertising translated to an effort to promote advertising where little 
or none existed: prescription drugs. “It is a curious set of values,” said Engman, “that 
says the consumer may be given full information about discretionary purchases such as 
deodorants and mouthwash but cannot be given information that will help him save 
money on drugs that a doctor has prescribed as essential to his good health.”410 Prior to 
the 1970s, pharmacists and other professionals such as doctors and lawyers had largely 
refrained from advertising because they considered their professions above the practice of 
selling consumer products. In other words, advertising degraded their professional social 
standing. Doctors, for instance, were either forbidden by law or strongly discouraged by 
professional organizations from advertising beyond phonebook entries or small office 
signs.  
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Consumer advocate Ralph Nader pushed to overturn such restrictions so that 
doctors and other medical professionals could provide information to consumers. It was 
“just as important,” argued Nader, “to know about different qualifications and standards 
of physicians as with autos and drugs.” Nader’s organization, The Health Research 
Group, published a directory of doctors in Prince George’s County, Maryland, listing 
information such as willingness to make house calls, fees, and medical training. Doctors, 
who were opposed to such a directory, argued the directory constituted advertising, and 
was therefore illegal in Maryland. In January 1974, Nader’s group filed suit to contest the 
advertising ban in Maryland and succeeded in legalizing such publications.411  
The same professional mentality held true for small, independent pharmacists. 
Twenty-seven states had laws restricting pharmacists from advertising, including 
California, Maryland, and Virginia, and the American Pharmaceutical Society strongly 
discouraged the practice. Consumer organizations were critical of the opacity and 
inconsistency of prescription prices. Consumer Reports, for example, conducted a study 
demonstrating an 840 percent price spread for the same drug in different pharmacies.412 
The conclusion by Consumer Reports was that “honest-to-goodness price advertising is 
much needed. Only the law stands in the way.”413 
 In 1974, the FTC launched an industry-wide investigation of prescription drug 
prices “to determine whether retail druggists or others have been or are engaged in 
unlawful practices under the FTC act—including, but not limited to, deceptive and unfair 
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acts in connection to the disclosure or non-disclosure of price information relating to the 
sale of prescription drugs anywhere within the United States.”414  To bolster the FTC’s 
authority, the House of Representatives drafted the “Prescription Drug Price Information 
Act” to require the FTC to oversee “procedures to implement the advertising, at the 
discretion of vendors, of prescription drug prices and in eliminating any legal 
impediments to such advertising.”415 The new law would have not only made industry 
advertising bans illegal, but would have also gone a step further, requiring rules for price 
information for commonly used pharmaceutical drugs in all advertising of such products. 
 The Pharmaceutical Society of New York represented small pharmacists in the 
state and opposed the movement to lift the advertising ban, arguing, “Pharmacy is a 
profession” and advertising violated the ethics of the business by reducing drugs to “just 
another commodity.”416 Small, neighborhood pharmacies had been staples in the U.S. 
since the turn of the century, and these smaller businesses feared that advertising by 
bigger retailers would prevent them from competing. Large chain pharmacies, however, 
saw it differently, and began to challenge the professional status quo and the legal 
constraints that slowed large-scale retailers’ domination of the market. 
 Large pharmacy chains like Pathmark, Osco, and Walgreens ingeniously 
borrowed the language of consumer organizations. Walgreens launched its own 
“consumer information program” by making its prices available for customers.417 The 
president of Pathmark cited the Consumer Reports study and attempted to align his 
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interests with those of consumers, announcing, “what we are doing is good business” by 
lifting that “veil of secrecy” for prescription drug prices.418 Pathmark filed suit in New 
York, New Jersey, and Connecticut in an attempt to overturn state laws restricting 
advertising for prescription drugs. Pathmark’s lawsuit charging that state bans violate 
“due process, goes beyond state police powers, and violates free speech laws.”419 By the 
time Pathmark filed, courts in Pennsylvania and Florida had already overturned laws 
prohibiting advertising for prescription drugs. In May of 1976, the Wall Street Journal 
reported that “up until recently, there hadn’t been much study given to the effects on the 
public of government controls on commercial speech, perhaps because the issue was 
fairly dormant before the ‘consumerist’ uprising of the 60s produced a new spate of 
control attempts. . . . the thrust of serious economic studies of those attempts has been 
that the public interest is ill-served by most curbs on commercial speech.”420 
The Commercial Speech Doctrine Discarded 
Following this set of logic, in 1976, the Virginia Citizens Council Inc., the 
Virginia State AFL-CIO, and consumer advocate Lynn B. Jordan challenged Virginia’s 
prohibition on prescription drug prices.421 The plaintiffs, represented by a lawyer from 
Ralph Nader’s Citizen Litigation Group, objected to regulations in Virginia because bans 
on advertising violated consumers’ right to obtain important price information. Virginia’s 
state board of pharmacy defended its laws based on the possibility that pharmacists 
would promote unnecessary drugs.422 The case was turned over to the U.S. Supreme 
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Court, and in May 1976, the Court ruled in favor of consumer groups 7-1 and discarded 
the Commercial Speech Doctrine, essentially extending First Amendment Protection to 
purely commercial speech. The New York Times referred to the decision as a “landmark 
victory for the consumer movement and a major reinterpretation of the free speech 
guarantee.”423 Justice Harry A. Blackmun, representing the majority opinion, justified his 
interpretation of the First Amendment as an “instrument to enlighten public decision 
making in a democracy.” He went on to say: 
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is 
nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and 
selling what product, for what reason, and for what price. So long as we 
preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our 
resources in large measure will be made through numerous private 
economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in 
the aggregate, be intelligent as well as informed. To this end, the free flow 
of economic information is indispensable.424 
 
Although the Virginia case is often cited as an affirmation of the marketplace logic in 
legal interpretation, the Court also brought commercial advertising under the First 
Amendment because they assumed advertising promoted price information for 
consumers: 
Those whom the suppression of prescription drug price information hits 
hardest are the poor, the sick and particularly the aged. A disproportionate 
amount of their income tends to be spent on prescription drugs; yet they 
are the least able to learn, by shopping from pharmacist to pharmacist, 
where their scarce dollars are being spent. When drug prices vary as they 
do, information as to who is charging what becomes more a convenience. 
It could mean the alleviation of pain or the enjoyment of basic 
necessities.425 
 
                                                
423 Ibid. 
424 Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
425 Ibid, 763 
 143 
 Chief Justice William Rehnquist was the sole dissenter in the decision, cautioning 
against the dangers of promoting prescription drugs “in the same manner as hair creams, 
deodorants, and toothpaste” because of the possibility that “they may be advertised on 
television during family viewing time.” Rehnquist feared that the ruling “could not be 
limited merely to dissemination of price alone” and furthermore “cannot possibly be 
confined to pharmacists without likewise extending to lawyers, doctors, and all other 
professions,” including advertising for liquor and cigarettes.426 His apprehensions were 
legitimate. A year later, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court struck down Arizona state 
laws barring lawyers from advertising. Justice Blackmun echoed his same marketplace 
and consumer-rights rationale for Virginia Pharmacy, claiming that Arizona’s restriction 
“serves to inhibit the free flow of commercial information and to keep the public in 
ignorance.”427 Laws that restricted doctors and other medical professionals from 
advertising were also swiftly discarded.428 
 In the months that followed the Virginia Pharmacy decision, Congress continued 
to hold hearings on the possibility of requiring the FTC to mandate specific TRRs for 
prescription drug advertising because the Court’s decision “still leaves room for 
discussion of its impact on the second section of H.R. 884, the section which would 
mandate posting of prices in pharmacies.”429  In his testimony, Dr. Geoffrey Gordon, a 
representative from the California Public Interest Research Group, called attention to the 
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“profiteering of the pharmaceutical industry.” Gordon was especially critical of 
pharmaceutical advertising for doctors in medical journals, which he said, “leaves a lot to 
be desired.”430 Gordon admitted that he “believed in advertising” but that “there must be 
supervision to prevent false and distorted advertising, and as these ads in medical journals 
point out, there is a lot of that going on, and I think if we do have advertising, there has to 
be some constraint in its wild natures.”431 
 Gordon’s words of caution fell on deaf ears, and his represented the only 
testimony to support explicit mandates for price information for prescription drug 
advertising in addition to lifting industry-wide bans. The FTC submitted a testimony as 
well, arguing that specific trade regulation rules were obviated by the Virginia Pharmacy 
decision: 
In conclusion, the [Federal Trade] commission notes that it is unclear at 
this time whether, in light of the Virginia decision there is a need for 
further action on the issue of drug price disclosures. Further action by the 
Commission has been postponed pending public comment to the 
Commission on the effect of the Virginia decision on the need for such a 
TRR [trade regulation rule]. Congress may wish to consider postponing 
final action on a legislative decision until the effects of the Virginia 
decision have been analyzed.432  
 
Bruce Chadwick, the FTC’s deputy assistant director of the Bureau of Consumer 
Protection, echoed this sentiment, testifying that the recent Supreme Court case would be 
sufficient in addressing “The most important way to assure that pharmacists pass on to 
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consumers a healthy portion of the cost savings” by assuring that “consumers have 
adequate price information.”433 
 Consumers, however, were less-than-pleased in the aftermath of Virginia 
Pharmacy. The New York Times reported that, since the ruling, price promotion was 
“spotty at best.” Betsy Mikita, the director of Philadelphia’s Consumer Council, 
protested: “Almost none of the stores in this area are advertising. People are looking for 
ads . . . but they’re not finding many.”434 Consumers weren’t necessarily looking for 
more advertising—they were looking for price information about prescription drugs. 
Although consumers were dissatisfied with the amount of price advertising after the 
ruling, advertisers celebrated the victory. Advertising Age published a piece in the 
aftermath of the decision titled “High Court ruling points up consumer, ad goals are 
same.” The article commended the ruling as  
more than merely an accolade for advertising, the decision established that 
commerce ranks equally with other activities and professions in its 
contribution to public welfare. . . . We find it ironic, yet encouraging, that 
this significant case originated with consumer groups, pleading that the 
absence of price advertising deprives them of information they need to 
operate efficiently in the marketplace. For a moment, the court has 
discovered doctrines which illuminate the common interest of consumers 
and advertisers.435 
 
 In the wake of Virginia Pharmacy, ad industry executives began maintaining that 
commercial advertising was synonymous with other libertarian principals. Less than two 
months after the ruling, the head of the agency BBDO, Tom Dillon, asked his fellow 
board members, “What does advertising contribute to the world?” Citing the First 
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Amendment throughout, Dillon venerated the freedom to advertise as similar to other 
foundational democratic freedoms: 
To exercise true freedom of choice, we’ve got to know what we’ve got a 
choice of. This is the function of advertising. We do not have free choice 
of religion unless there are speakers for a variety of candidates. We don’t 
have economic choices unless there is some way in which our alternatives 
can be brought forcibly to our attention. What the orators and preachers 
are to politics and religion, advertising is to economics. Advertising 
presents in the best possible way the best possible case for an economic 
decision to buy certain products.436 
 
 Although the ruling had united advertisers, it left constitutional uncertainties for 
the FTC.437 Long-time FTC commissioner Phillip Elman admitted that FTC actions after 
the ruling would need to withstand “strict judicial scrutiny” and “must be the least 
restrictive available.”438 In 1975, the FTC had ordered the company Beneficial Tax Corp. 
to drop the slogan “instant tax refund” because it was deceptive and misleading. After 
Virginia Pharmacy, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the FTC’s order, even 
though it agreed that the slogan was misleading. The Court reasoned that the Virginia 
Pharmacy decision “established, beyond dispute that there is no commercial speech 
exception to the First Amendment.”439 Although this beneficial case was minor, it was 
unclear what effect the case would have on other pressing and unsettled issues, including 
trade regulation rules in advertising for entire industries, and the regulation of unfair 
advertising to children.  
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The Politics of the FTC Come Full Circle 
 By 1976, the FTC was at the crossroads of a policy paradox. The FTCIA had 
significantly strengthened the FTC’s ability to protect consumers, but Virginia Pharmacy 
and the cases that followed created constitutional uncertainties for the very rules granted 
by the law. This paradox occurred within a broader political pivot toward neoliberalism. 
After Nixon resigned, his handpicked successor, Gerald Ford, pardoned him from 
criminal prosecution. The Watergate scandals opened up a space for a critique of the role 
of big business in government, and of government itself (see Chapter 4). Ford was much 
more of a libertarian conservative, and he was a critic of the type of government 
regulations and spending enacted under Nixon. In his State of the Union address in 1975, 
Ford outlined the fundamentals of his economic plan, including a one-year tax reduction 
of $16 billion, which, he argued, would “point us in the right direction” by “allowing 
taxpayers rather than the Government to spend their pay.”440 For the first time since 1960, 
the Republican National Committee’s (RNC) strategy in 1976 did not include a platform 
for consumer protection.441 And, for the first time since 1916, Republicans excluded a 
specific proposal for labor.442  Instead, Republicans created a new platform called 
“bureaucratic over-regulation,” which, they argued would prevent the federal 
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government’s “interference in the lives of the American people.”443 Under Ford’s 
leadership, the RNC was beginning to abandon its earlier pledge to revitalize the FTC by 
building a new political base of support. 
 In December of 1976, Lewis Engman announced his resignation to seek the 
Republican nomination for Michigan’s Senate race. In an ironic twist, Ford filled the 
vacancy with Paul Rand Dixon as the FTC’s acting chair. Dixon, appointed by President 
Kennedy, served as chair from 1961–1969, and had been a major target of the Nader and 
ABA reports. During Congressional Oversight hearings in 1976, Representative Edward 
Mezvinsky (D-IA) lambasted Dixon’s FTC for its long delays: 
I think it’s clear that what we are telling you—if you did not get the 
message—that we are worried about the effect of the long delays on the 
public interest and consumers. We are disturbed, also, that it takes 5 to 10 
years after filing a complaint to get it resolved. . . . I am embarrassed not 
only for you, but I am embarrassed for the public. . . . It is terribly 
disturbing.444 
 
After less than three months, before the appointment could stir up too much controversy, 
Ford replaced Dixon with Calvin Collier, a 34-year-old former director of the Office of 
Management and Budget. Collier had worked with the FTC and members of Congress to 
advocate for the FTCIA and was supported by consumer advocates on the Senate’s 
Commerce Committee.445   
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 Despite his role in helping to pass the FTCIA, Collier, during his thirteen months 
as chair, mostly stayed out of the headlines by avoiding controversies. When a New York 
Times reporter probed Collier on his priorities, he answered vaguely: “My major priority 
is to promote free and fair competition.”446 In fact, Collier stayed clear of passing any 
new TRRs altogether. In 1976, Collier halted the FTC’s earlier plans to pass TRRs 
banning testimonials and premiums from children’s ads. Instead, Collier preferred 
regulations of children’s ads on a smaller-scale, case-by-case basis.447 Collier’s reticence 
echoed Ford’s overall plan to avoid controversial initiatives that might alienate his 
promising base of support among businesses.  
Conclusion 
 Contradiction and incongruity defined the years between 1973–1976, for the FTC 
and the political economy in general. Compared to Nixon, who had unabashedly ordered 
the FTC to protect consumers, Ford’s reelection platform hinged on libertarian principals: 
“less government, less spending, less inflation.” This new libertarian rhetoric epitomized 
the shifting political paradigms of the mid-1970s. When Engman was appointed in 1973, 
both Republicans and Democrats were committed to ensuring that the FTC would 
continue to protect consumers. Advocacy groups like ACT began to mobilize more 
support for regulation of children’s advertising, and Congress significantly strengthened 
the FTC’s ability to regulate advertising and protect consumers through the FTC 
Improvements Act in 1975. Children’s advertising initiatives were put on hold, as 
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government regulators grappled with how to solve the nation’s economic crisis. Rising 
energy costs put the oil companies under the microscope, and the HSR Act shored up the 
FTC’s jurisdiction over mergers, mandated detailed premerger notifications, and allowed 
the FTC to bring a halt to mergers in early stages.  
Amid this extraordinary legislative reinforcement, consumer activists and their 
allies in the FTC drew attention to opacity and inconsistency in the market for doctors 
and pharmaceuticals. Propelled by these broader forces, the Virginia Pharmacy case 
ironically aligned the interests of consumers with those of businesses. Although 
advertisers were tentative about asserting First Amendment rights prior to 1975, the 
ruling gave advertisers justification for opposing further government restraints offered by 
the FTCIA. Virginia Pharmacy was the first of several interpretations of the First 
Amendment that would destabilize the FTC’s authority and help unite its adversaries 
around a libertarian ideal.  
 More important than the issue of jurisprudence, this libertarian view of the 
marketplace would serve as the central tenant of businesses’ massive public relations 
campaign,  which would continue throughout the rest of the decade. The Virginia 
Pharmacy decision, which was initiated with the goal of protecting consumers, opened up 
the floodgates for businesses to sell the idea that business interests were synonymous 
with democratic ideals. Many of Ford’s political positions were consistent with this 
belief, and as a result, the FTC shied away from passing laws to make industries more 
accountable for the public interest. The year 1976, however, was the in no way end of the 
FTC’s renaissance. Instead, it was the peak of this period’s overall crisis of hegemony. 
Watergate, stagflation, and the energy crisis exposed both government and corporate 
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malfeasance. In rhetoric, Ford affixed business interests with those of the public, but his 
conservative libertarianism did not have the traction it would later in the decade. Ford’s 
days appeared to be numbered, and businesses worried that a new administration would 
result in even more direct forms of government support for making private interests 
accountable. Would corporate America be able foster a backlash against the type of 
government regulations offered by the FTC? With a fresh face in the White House, would 
the public interest movement redirect the debate to preserving the powers of the FTC? 
Here, Gramsci’s observation that “the war of position demands enormous sacrifices by 
infinite numbers of people” helps theorize vigorous debates between businesses and the 
public over how to structure the American political economy in the public interest.448 As 
the following chapter details, businesses and public interest groups would continue to 
clash over this the war of position, and the outcome of this ideological struggle would 
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CHAPTER 4: ECONOMICS (RE)EDUCATION: PUBLIC RELATIONS, 
ADVOCACY ADVERTISING, AND THE RIGHT TO REBUTTAL, 1976–1978 
 
“If economists could manage to get themselves thought of as humble, competent people 
on a level with dentists, that would be splendid.” —John Maynard Keynes 
 
 In June of 1975, President Ford made his views on the FTC clear in front of the 
National Federation of Independent Businesses when he vowed to remove the “shackles 
of Federal red tape” by government, which he dubbed the “big daddy of all businesses.” 
In response to Ford’s promises to curb government regulation, the 1,500 members broke 
out in boisterous applause and ovation.449 Ford’s assurances to businesses, however, did 
little to change public opinion. By 1976, the public’s approval of business was at an all-
time low. The number of people who expressed confidence in businesses was a mere 15 
percent, down from 55 percent a decade prior.450 In addition, the recently enacted 
legislative reinforcement of the FTC gave the agency unprecedented levels of powers to 
regulate the advertising industry and the entire American economy. The Federal Trade 
Commission Improvements Act made “rulemaking a whole new ball game,” according to 
the director of the powerful trade group Grocery Manufacturers of America. Peter A. 
White of the Chamber of Commerce called FTC the “second most powerful legislative 
body in the United States” because the recent congressional powers granted it the power 
to “alter the structure of an entire industry.”451 Despite the extension of powers, a number 
of FTC initiatives were unsettled by 1976: 749 investigations, including probes into the 
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shared monopoly in the cereal and oil industries, and trade regulation rules for entire 
industries, were ongoing.  
 Although Ford’s appointees had managed to steer clear of making waves, 
members of Congress continued to pressure the FTC to move on unsettled cases. It 
seemed likely that many of these cases would result in more government oversight over 
issues of deceptive advertising and antitrust because the FTC, by 1976, appeared to have 
won the favor of the press and the public. Starting in 1970, the FTC was the first 
government agency to hold televised press conferences and install phone-in systems for 
reporters to obtain a daily update. Business executives frequently found out that their 
industry was under investigation through FTC press releases. An article in a 1976 issue of 
Business Week referred to the FTC’s press operation as “one that it would be hard for 
some of the country’s largest companies to match.”452  
 Articulating a consistent and effective response to the FTC and the growing anti-
business sentiment dominated the corporate agenda during the last half of the 1970s.453 
The epitome of such efforts was the Advertising Council’s largest campaign in its thirty-
four-year history—a massive drive that began in 1976 to educate the public on the subject 
of economics called the American Economic System (AES). This campaign was 
circulated to millions of Americans and successfully solidified various elements of the 
conservative economic movement. Despite its success, the AES campaign stirred 
controversy over the Advertising Council’s version of economics because of its alleged 
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corporate-industry bias.454 In response to the Ad Council, a broad coalition of progressive 
groups launched its own version of economics education, which stressed the notion that 
government regulation was the only way to direct corporate activity to preserve 
democratic freedom and human rights.455 Backed by the Public Media Center, this 
coalition filed a petition for the FCC to review its policies on public service 
announcements.456 Both groups relied on the First Amendment: while the Public Media 
Center argued that the logic of a free press guaranteed broadcasting time for its own 
economic campaign, the Ad Council maintained that setting guidelines for PSAs would 
violate its individual First Amendment rights.457 Progressive groups and advertisers 
offered contrasting views of democratic ideals and of the political economy in general, 
and the debates between businesses and reformers produced sharp ideological currents 
that would set the parameters of political debate for the next thirty years.  
Challenging Existing Paradigms  
 These debates occurred within this period’s overall crisis of hegemony. During 
the mid-1970s, the post-war consensus—that businesses, labor, and government work in 
tandem to balance prosperity for all—was beginning to erode to make way for a new 
social order. Gramsci described such a crisis as one that “consists precisely in the fact 
that the old is dying and the new cannot be born: in this interregnum, morbid phenomena 
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of the most varied kind come to pass.”458 In such a crisis, according to Gramsci, 
intellectuals, through ideological tools like education and the media, become central to 
the broader political struggle for hegemony. This was no easy task. Gramsci observed the 
problems presented by “creating a new stratum of intellectuals,” which required a 
massive innovation of the “physical and social world” toward a “new equilibrium.”459 
Gramsci elaborated on what this creation required: 
One of the most important characteristics of any group that is developing 
towards dominance is its struggle to assimilate and conquer 
“ideologically” the traditional intellectuals, but this assimilation and 
conquest is made quicker and more efficacious the more the group in 
question succeeds in simultaneously elaborating its own intellectuals.460 
 
As Gramsci foresaw, the creation of new intellectuals was crucial element of the war of 
position. Bryce Harlow, Proctor and Gamble’s government relations chief, understood 
this as well. Harlow referred to the “debilitating regulatory schemes,” and said that it was 
to “pontifications of academics long ago that most of these schemes owe their origins.” 
He went on to explain: 
Yes, we can win this or that skirmish now, and we can triumph in a major 
battle here or there, as recently we have—but if we want to win not mere 
skirmishes but the war, if we want to regain the luxury of spending less 
not more time struggling with governmental vexations, we must rally . . . 
research and scholarly activities that are genuinely consecrated to the 
advancement of capitalism and free, competitive, private enterprise.461  
 
The advancement of new intellectuals was a fundamental strategy on behalf of businesses 
during the mid-1970s. The expansion of a new type of economic paradigm preoccupied 
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businesses during this period. The political and economic traumas of the mid-1970s 
fueled these ideological shifts. 
 The political scene in the wake of Watergate provided an extraordinary 
opportunity for both businesses and public interest groups to redirect government policies 
in their favor. The Watergate scandals exposed more than a cover up of the illegal break-
in at the Democratic headquarters. The investigations of Watergate also revealed that 
corporations had illegally contributed to campaigns for federal offices. David Vogel 
writes that the “break-in and the illegal campaign contributions were, in fact, closely tied: 
it was the company funds—many dispersed in cash—that financed many of the unethical 
and illegal activities associated with the president’s reelection campaign.”462 A number of 
corporate political scandals were revealed during the years between 1973 and 1976. Most 
horrifying, was the ways that the International Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT) 
lobbied for the State Department to prevent socialist Salvador Allende from becoming the 
President of Chili. This exposure, according to Vogel, “made the conglomerate 
multinational the most widely criticized corporation in the United States during the mid-
1970s—a status previously held by General Motors.” By 1975, public hostility toward 
corporations was at an all time high.463 
This public disenchantment with the Republic party helped Democrats gain forty-
nine seats in the house and five in the Senate during the 1975 elections. Although 
Watergate gave a temporary boost to progressive causes, it also provided an anti-
government platform for conservatives. Historian Bruce Schulman describes the political 
scene in the wake of the 1976 election: 
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In 1976, enough resentment persisted that Gerald Ford, Nixon’s pardoner, 
narrowly lost the presidency to an unknown whose platform consisted of a 
fairly convincing promise that he would never lie to the American people. 
But the general trends bolstered conservatives. The ultimate lesson of 
Watergate remained “you can’t trust government.” The scandal reinforced 
a generalized antigovernment passion whose main effect worked against 
Democrats and liberals and for Republicans and Conservatives.464 
 
Watergate alone did not cause this political shift; it merely provided a fulcrum for 
businesses to oppose government regulation. Businesses could take advantage of the 
collapse of faith in government institutions and tout the market as the best way to 
overcome a number of social problems.  
 This rupture occurred in tandem with continued economic woes. With inflation 
still high and unemployment at nearly 8 percent, the debate over how to solve the 
nation’s economic crisis continued throughout the latter half of 1970s.465 According to 
Judith Stein, “When economies do poorly, reigning economic paradigms are questioned. 
Keynesianism was in trouble, but the alternative was not evident.”466 This debate was 
evident in the 1975 congressional conference called “Long-Range Economic Planning in 
a Free Society.”467 Top business executives from General Motors and the NAM were 
present, alongside Paul Sweezy of the Monthly Review and the president of the 
progressive Public Interest Economic Center.468 The 1976 Nobel Prize for Economics 
went to Keynesian Wassily Leonteif and libertarian Milton Freidman. A New York Times 
article aptly described this period as an “intellectual vacuum” caused by the “theoretical 
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paralysis” in economics.469 John Cobbs, the editor of Business Week, captured this split in 
economic paradigms: 
As the scope of economics widens, so does the battlefield. But like the 
classic feud between the Hatfields and the McCoys, the fight between 
those who want government intervention and those who believe in laissez-
faire continues from generation to generation. Today’s battles between the 
Keynesians and the monetarists are fought as bitterly as anything that went 
on in Appalachia.470 
 
Cobbs concluded that the disputes in economics opened up a “great opportunity for 
thoughtful presentation of economic ideas”471 on behalf of businesses. Friedman’s 
economic theory was attractive to businesses because at its core was the assumption that 
free markets, not governments, were the best regulator of economic activity. The 
emerging Chicago School trend in economics challenged the reigning logic of Keynesian 
economics, which assumed that government spending and regulation would create 
economic stability and prosperity. The Chicago School trend was as much an economic 
theory as a moral theory, according to economic historian Jeff Madrick, because it was 
“nearly a utopian or religious promise . . . a moral call for the protection of personal 
freedom.”472 Businesses began to grapple with how to create a new equilibrium within 
the period’s interregnum, and this played out in the academy and in the press.  
Treetops Propaganda and the Academic–Journalistic Complex 
 Changes in public relations fueled businesses’ success in popularizing the free 
market trend in economics. According to the late Australian sociologist Alex Carey, 
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businesses during the 1970s established “complete business hegemony over the American 
Mind” with a massive public relations program of “conservative economic education.”473 
Two types of corporate propaganda grew tremendously during the 1970s: grassroots, 
aimed at influencing the public at large, and treetops, aimed at influencing government 
officials and other opinion leaders. A new breed of lavishly funded conservative think 
tanks like the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, the Heritage 
Foundation, and the Business Roundtable began to, in Carey’s words, “focus on the 
mobilization of intellectuals on behalf of corporate interests.”474  
 By the mid-1970s, trade associations admitted that they made a number of 
missteps by underestimating the influence of consumer activists. First, during the early 
1970s, they had focused too heavily on influencing the outcomes of individual pieces of 
legislation. As part of this overall strategy, many trade groups and large organizations 
moved their headquarters from hubs of manufacturing in the Midwest to Washington, 
D.C., to keep careful watch on lawmakers. From 1968–1978, corporations with offices in 
Washington, D.C., increased fivefold.475 This strategy was often effective in shaping 
legislation, but it did not produce a consistent ideology and, in some cases, it merely 
solved one problem by producing another.476 In its fervent campaign to squelch the 
Cabinet-level Department of Consumer Affairs, businesses made that case that the 
proposed department would overlap and eventually absorb the FTC. In doing so, some 
businesses came out in support of strengthening existing federal agencies instead of 
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adding a new bureaucracy to the federal government. This tacit support of the FTC, as the 
last three chapters have shown, proved unsuccessful. When the FTC’s powers were 
bolstered by the Magnuson-Moss FTC Improvements Act, businesses were mostly taken 
by surprise. The chief lobbyist for the Chamber of Commerce recalled that the law “was 
done with a business community mostly unaware. We just started getting called from 
major businesses around the country saying, we just heard that this bill passed, what is 
it?” He explained that “business didn’t want to try to fight against something with a 
consumerist handle on it. They weren’t sophisticated, they weren’t well organized.”477  
More than a lack of internal organization, businesses, during the first few years of 
the decade, had lacked solidarity. Rather than rallying together, broadcasters and 
manufacturers distanced their industries from the publicly disgraced advertising industry. 
For example, in 1971, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce blamed the ad industry for a 
number of deceptive practices and expressed some support for the FTC’s advertising 
regulations.478 Finally, businesses in some ways had legitimized consumer activists by 
celebrating their achievements. In 1973, for example, the Chamber of Commerce chair 
Edward R. Rust declared, “Business should be grateful for Ralph Nader. He is single-
mindedly committed to making the free enterprise system work as it’s supposed to—to 
making marketplace realities of the very virtues that businessmen ascribe to the 
system.”479  
 By the mid-1970s, however, the Chamber was changing its tune. Its chairman, 
Charles H. Smith, in 1974, opened a speech to National War College with the story of 
                                                
477 Quoted in Vogel, Fluctuating Fortunes, 135. 
478 “FTC Finds a Friend,” 27, 28.  
479 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is quoted by Michael Pertschuk in Revolt Against 
Regulation, p. 16. In 1966, the Chamber named Ralph Nader as one of its outstanding young 
men.  
 161 
Napoleon Bonaparte, whose major weakness was a misunderstanding of basic economics. 
Smith blamed the “so-called regulatory agencies” for “decreasing productivity and 
raising costs to the consumer.” Smith warned that the future generations of Americans 
would “witness the elimination of capitalism, and the substitution of state ownership of 
means of production and a centrally planned economy.” He ended his speech with a call 
to action: “The longer we procrastinate in changing course, the more dangerous becomes 
our position. It is high time that we begin to identify and seek to avoid currents that carry 
us downstream at an ever-accelerating pace until we reach a channel from which there is 
no possibility of return.”480 
 Who did businesses blame for the backlash against them? The chairman of 
Westinghouse Corporation blamed the “ripple of hostility” on “college professors to their 
students, citizens’ groups to governments, government to the news media and the media 
to the general public.”481 In 1977, Henry Ford announced his resignation from the Ford 
Foundation, reminding that his foundation was a “creature of capitalism” but that it was 
“hard to discern of this fact in anything the Foundation does [or in] the universities that 
are beneficiaries of the Foundation’s great programs.”482 William Simon, who served as 
treasury secretary under Nixon and Ford advocated for business foundations to “rush by 
multimillions . . . to funnel desperately needed funds to scholars, social scientists, writers 
and journalists who understand the relationship between political and economic 
liberty.”483 
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W. Allen Wells, the Chancellor at the University of Rochester, had a solution to 
the “movement away from limited government and individual freedom . . . toward 
pervasive government control of all activities.”484 Dismissing attempts at persuading 
members of Congress, Wells saw great potential in influencing what he called “the 
academic-journalistic complex,” which he defined as: 
the people who get their data second hand and their experiences 
vicariously, and who write and talk; the professors, school teachers, 
ministers, commentators, columnists, novelists, dramatists—even poets 
and lyricists. These are, of course, also the chief carriers of the prevailing 
tides of opinion. These are the people who disseminate ideas. 485 
 
In the end of his address, Wells cited the University of Chicago’s Economics Department 
as a fruitful area of pro-business academic work. According to economic historian Alfred 
Malabre, Friedman’s theories during the early 1970s were “gaining ground on campuses 
where Keynesian economics had long reigned supreme.”486 At the University of Chicago, 
Friedman recruited a number of like-minded economists, including Michael Darby, who 
later became an important economic adviser for Presidents Reagan and Bush. Many of 
the Chicago School’s protégés would later take up leadership positions at prestigious 
economics departments like Carnegie-Mellon and Brown.  
 Starting in the mid-1970s, businesses began to form partnerships with the Chicago 
School to help disseminate and popularize its theoretical approach. For example, in 1975, 
ITT Continental sponsored a lecture series called “Advertising and Society” edited by 
University of Chicago economics professor Yale Brozen. It was an ideal marriage: ITT 
had been a major target of the FTC since its revitalization, and Brozen was an outspoken 
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critic of the FTC’s advertising and antitrust reforms. The lecturers in the series made the 
case that advertising was helping the economy, informing consumers, and furthering 
competition.487 In 1976, the Phillips Petroleum Company launched the American 
Enterprise film series for colleges and grade schools, along with a $1.25 million 
television and print campaign to promote the films.488 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
created films for classrooms, and the Joint Council on Economic Education shaped 
educational materials in economics for schools and universities. The Business 
Roundtable sponsored a series of advertisements and op-eds on Friedman-style 
economics in Readers Digest. The International Association of Business Communicators 
launched a journal entirely devoted to assessing and improving these various economic 
education programs.489   
 The Chicago School’s brand of economics was also gaining more credibility in 
the popular press. More than any other force, Malabre argues “the role of journalism—
and particularly that of The Wall Street Journal—appears, in retrospect, to have been a 
crucial element in Washington’s adoption of supply-side economics.”490 The monetarist 
policies were receiving wider recognition because of the growth of columns devoted to 
economics. Friedman and other economists rotated columns in Newsweek. Time 
magazine organized a board of economists and the Wall Street Journal’s regular 
economic contributors included a number of Friedman supporters.491 Although 
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Freidman’s economic theories were gaining attention in academia and the press, this 
“dismal science,” according to one ad industry exec, would “not be readily gobbled up 
with enthusiasm by the public at large.”492 The Chancellor at the California State 
University and Colleges echoed this concern to the Commonwealth Club over what he 
called “a nation of economic illiterates.” He concluded that despite the “many 
organizations [that] have been involved in the front line battle against economic 
illiteracy, an all-out coordinated, comprehensive, fully integrated effort has yet to be 
achieved.”493  
The Ad Council Steps In  
 The Ad Council was certainly qualified to take on this colossal task. Since its 
inception during World War II, the Ad Council had been the leading producer of a variety 
of public service campaigns. As many historians have demonstrated, the Ad Council was 
in large part formed as public relations vehicle for the ad industry itself.494 During the 
1960s, its President Robert Keim viewed the Ad Council as an organization that 
addressed “democracy’s unfinished business.”495 It tackled issues of racial inequality in 
America’s urban areas, ways to assist minority-owned businesses, and launched one of its 
longest running campaigns in support of the United Negro College Fund. According to 
Robert Jackall and Janice M. Hirota, the Ad Council during the late-1960s and early 
1970s “took on somewhat religious like tones. Its watchwords became ‘volatility’ and 
                                                
492 B.A. Cummings, “5-Year Campaign to Educate the Public on Economic System,” Editor and 
Publisher 108 (December 13, 1975): 45–46, at 46. 
493 Glenn S. Duke, “A New Dimension to Economic Education,” Vital Speeches, August 6, 1976, 
727, emphasis added. 
494 Stole, “The ‘Salesmanship of Sacrifice’”; R. Griffith, “The Selling of America,” Business 
History Review 59, no. 1 (1983): 394. 
495 Robert Jackall and Janice M. Hirota, Image Makers: Advertising, Public Relations, and the 
Ethos of Advocacy, 1st ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 58. 
 165 
‘relevancy’ . . . council leaders saw themselves as ‘roof raisers,’ lending a helping hand 
to neighbors in need.”496  
 The Ad Council’s campaigns, however, emphasized social and individual 
responsibility at the expense of social reforms. A Washington Post op-ed from 1973 
described the Ad Council’s opportunistic agenda: 
Since radio and television stations broadcast Ad Council propaganda at 
license renewal time, their stuff blankets the country and probably does 
affect people’s thinking, if not their behavior, which is really all the 
authorities want. They don’t really care if you stop throwing trash in the 
streets, but what they do want you to believe is that, “people start 
pollution. People can stop it.”497 
 
As the article implies, the Council’s anti-litter campaign blamed litterbugs, in lieu of 
institutions, for causing pollution. In the same vein, the first drug abuse prevention drive 
omitted any discussion of legal drugs, and stressed the idea that parents were responsible 
for problems of drug abuse among America’s young people.498 The Ad Council’s 
Inflation Campaign used similar tactics. With slogans like “America. It only works as 
hard as we do,” the Ad Council suggested that inflation could be combated with 
increased productivity, rather than decreased consumer spending or increased 
competition. And, it was perhaps not a coincidence that the Council’s messages about 
highway safety, which focused on drunk and distracted driving, came out shortly after the 
debut of Nader’s Unsafe at Any Speed.   
 Despite the various ways in which the Ad Council had woven subtle pro-industry 
messages into its various public service campaigns, it did little to quell the continued 
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public support for government regulations. Like many other business leaders, the Ad 
Council recognized the ways in which heavy-handed public relations resulted in a 
“negative impact” and a “corresponding loss of credibility.” Instead, the Ad Council 
supported the existing efforts on behalf of businesses to become “seriously involved in 
our society” to explain the ways in which “the community, the people and their dignity, 
and the rights of others” are “inextricably interwoven with sales, profits, dividends and 
business success.”499  
 Howard Morgans, a long time supporter of the Ad Council and the CEO of 
Proctor and Gamble, was instrumental in persuading the Council to initiate the AES 
campaign. In December of 1973, Morgans was given the Ad Council’s award for public 
service. During his acceptance speech, Morgans surprised his audience by criticizing the 
ways in which business leaders had tried to become “statesman” by engaging in and 
promoting “their ‘good works’—in aiding education, in helping to solve social problems 
of all kinds.” Instead, he called upon business leaders to respond to the growing “attacks 
on profit motive” by promoting the notion that profit motive “is the mainspring of our 
whole economic structure and one of the greatest instruments of public service ever 
devised.”500 Rather than the assiduity with which businesses had worked to oppose 
various regulations, this argument provided a unified front for all actions that set limits 
on big business. And, it served as the major impetus for the Ad Council’s largest 
campaign since its inception during World War II.  
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 Morgan’s assertions were crystallized in October of 1974, when the Secretary of 
Commerce, Fredrick Dent, spoke to the Ad Council: 
The public is now being asked to make critical and informed judgments on 
vastly complex economic issues related to public politics, actions and 
legislative proposals. It is being asked to evaluate the many and diverse 
points of view being debated across the whole breadth of this nation. The 
question is, do we have the basic understanding of our American 
economic system to make these judgments and help decide these critical 
issues? It is clear that economic ignorance as well as political apathy is 
what caused less than one-half of voters to participate in off-year election 
of Congress—our federal budgeters. This is our crisis of America. We do 
not understand basic economics. We do not understand political 
responsibility. If we understand the former, I am sure the latter will 
follow.501 
 
The speech from Dent provided a strategy for the Ad Council: a campaign to educate the 
public about economics.  
Funding the Campaign 
 The Department of Commerce supplied the Ad Council with initial grants from 
reserves in its Minority Enterprise budget ($125,000) and from its allocation for 
Economic Development ($114,000). These grants would allow the Ad Council to 
compile and evaluate existing survey data on public attitudes about the American 
economy.502   
 Compton Advertising enthusiastically volunteered its agency to take on the task 
of data analysis and creative execution. Barton Cummings, the head of Compton, 
estimated that the campaign would cost the agency $250,000–300,000 per year in 
resources and time spent on “planning the campaign, designing and analyzing the 
research, writing campaign materials, and preparing print and broadcast 
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advertisements.”503 This was an investment with high return. Cummings believed that it 
would receive support from many of its clients, including Proctor and Gamble. The Ad 
Council and Compton projected that the total expenses for a campaign would cost about 
$25 million—more than its total expenditures for all campaigns in 1974 and more than 
the budget for any campaign in the Ad Council’s history.504  
 On September 29, 1976, Aldo Podesta, the vice president of the Advertising 
Council, stressed the importance of the campaign to 400 local business leaders at the 
National Conference for Better Business Bureaus: “It is a privilege for me to present to 
this distinguished group what we believe to be one of the most exciting, the most 
challenging, and probably the most important campaign conducted by the Advertising 
Council in its 34 years of existence.”505 The AES campaign was a catalyst to stimulate 
more financial support from 1976–1977 than any year prior to the Ad Council’s 
founding. In 1977, the Ad Council celebrated the $1.9 million it had raised from private 
companies as a “feat unparalleled in Council history.”506 
Opinion Polls Offer Opportunities 
 The campaign was officially launched in 1976 after two years of detailed 
assessment of the existing survey data. As far back as 1972, the AAF commissioned a 
study about trends in opinion toward businesses. The computerized results coded from 
3,000 face-to-face interviews revealed a sharp decrease in approval for the “free 
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enterprise system.” Young, affluent, college-educated professionals were among those 
with the sharpest decline in approval of business. More alarming to businesses was the 
attitude of teenagers, the “future adults and future consumers.” High school seniors who 
reported that the “bad outweighed the good” in the free enterprise system increased 
fivefold. In terms of consumer issues, the AAF study found an increase in those who 
supported “legislation for control, for getting government involved in business, based on 
this awareness of consumerism.”507 Without the public’s approval, businesses’ goals of 
deregulation and tax cuts were uncertain. The report called upon business to  
stem a flood tide of adverse public opinion if it is to continue to prosper. 
The business community must educate those areas where half-truths dwell 
and must hold itself accountable in those areas where it has fallen down in 
its responsibilities. . . . Business must, by its deeds and words, correct 
these basic feelings of suspicion and resentment about contributions to 
American life.508 
 
Although the surveys revealed that confidence in business was at an all time low, some of 
the study’s findings provided a way for corporate interests to enter into the public debate. 
For one, favorable opinions about other institutions, including government, labor, and 
religion, had declined as well. Although government regulations were viewed in positive 
ways, Americans were for the most part not “asking for fundamental structural change in 
the economic system.” The Ad Council’s campaign, thus, could emphasize “tweaking” 
over more sweeping changes. Survey respondents also overestimated the amount of 
profits earned by corporations per every dollar—a falsehood the Ad Council hoped to 
correct. When respondents were prompted to speak to the positive aspects of the 
economy, they framed the issues mostly in terms of “freedom and economic mobility of 
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the individual.”509 The study also concluded that many people felt disconnected from 
profits; when asked, nearly 37 percent of Americans could not think of any way that their 
lives were directly affected by the rise and fall of business profits. These results would 
serve as a basis for the strategic planning of the entire campaign.  
Strategies and Themes 
 The Ad Council recognized the limitations of conveying all economic information 
in advertising alone, which is why it used advertisements to prompt readers to send in for 
a free booklet entitled The American Economic System and Your Part in It. The twenty-
four-page book was colorful and illustrated by Charles Schulz, the creator of Peanuts 
comic strip. The overall goal of the booklet was to champion the idea that profit motive 
was the engine of the American economy and prosperity in general. Relying on extensive 
survey data, the Council hyped the idea that individual freedom was the foundation of 
free enterprise and the American economy and used as platform the lack of faith in 
government to frame government regulation as an adversary to economic prosperity.  
Individualism as the Engine of the Economy 
 First, as the title would suggest, the booklet stressed the significant role of each 
individual in the American Economy. Omitting mention of consumer groups or a lengthy 
discussion of labor unions, it emphasized the idea that “[t]he key role that makes 
everything work is played by you, in your role as a consumer.” It also drew connections 
between consuming and other forms of democratic participation, declaring that each 
American plays a part as a “consumer, producer, and a voter” by exercising “freedoms of 
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economic choice.” By performing labor and work, the booklet referred to workers 
themselves as producers, with similar goals as larger corporate producers: 
 
Who are these producers in the American Economic System? You may 
think only in terms of large businesses, but, in all probability, you are a 
producer yourself. Workers are producers. They apply their basic skills 
and energies to change resources into goods and services.510  
 
 By calling attention to the role of individual consumers, the AES booklet made 
clear a direct relationship between “what was produced and what was consumed.” During 
the first half of the 1970s, the FTC had relied on theories of competition to regulate 
advertising and antitrust. Contrary to the theories of competition upon which the FTC had 
relied, the booklet omitted discussing the ways in which concentrated industries inflate 
prices, and relied instead on supply and demand as the “forces that ultimately determine 
the levels of production and employment in the economy.” Supply, according to this 
logic, was determined solely by the consumer, “who may decide that a product is not 
worth the cost of producing it, and then this happens, and if the situation continues very 
long, the product will be forced off the market.”  
Big Government  
 The booklet included a breakdown of government expenditures in 1975: $531 
billion or roughly $7,500 per household. Research revealed that most people tend to over 
estimate the amount of business profits, and the booklet sought to correct this 
understanding with a chart showing that over 76 percent of the earned income went to 
wages and benefits for individuals, while only 7.6 percent went to corporations. It also 
addressed the fact that “debt of all government units beginning in 1975 was estimated at 
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almost $644 billion” by comparison to the mortgage debt on private homes, which was 
$524 billion. Although it did not blame one single factor, the booklet included a chart of 
the “large increases in public employees.” It also stressed the fact that 3.6 cents on every 
dollar of sales by corporations went to corporate income taxes, while corporations 
retained only 2.4 cents.  
Profits Are Good for All 
 Those profits, the booklet claimed, were “typically used for business expansion, 
for new plants and equipment, or to repay loans.” A major theme in the booklet was that 
profits ultimately benefit everyone by increasing competition and creating new jobs. One 
claim throughout was that increased profits result in more competition: 
Profit margin, if it’s large enough, encourages new businesses to enter this 
field. Now there’s more competition among sellers, and this tends to 
reduce prices and or improve products—or both. And it means larger 
supply. 
 
Quoting the U.S. constitution, the booklet underscored the ways in which the constitution 
was a doctrine of individual liberty. The AES booklet ended with a patriotic theme for the 
bicentennial: 
For 200 years, America has prospered, defended individual freedoms, 
offered hope and opportunity for to people from many lands and of many 
beliefs, and met challenges with confidence and determination. Our 
economic system has been a major element of this tradition. The system 
must continue to be a vital source of strength and achievement if we are to 
maintain our progress in the years to come.511 
 
The upcoming bicentennial celebrations provided the Ad Council with a patriotic theme 
of freedom and hope. The booklet’s overall tone was, as the Ad Council and its 
government sponsors had wanted, relatively “reasoned, friendly, and involving” by 
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“avoiding propagandizing or defensive statements.” In order to meet the goals of 
distributing the booklet to millions of Americans, the Council knew it needed cooperation 
from many groups, including government, labor groups, businesses, and mass media.512 
Mass Media Support 
 In order to make the campaign a success, the Ad Council knew that it first had to 
convince media outlets to run the ads free of charge. Council president Robert Keim gave 
a passionate speech to a variety of press officials at the National Symposium of Business 
and the Media. He began his speech with an oft-cited quote by media scholar Marshall 
McLuhan: 
All media work us over completely. They are so pervasive in their 
personal, political, economic, aesthetic, psychological, moral, ethical, and 
social consequences that they leave no part untouched, unaffected, 
unaltered. The medium is the message.513 
 
 Using Theodore Peterson’s theory of social responsibility of the press, Keim 
made a case that it was the press’s responsibility to correct the public’s “incomplete and 
fragmentary” understanding of economics: “If the social responsibility theory of the 
press—which can be extended to business and education as well—does indeed prevail, 
and I believe it will, we should then see more clearly the beginning of the end of 
economic illiteracy.”514 Using Peterson’s theory as the backbone, the Ad Council 
arranged to have speakers stress the importance of the campaign to major newspapers and 
press associations. In Wisconsin, ad clubs helped to distribute the Ad Council’s message 
on a massive scale by convincing newspapers to run free, full-color reproductions of the 
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booklet. Frank Flood, the advertising manager for New York Daily News, spoke to the 
International Newspaper Advertising Executives in 1976 and pitched the campaign as a 
way for newspapers to “really show our pull and influence” by “combat[ing] our nation’s 
widespread economic illiteracy.”515 
The Multiplier Effect 
 With the cooperation of mass media, the Ad Council hoped that the “ultimate pay-
off” would mean influencing other opinion leaders, including “corporate chief executive 
officers, school superintendents, presidents of labor unions and trade associations, 
members of Congress, heads of college and university economics departments, chambers 
of commerce, Better Business Bureaus, libraries, and others.”516 By keeping track of 
similar corporate programs, the Council provided materials for speakers, offered advice 
on strategy, and assisted in localized efforts.517  
 Another goal was to create an “economics reading rack display” with the AES 
booklet in every library and school. The American Library Association agreed to work 
with over 10,000 libraries across the country to prominently display the ads with the AES 
booklet request cards. A children’s version of the booklet was distributed to a number of 
school boards, PTAs, and teachers to use for teaching material, and more sophisticated 
versions were widely distributed to colleges and universities.518 The Council’s booklet 
and other classroom material served as the basis for a new class, “Free-Enterprise—
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Understanding the System” in the New York public school system.519 The Ad Council 
also sent its materials to major universities, including Yale, Purdue, and Washington 
University. With help of the Tulsa AAF Chapter, the AES booklet was distributed to 
5,000 eighth graders and used as part of its core economics curriculum. The state of Utah 
required economics in public schools, and the Salt Lake City AAF arranged forums to 
promote its booklet as part of Utah’s economics curriculum.  
 The effort to shape economic education in school systems was widely successful, 
but influencing adults presented more challenges. The Ad Council reported that 
Undue attention goes to reaching children in school, largely in the belief 
that only young people are susceptible to having their ideas shaped. But 
recently adult ideas have shifted dramatically on many questions, and the 
threat to the business system is acute now—not 10 years from now.520 
  
The only practical way to reach the adult population, according to Ad Council vice 
president Al Podesta, was “by mass communications.” This, however, was a problem for 
the Ad Council, because only a few months into the launch of the campaign, the Ad 
Council’s effort was stirring controversy and backlash from progressive groups and 
government officials. 
AES Campaign Under Fire 
Government Officials and Economists 
 Despite the fact that the $239,000 given to the Council by the Commerce 
Department was a drop in the bucket compared to the millions it had raised in private 
donations, Representative Benjamin Rosenthal, a Democrat from New York, referred to 
the expenditure as “the most wasteful and obscene thing I’ve ever seen” and urged 
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networks to refuse the air Ad Council’s campaigns. 521 Rosenthal was a high-ranking 
member of Congress, Chair of the Government Operations Consumer Subcommittee, and 
a well-known consumer advocate.522 Because of the campaign’s clear “corporate-industry 
bias,” Rosenthal questioned the Ad Council’s tax-exempt status as a nonprofit 
organization.523 In addition, Rosenthal, through letters to networks, pressured CBS, NBC, 
and ABC to not run the campaign: 
the Commerce Department took $239,000 earmarked for the creation of 
jobs and minority business opportunities and turned that money over to the 
Ad Council to produce an economic understanding booklet that reflected 
the economic view of the Nixon-Ford administrations. Economics and 
politics are so interrelated that no government agency should be involved 
in an economic understanding campaign and no booklet setting forth an 
allegedly balanced view of our economic system should carry a Federal 
“seal of approval” under the guise of a public service message.524 
 
 The AES campaign drew flak from scholars as well, among them, Professor 
James Tobin, a Yale University economist, former adviser to President Kennedy, and 
1981 Nobel Laureate. Tobin worried that “many will be deceived because smooth 
Madison Avenue language gives the impression of telling how the economy works 
without ever doing so.” The Ad Council, according to Lester Thurow of MIT, “has 
chosen to ignore all of our society’s economic problems.”525 Paul Davidson of Rutgers 
commented, “At best, the booklet represents a Panglossian view of the American 
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Economy, and at worst it diverts attention from the hard economic issues that our nation 
will face in the coming years.”526 
Progressive Organizations Join the Fray 
 A number of other progressive groups made public condemnations about the Ad 
Council’s campaign.527 The director of a nonprofit agency, the Public Media Center, 
labeled the AES campaign as a “sham” because it “represents corporate interest, not the 
public interest.” Terry Henderson of the National Education Association called it a 
“subtle, insidious—but very sophisticated—propaganda device.” The Consumer 
Federation of America claimed that the AES booklet gave a “fuzzy view of the economic 
system, and there are a lot of gaps.”528 
 The Ad Council also faced criticism from a progressive organization, the People’s 
Bicentennial Commission (PBC). Jeremy Rifkin, the founder of the group, had earned the 
reputation as “the best P.R. man in town” among his Washington, D.C., political 
counterparts.529 In 1973, during celebrations for the 200th anniversary of the Boston Tea 
Party, the group dumped oil barrels into Boston Harbor to protest political influence of 
the big oil companies. The PBC also launched “Campaign Corporate Exposure,” whereby 
it sent letters to the homes of thousands of corporate executives and offered a $25,000 
reward for secretaries who would provide information about illegal corporate 
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misconduct.530 The PBC had made enemies in the corporate world, but plenty of friends 
as well. By 1976, the PBC had raised close to $1 million.531 
 Rifkin gained media attention for his opposition to the Ad Council drive when he 
organized a press conference on the same day that the Ad Council unveiled the AES 
campaign. The PBC accused the Ad Council of trying to teach economics from a 
“Chamber of Commerce perspective” without “discussing the policies that adversely 
affect the industrial health and safety of workers” or “issues of pollution or the flight of 
capital.” Keim defended the AES campaign on the basis that it did not advocate for 
“capitalism,” but merely for “free enterprise.”532 The PBC pledged to monitor the stations 
that aired the AES campaign and draw on the U.S. Fairness Doctrine to promote its own 
economics education campaign.533  
 Rifkin boasted about the skillful way his group had conducted PR, claiming, “one 
woman on our staff writes better ad copy than J. Walter Thompson.” One of PBC’s ads 
juxtaposed a gas station worker, who was jailed for ten years because of stealing a few 
hundred dollars, with a corporate chairman, who received no jail time for stealing $48 
million.534 PBC’s print ads mimicked the Ad Council’s strategy by asking for people to 
mail in to get their own free booklet called A Working Economy for Americans.
 Compared to the full color Ad Council booklet adorned with characters from the 
Peanuts comic strip, Working Economy addressed the dim realities of the American 
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economic system: the continuing problem of boom and bust cycles, the ways in which 
concentrated markets inflate prices, a media system saturated with advertising, and 
persistent inequality. The working economy campaign clung to Keynesian principal, 
referring to government regulation as the “only real route for controlling and channeling 
corporate activity so as to meet human needs while at the same time, preserving 
democratic freedoms we all cherish.”535 The Ad Council and the Public Media Center 
offered Americans contrasting views of the world. While the Ad Council emphasized 
individual freedom, consumerism, and free enterprise, the progressive groups involved 
with the Public Media Center campaign clung to collective values like social justice, 
equal rights, and democracy. Roger Hickey, the director of PMC, explained that he was 
not opposed to “corporations putting forth their views,” but instead he wanted “to make 
sure that all views are heard.”536 
The Right to Rebuttal 
 Alleging that the AES campaign represented one side of a controversial issue, 
PBC sent its campaign materials to the television networks to level the playing field. The 
Ad Council insisted that its campaign was not controversial because they presented a 
straightforward and unbiased approach to economics. The networks were split on how to 
deal with the controversy. The vice president of CBS, Gene Matter, saw the AES 
campaign “as one side of a controversial issue.” ABC’s broadcasting director announced 
that it would sit tight and explore the issue of whether the campaign was controversial 
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and this would be “more appropriately discussed in news or public affairs programs.” 
NBC took a different take and saw “nothing controversial” about the AES campaign.537  
 Ad Council president Keim accused the PBC of trying to “abridge our First 
Amendment right” and urged networks to “let them get the time on the merit of their own 
claims rather than trying to deny us time.” 538 The Advocates for the Working Economy 
Campaign stressed that the amendment protects more than just the “right of each 
speaker” to include “the right of the public to receive information and ideas, including the 
right to receive contrasting views on controversial issues of public importance.”539 
 Maintaining that the PBC’s ads were too controversial and not a direct response to 
the AES campaign, NBC turned down the PBC’s request.540 In its response letter to 
Rifkin, NBC maintained that it did believe that the “fairness doctrine is called into play 
by running of the Ad Council PSA” and could itself “stimulate a substantial number of 
requests for free time from groups or individuals holding viewpoints different from 
yours.” NBC also listed the number of experts representing a variety of economic views 
it had used on its new stations, including John Galbraith, William Buckley, and Milton 
Friedman.541 In September of 1976, Representative Rosenthal admitted that it was “too 
late to stop this double-think campaign.” Instead, Rosenthal began seek the support for 
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the enforcement of the Fairness Doctrine so that broadcasters would be obligated to air 
alternative points of view to the “enormous audience that will hear the Ad Council.”542 
 In June of 1976, the Public Media Center, along with the PBC, Action for 
Children’s Television, Friends of the Earth, National Gay Task Force, National Black 
Media Coalition, Congressman Rosenthal, and sixty other national and local interest 
groups, filed a petition to the FCC to review its policies on PSAs. Under their proposal, 
broadcasters would be required to air three public service announcements per hour, 23 
percent of which would be local in origin. The Ad Council, and other single sources, 
would only be allowed 20 percent.543  
 In its 1976 press release titled “The Advertising Council Responds to Efforts to 
Violate its First Amendment Rights,” the Ad Council stressed that the Public Media 
Center, “a so-called public interest group,” was demanding 
Something other than public service announcements (PSAs). They are 
seeking what could be labeled public debating announcement (PDAs)—
announcements that at a minimum would be highly controversial, at a 
maximum would be politically partisan and designed to influence 
legislation. In our opinion, the question of how much PSA time should be 
allotted to any organization or causes should be the editorial prerogative of 
the broadcaster concerned.544 
 
After considering the arguments in favor and opposing the proposal, in October of 1977, 
the FCC concluded that the adoption of such standards for PSAs would be “an intrusion 
into the sensitive area of programming” and thus declined to propose specific PSA 
guidelines. The Public Media Center pressed on, and a year later, submitted new evidence 
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in a formal appeal for the FCC to reconsider its earlier ruling. This time, members of 
Congress as well as the FTC supported the appeal. 545 Evidence submitted from a Federal 
Energy Administration report concluded that the Ad Council completely dominated the 
development and implementation of PSAs and thus had the “unique capability to 
encourage national and local media to contribute public service time on television and 
radio.”546 
 The AES campaign was the epitome of the Ad Council’s power and influence. By 
1977, AES ads had appeared in over 3,000 daily newspapers and 400 magazines. More 
than 400 television stations and 1,000 radio stations aired the spots and outdoor 
advertisers ran 110,000 transit cards and posters. The booklet had been distributed to 9 
million people. Six percent of the adult U.S. population claimed to have written for or 
received the booklet. By 1978, an estimated $35 million in free time and space had been 
provided by various media outlets. The multiplier effect was a success. The booklet was 
widely distributed to 1,800 schools and colleges across the country.547 Over fifty daily 
newspapers published a complete text of the booklet and it was distributed to 800 college 
newspapers and 3,400 employee publications.548 In 1977, Compton Advertising 
conducted a benchmark study to measure the overall effectiveness of the Council’s AES 
campaign. The study revealed that the campaign was a success. Compared to the year 
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before, adults displayed more positive appraisals of the “free market system” and had 
“less desire for government regulations.”549 Although roughly a third of Americans 
reported that there was not enough government regulation, there was an overall “decline 
in the size of the group who feel there is ‘not enough’ government regulation (41% in 
1976 vs. 36% in 1978).” In a series of press releases, the Ad Council celebrated “the 7.5 
million fewer Americans who think economic activities need more government 
involvement.”550  When presenting the benchmark study, an executive from Opinion 
Research Corporation concluded, “the climate seems right for speaking out. People 
remain very critical of business, but that is leveling off. The heat is now on big 
government . . . those in the business community only have themselves to blame if they 
do not capitalize on the signs that the public opinion tide is turning.”551 
Conclusion 
 Although the Ad Council was not shy about taking credit, it difficult to say 
whether the shift in public opinion was caused by the Ad Council’s campaign. 
Considering the massive scope of its project, it likely had some effect. In tandem with the 
AES campaign, a host of other corporate PR activities were taking place, a point 
elaborated in the next chapter. The AES campaign did help translate a new economic 
conservative movement in the academy to millions of Americans, taking treetops PR 
down to grassroots levels. More importantly, the Ad Council congealed various strands of 
corporate public relations and provided businesses with a unified front. At its core, the 
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Ad Council made the case that profit motive alone—free from the constraints of 
organized labor and government regulations—benefited every individual. The cynicism 
in the wake of Watergate provided momentum for the argument that government was the 
enemy to the innovation, productivity, and progress offered by the marketplace. 
Businesses were able to drown out and marginalize progressive voices, but this should 
not diminish the significance of the offering of an oppositional stance.  
This period’s war of position was epitomized by the two campaigns: the Ad 
Council argued that the free market would translate to individual freedom and prosperity, 
and the progressive coalition maintained that government needed to regulate the excesses 
of the market to preserve democratic ideals. Although the PBC had failed to disseminate 
its message through the television networks, it, too, had solidified diverse groups into a 
forceful movement. This progressive coalition continued to pressure broadcasters to serve 
the public interest by limiting children’s advertising, and by 1977, they turned their 
attention to the FTC. Business trade groups had been taken off guard by the FTC’s initial 
revitalization in 1970, and again when it was reinforced by legislation in 1975. After 
1977, however, business interests were organized in opposition to the mighty FTC. 
Against this backdrop of ideological rivalry, President Carter appointed Michael 
Pertschuk, a well-known and outspoken ally to the consumer movement, to head the 
FTC. While the Ad Council celebrated its success, the right to rebuttal was still on the 
table. Under Pertschuk’s lead, the FTC proposed further regulatory reforms for the ad 
industry. The FTC’s few years of somnolence under the Ford Administration were over. 
As the following chapter will demonstrate, the contrasting views of the world instigated 
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by the Ad Council’s AES campaign played out in the FTC’s final push for reform during 
in the last few years of the 1970s.  
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CHAPTER 5: FROM GRAY PANTHER TO NATIONAL NANNY: THE KIDVID 
CRUSADE AND THE ECLIPSE OF THE FTC, 1977–1980 
 
 
“After all, it wasn’t too long ago—say, 50 years—that business sort of ran this 
country. And then came the—shall I call it the interregnum?—In which President 
Roosevelt and the New Deal virtually destroyed the influence of business on the 
ground that we are public-baiting, people hating “economic royalists.” But now, 
half a century later we begin to recover not only our confidence but also 
influence in the public arena somewhat commensurate with our native 
strength.”552  —Bryce Harlow, Washington Chief for Proctor and Gamble, 1977 
 
 
On January 20, 1977, President Jimmy Carter began his inaugural address with an 
optimistic message: “This inauguration ceremony marks a new beginning, a new 
dedication within our government, and a new spirit among us all.”553 It appeared to be a 
turning point in American politics—for the first time in eight years, Democrats controlled 
the White House and both houses in Congress. This was an especially promising sign for 
the FTC, which had been hushed under President Ford. As the previous chapters have 
demonstrated, the president and Congress had the power to change the course of 
regulatory agencies. Although the Ad Council’s campaign for economics education had 
united businesses, Congress had granted the FTC unprecedented levels of power in 1975. 
The fresh face in the White House might mean that the FTC’s lull under the Ford years 
was a minor blip for the agency. Carter, however, moved into the White House along 
with a new generation on Capitol Hill. By 1977, trade groups had a greater presence in 
Washington and were more united and confident. Businesses were taken off guard when 
the FTC was first revitalized in 1970, and again when its powers were extended in 1975, 
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but over the course of the last half-decade, business interests had assembled a vast 
network of power and influence. The free market fundamentalism espoused by the 
Advertising Council had made its way into the dominant sociopolitical ethos. Consumer 
rights activism appeared to be in decline as well, deflated by the failure to create a 
consumer protection agency in Washington. Businesses had marshaled resources and 
talent to defeat the consumer protection agency, but the FTC stayed on course, and voted 
unanimously for significant restrictions on advertising to children. This was viewed by 
businesses as more than just a restriction for children’s advertising, although this alone 
would have cost millions for advertisers, broadcasters, and related industries. It was a 
major test of whether the FTC could go beyond the scope of regulating explicitly 
deceptive advertising to police unfair trade practices that it found contradictory to the 
public interest. 
 This war of position—whether government or private interests best serve the 
public—came to a head during the last few years of the 1970s. The year 1978 was pivotal 
year for the FTC, and the American political economy in general. It was during this year 
that the assemblage of power built by businesses over the course of the decade was truly 
unveiled. By 1978, the FTC was under siege by the populist anti-government movement, 
which had swayed leaders in both political parties. During the first half of the decade, 
major newspapers had been sympathetic to the consumer movement’s cause. This 
network of support began to crumble after 1977, as broadcasters and newspapers became 
united in opposition to government regulation of advertising. More confident and unified, 
businesses engaged in a direct attack of the FTC. 
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 In 1977, on the eve of this political fulcrum, President Carter appointed Mike 
Pertschuk, a long-time consumer advocate, to head the FTC. Pertschuk was committed to 
using the powers granted by Congress and broke new ground by proposing trade 
regulation rules for unfair advertising to children. This so-called “kidvid crusade” would 
embroil the agency in public controversy, similar to the level of notoriety for the agency 
following the Nader’s scathing expose in 1969. In 1980, public officials would once 
again question the agency’s very existence, but for very different reasons.  
A Familiar Face in the FTC: Mike Pertschuk 
Carter’s appointments to regulatory agencies and top-level cabinet positions 
signified that the public interest movement was still a powerful force in American politics 
in 1977. In fact, Carter sought the council of his friend and ally Ralph Nader for his top 
staff and regulatory appointments. Carter appointed Joan Claybrook, who had been the 
head of Nader’s Congress Watch, to head the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Commission. Carol Foreman, the executive director of the Consumer Federation of 
America, became the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for consumers. To head the FTC, 
Carter considered two Nader-approved candidates: Mike Pertschuk and Bella Abzug. As 
a former member of Congress, Abzug was a liberal Democrat from New York and she 
was strongly opposed by businesses; therefore, Carter’s advisers suggested the less 
controversial pick, Mike Pertschuk.554 Unlike the heads of the FTC appointed by Nixon 
and Ford, Pertschuk was well known on Capitol Hill. He had served as the staff director 
and chief council to the Senate Commerce Committee for almost a decade and had earned 
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the not-always-flattering title of the “101st Senator.”555 As a top congressional staffer, 
Pertschuk was an outspoken advocate of consumer rights and he helped spearhead the 
Magnuson-Moss FTC Improvements Act. An article in the New York Times described 
Pertschuk as caught in a “crossfire of praise” when he was appointed in 1977.556 Ralph 
Nader was pleased with the appointment and said, “rarely has there been a more perfect 
match between the technical requirements of a government post and the talents of a 
nominee.” Virginia Knauer, Nixon’s former consumer adviser, complimented 
Pertschuk’s commitment to consumer rights, saying “every industry lobbyist will scream 
for more staff and more money when Mike is appointed . . . they’re all afraid of him.”557  
 Carter’s choice to appoint Pertschuk, however, did not ignite a strong reaction 
from industry. The consumer rights coalition, although waning in strength by the late 
1970s, was still strong and the possibility for reform was not yet lost in 1977. In fact, 
most of the opposition to Pertschuk came from fringe left-wing consumer groups, who 
worried that Pertschuk was too tied to the Senate’s Commerce Committee and not 
independent enough to represent consumer interests.558 At Pertschuk’s swearing in 
ceremony, President Carter tempered his enthusiasm for consumer protection with some 
reassurances for businesses:  
Another appointment that I make this afternoon with a great deal of pride 
is to the Federal Trade Commission. This is ostensibly or by reputation the 
battleground between the business community on one side and consumers 
on the other. But the man that I’ve chosen to serve as a member is one 
that’s been almost unanimously supported by both the business 
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community and consumers. Mike Pertschuk comes to us as a distinguished 
member of the Senate staff. He has a background that’s broad and, I think, 
has demonstrated his sound judgment and his own integrity. And I’m very 
grateful that he has been willing to come and serve with us.559  
 
In private conversations, however, Carter indubitably expressed loyalty to the FTC. 
Pertschuk recalled his initial meeting with the president: 
Carter was very probing in his questions and asked me what my priorities 
would be, and I said they were consumer protection focused, on 
exploitation of the poor and of children. Carter was very supportive. The 
last thing he said to me was, if anyone in his administration tried to ever 
interfere with the independence of the FTC, he wanted me to let him know 
and he followed through on that. I had no interference from anyone in the 
administration.560 
 
Pertschuk appeared to have the support of the White House, Congress, and most 
prominent consumer activists for his rulemaking plans. Aside from a few testimonies to 
Congress, Pertschuk remained relatively quiet for the first six months on the job and 
made no public speeches. Pertschuk’s appointments to top staff positions and his internal 
management style signified that the FTC would be an even stronger and more 
independent agency than it was during the first half of the decade. Bill Baer, one of 
Pertschuk’s advisers, recalled Pertschuk’s thoughtful consideration of FTC positions: 
What he [Pertschuk] was really looking for initially was people who were 
outstanding lawyers, with some clear evidence by their past activities that 
they had a sense of public interest activities, and an appreciation for 
consumerism. He really wanted to have a feel that these were the people 
that knew right from wrong and had a sense of purpose and 
commitment.561 
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 Albert Kramer, Pertschuk’s appointment for the Director of the Bureau of 
Consumer Protection, was a well-known foe to the television industry. During his time as 
chief of the public interest law firm the Citizens Communication Center, Kramer had 
battled broadcasters over FCC licensing policies and was well-known as a 
communications consumer advocate. Margery Waxman Smith, the FTC’s new executive 
director, criticized the FTC’s previous emphasis on “line-by-line substantiation” because 
the FTC had “missed TV advertising and the implications of mood advertising.”562 
Pertschuk understood the problem of outside pressure on the agency, and he was 
dedicated to preserving the independence of the agency. During his confirmation hearing, 
Pertschuk affirmed his commitment to  
keep to an absolute minimum social contact with those who had an 
economic stake in the commission activities. In some cases, this will mean 
curtailing social relationships which I value, but cynicism and public 
skepticism of the integrity of government is at a fever pitch, and I believe 
that it is essential for government servants to scrupulously avoid even the 
appearance of collusive relationships.563 
 
Members of the business community took notice of the FTC’s cold shoulder. Prior to 
1977, an executive at the Grocery Manufactures of America recalled, “the commission as 
whole used to meet with regularly with different industries, sit down, have lunch or 
something, and discuss what was going on. . . . That was perceived as bad when Mike 
came in.” The Chamber of Commerce’s chief lobbyist waited two years for a meeting 
with Pertschuk, and later recalled that Pertschuk “didn’t need to talk with business. He set 
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the stage. All we could do in business is say, look, if you won’t talk to us, we’ll find 
some other way to get your attention.”564  
 Although Pertschuk was more committed to the FTC’s independence from 
business interests than previous heads of the FTC, he was guided by a similar philosophy 
as the previous Republican appointees. Hanging in his office was a framed quotation 
from Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations: “The interest of the producer ought to be 
attended to only so far as it may be necessary for promoting the consumer.” An article in 
the New York Times commented on the dual meanings of this message: 
For consumer advocates paying a call on the FTC chairman, this message 
is obviously a cheering portent. But businessmen, particularly those 
familiar with Mr. Pertschuk’s long war against marketplace abuses while 
he was chief of staff of the Senate Commerce Committee, may find the 
quotation somewhat ominous.565 
 
More ominous signs for businesses would come when Pertschuk broke his silence in 
November. At a conference organized by Action for Children’s Television, Pertschuk 
assured his many supporters that he would make the FTC the “best public-interest law 
firm in the country” by refusing to “shrink from tough targets.”566 Pertschuk went on to 
affirm his commitment to the issue of children’s advertising: 
If there is one salient public policy issue which rises commandingly from 
centuries of common and statutory law, it is that the commercial 
exploitation is repugnant to a civilized society. . . . With food this often 
means instant pleasure and the danger of malnutrition. . . . It may be that 
only a ban on the advertising of these products on programs directed 
towards the young child can help remedy their inherent defect.567 
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Pertschuk began to convey his views in the press as well. In an interview with the New 
York Times, Pertschuk blatantly stated, “I am an activist and the staff people I brought in 
are activists. It’s a gut thing.”568 These statements might have earned Pertschuk political 
capital during the first half of the decade, but Pertschuk was appointed amid striking 
political shifts, including a new generation on Capitol Hill, a much more organized 
coalition of businesses interests, a disillusioned consumer movement, and a changed 
media landscape. In a personal conversation, Ralph Nader, who understood these 
obstacles, offered a warning to Pertschuk: “If you take on advertisers you’ll end up with 
so many regulators—with their bones bleached—in the desert.”569  
A New Generation on the Hill 
 
Congress and the White House 
 
Pertschuk had the support of many consumer activists and Capitol Hill, but the FTC lost 
key allies in Congress in the 1976 general election. Republicans defeated Democratic 
Senators Vance Hartke, Gale McGee, and John Tunney. Republican Orrin Hatch defeated 
the Senate’s most loyal advocate of the FTC, Frank Moss. Democratic Senator Philip 
Hart of Michigan, who was nicknamed “the conscience of the Senate,” died while serving 
his term and was replaced by Republican Donald Reagle. Although Mike Mansfield and 
John Pastore retired and were replaced with Democrats, they had both been strong 
supporters of the FTC’s continued revival and occupied high-ranking positions on 
important committees responsible for appropriations and oversight of the FTC.570  
                                                
568 Shabecoff, “Washington & Business,” D5. 
569 Quoted in Applbaum, “Mike Pertschuk and the Federal Trade Commission,” 15. 
570 Kovacic, “Congress and the Federal Trade Commission,” 869. 
 194 
 The Senate’s Commerce Consumer Subcommittee had been the FTC’s most 
essential ally. The chair of the committee, Senator Magnuson, had helped sponsor the 
legislation to bolster the FTC’s powers. Magnuson remained until late 1977, when he 
resigned to head the appropriations committee. Senator Wendell Ford, a Democrat from 
Kentucky, succeeded Magnuson as the chair of the subcommittee. Earl Clements was 
originally instrumental in persuading the Senate to appoint Ford to the subcommittee. 
Clements was well connected to the Democratic National Committee: he was a former 
Democratic member of the House and Senate, and governor of Kentucky. During the 
1960s and 70s, Clements used his connections in government to work as a chief lobbyist 
of the tobacco industry. Pertschuk, who was on the staff of the consumer subcommittee at 
the time, recalled a phone conversation he had with Clements: 
When I was on the staff of the consumer subcommittee, he [Clements] 
called me, and among other things, he said Wendell Ford was interested in 
being on Senate Commerce Subcommittee. I said there were no vacancies, 
and he said, “I’ll worry about that.” He had enough power to convince the 
Senate’s policy committee to expand the committee to include Ford, all of 
which was designed to protect the tobacco industry.571 
 
Under Wendell Ford’s leadership, and absent the FTC’s strongest supporters, the 
powerful Senate Consumer Subcommittee began to demonstrate an increasingly bellicose 
attitude toward the FTC.572  
 As the previous chapter demonstrated, the Ad Council pooled resources to help 
popularize a new paradigm of conservative economics. In 1977, public opinion polls 
suggested that the public’s approval of business had increased, along with an overall 
decrease in approval of government regulation. The ascendance of conservative 
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economics was evident in the bureaucratic structures of government as well. Ford, much 
more a proponent of the free market ideology, had surrounded himself with a group of the 
so-called “free market Mohicans” like Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Alan 
Greenspan.573  
 Although Carter was a fresh face in the White House, he won by a narrow margin 
and in public speeches had expressed ambivalence about the government’s role in 
economic matters. According to historian Jeff Madrick, in economic matters Carter was 
“known more for his vacillation than his conviction, at one moment worried about 
unemployment, at the next inflation, all the while referring to the nation’s lack of 
confidence in government.”574 Although he expressed ambivalence, Carter was not 
simply an extension of Ford; he was no “free market Mohican,” although he inherited 
these ideological changes. In fact, Carter refused to accept corporate money for his 
general election campaign, and he consistently expressed to Pertschuk his moral 
commitment to protect vulnerable consumers from unfair business practices.575 For the 
FTC, there appeared to be a real political opportunity for even more rigorous rulemaking 
power. Business interests, poised to respond to unfavorable regulations, were ready and 
on the front lines. 
The Great Migration: Trade Associations and Corporate PACs Ascend on Washington 
 Business trade groups were also part of this new generation, which for a decade 
had been migrating from New York and the nation’s manufacturing hubs to the nation’s 
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capitol, blocks away from the White House and the Federal Trade Commission building. 
From 1968–1978, the number of corporate affairs offices in Washington grew from 100 
to over 500.576 Among the trade groups was the Aluminum Association, which moved 
from New York to Washington in 1978. According to one executive in the Aluminum 
Association, trade groups had built a “vast intelligence network for exchanging 
information, and the lunch table talk at the Association Club in the Capital Hilton Hotel 
might concern the new lawyer at the Federal Trade Commission or a successful court suit 
against the Consumer Product Safety Commission.” Bernard Falk, president of the 
National Electrical Manufacturers Association, described reasons for the migration: “The 
manufacturer controlled the makeup of his own product, and Washington could be 
ignored. Now we all have a new partner, the federal government.” The vice president of 
the American Society of Association Executives explained the strategy in dealing with 
government: “You have to be helpful, be dependable, keep in contact. The good 
association executive builds friendships, takes people out to lunch, takes them to the 
ballgame, builds trust.”577 Forming partnerships, rather than “sassing the cop,” was 
becoming the new mantra for businesses during the late 1970s.  
 By 1978, these lobbying efforts were well-funded through the growth of 
corporate-funded political action committees (PACs), which were spending just shy of a 
billion dollars per year.578 Organized labor had invented PACs, and it used these groups 
to help influence elections and policymaking in its favor. In 1974, there were 1,284 PACs 
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sponsored by business interests, compared to 217 associated with organized labor.579 The 
greater presence and power that businesses had assembled in Washington throughout the 
1970s bolstered businesses influence over the political process. The grassroots efforts by 
the Ad Council had helped build public faith and disenchantment with business and 
government respectively. These ideological changes toward neoliberalism worked against 
the grain of what the pubic interest movement had worked to accomplish over the course 
of the decade: an agency dedicated to consumer protection in Washington.  
A Defeated Movement: Consumer Activism and the CPA 
 The migration of trade groups to Washington and the growth of business PACs 
were used to defeat the Consumer Protection Agency, which was finally struck down by 
Congress in 1977 before it reached Carter’s desk. The fierce and successful lobbying 
efforts on behalf of trade groups provided a model and a strategy for continued efforts to 
squelch further consumer rights legislation.580 By 1978, business leaders were licking 
their chops over the victory. Bryce Harlow, Proctor and Gamble’s chief of government 
regulations, celebrated the victory, observing that  
It doesn’t really matter a whole lot which party is runs things . . . because 
when businesses start marching lockstep, the government apparatus 
hunkers down . . . we proved it 31 years ago with Taft-Hartley; we proved 
it 18 years ago with Landrum-Griffin; we proved in a year ago with situs 
picketing; but now we have proved it in spades by our eight year torment 
with the CPA. 
 
Harlow called upon businesses to “retrieve a small measure of humility” and learn from 
the mistakes made in the early part of the decade. He went on to explain:  
As to the lessons, one is that the scope of a victory like this can be gauged 
only by visualizing what would have been said and thought around town 
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had we lost. If Ralph and Ester . . . Speaker O’Neill, Rosenthal and such as 
John Moss had won, the business stance around town would have suffered 
terrible injury and our most virulent foes in and out of government would 
have been fired up as never before to force-feed us gallons more of other 
kinds of hemlock. Our friends on the Hill would have been spooked, our 
enemies elated, and we ourselves would have been shattered and in 
disarray.581 
 
 The demise of the CPA had in many ways left the consumer movement spooked 
and in disarray. The passage of the bill had preoccupied the resources and energy of the 
Consumer’s Union and many consumer advocates like Ralph Nader. According to 
historian Lawrence Glickman, “by depicting the CPA as a synecdoche for liberalism in 
general, opponents of the CPA not only defeated the bill, they succeeding in deflating 
American liberalism, which was for decades closely aligned with the consumer 
movement.”582 Nader was dissatisfied with the CPA as merely another regulatory agency 
like the FTC. He wanted the agency to have broad authority to act as an umbrella 
organization to ensure that other regulatory agencies and government activities represent 
consumer interests. Business used this one aspect of the proposal to make the case that 
the CPA would simply add a layer of bureaucracy and complexity to existing agencies. 
This argument certainly had an element of truth on its side, and businesses were 
successful in finally defeating the bill.   
 Carter himself had indicated that he would support a consumer protection agency 
without the power to oversee all regulatory activity. Thus, the last stages of the battle 
over the CPA illuminated a division between the consumer movement and the president. 
In a series of public statements, Nader blamed the Carter Administration for his 
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preoccupation with “foreign policy and worrying about business confidence.” Through 
his congressional raids, Nader had also made many enemies within the Democratic Party, 
which did not help the consumer movement’s backing in Congress. For example, Nader 
made an enemy of Senator Ernest Hollings (D-SC) after Nader listed him as “the most 
disappointing member of the Senate.” Pertschuk recounted a phone call he received from 
Hollings in which he avowed, “I want to tell your friend Ralph Nader, from here on out I 
am going to vote against everything that the FTC wants.”583 Nader’s political power was 
beginning to crumble. 
 Members of Congress began to criticize Nader publicly. Representative David 
Obey, a Democrat from Wisconsin, said “members are just fed up with being equated 
with evil if they vote against Nader.” Nader’s image was also tainted by his appearance 
on Saturday Night Live in January of 1977, when he, according to Time magazine, 
“deadpanned his way through a comic turn satirizing none other than Ralph Nader.”584  
 The deflation of the consumer movement was not helped by reports of Nader’s 
expressions of grief, when he was brought to tears after the final defeat of the CPA. An 
op-ed in the Wall Street Journal titled “Cheer Up, Ralph Nader” mocked him over his 
emotional response to the defeat of the CPA. The article concluded: “Well, look at it this 
way. You still have the Federal Trade Commission.”585 And he certainly did. Although 
the CPA never successfully passed through both houses of Congress, the FTC had been 
actively working to protect consumer rights for nearly a decade. Congressional legislation 
passed over the course of the decade had given the agency broad powers to issue rules for 
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entire industry segments to make businesses better serve the public interests. With 
Pertschuk at the helm, consumer rights policies did not die out with the defeat of the 
CPA. The consumer movement’s preoccupation of the CPA, however, meant that it 
missed an opportunity to pool time, talent, and resources to support the continued vigor 
of the well-regarded and established FTC. By 1978, the writing was on the wall. Changes 
within the news media—a lack of sympathetic coverage for consumer rights, a greater 
collusion between advertisers and newspaper owners, and more unity among America’s 
media owners—set the stage for a major backlash to the FTC. 
Changes in the News Media 
Structural Changes to the Newspaper Industry 
Structural changes within the Washington Post added to the lack of sympathetic press 
coverage of labor and consumer rights issues during the late 1970s. During the 1960s and 
for most of the 70s, the Washington Post had helped reinforce the consumer movement’s 
cause. The Post was the epitome of quality investigative reporting—it had originally 
leaked the Pentagon Papers in 1971, and a year later it exposed the Watergate scandal. 
The Post’s investigative reporting was not limited to coverage of malfeasance within 
government. Morton Mintz had been a reporter for the post since 1958, and he broke 
stories on the birth defects caused by the drug thalidomide, exposed GM’s hiring of 
detectives to stalk and intimidate Ralph Nader, and wrote numerous exposés about the 
tobacco industry. Pertschuk recalled the significance of Morton Mintz for consumer 
rights: 
The Post was really a major influence . . . in fact Morton Mintz’s articles, 
many of which originated with Nader, were as important a factor for our 
ability to pass consumer legislation in the sixties and early seventies as 
anything that Nader did. It wasn’t just the Post editorials, which were 
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supportive, and they were, but it was pro consumer reporting, and the Post 
was the primary power in the media at that time. 
 
 Behind the scenes of this excellent investigative reporting, the Post became a 
publically traded company and it purchased the Trenton Times and several television 
stations during the late 1970s.586 Shortly after Pertschuk was appointed to FTC, Katherine 
Graham, the publisher of the Post, invited Pertschuk to lunch. She wanted to discuss the 
children’s advertising regulations and FTC’s plans to investigate newspapers giving 
quantity discounts to large corporate clients. Pertschuk recalled his meeting with Graham: 
So we had lunch, and she brought her general council just to make sure I 
didn’t bite her and one of things she said was that if we don’t make 
enough money, we can’t afford to have Morton Mintz reporting the way 
you’d like him to do it. So she was balancing her own reporting with the 
need to make money. And there was a succession of editors during my 
time in Washington who were increasingly more conservative and open to 
corporate arguments.  
 
The Post, as Graham insinuated, was under pressure to appease advertisers and therefore 
was beginning to minimize pro-consumer, anti-business reporting. Morton Mintz also 
recalled the chilling effect at the Post, which radiated “from the top down” making it an 
unwelcome “atmosphere to cover business misdealings.”587 As previous chapters 
demonstrated, investigative journalism played a crucial role in bolstering consumer 
activism and the public interest movement during the 1970s. After Pertschuk officially 
announced controversial plans for rulemaking in 1978, the Post would wholeheartedly 
join the cause of the budding anti-FTC movement. A greater reliance on institutional 
advertising added to greater collusion between corporate interests and journalistic 
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practices, which helped weaken the consumer movement and fortify the anti-FTC 
movement.  
 The New York Times also experienced a change in leadership in 1977, when Abe 
Rosenthal took over. Ralph Nader recalled that Rosenthal “literally told reporters and 
Washington bureau chief that they should not cover me, unless there was a thorough 
response by corporations.” Nader later called Rosenthal “one of the nastiest Canadians 
who has ever come to the United States.” Nader’s vitriol aside, Rosenthal was 
responsible for sectioning the paper into arts, business, science, and regional sections for 
advertisers interested in targeting affluent and more-specific audiences.588 The type of 
newspaper advertising was also changing dramatically during the late 1970s, from ads 
selling products and services, to ads promoting a new type of corporate image 
advertising.  
A Growth in Institutional Advertising 
 According to political scientist David Vogel, by the end of the 1970s, businesses 
were spending nearly one-third of all of their advertising on selling a corporate ideology 
rather than products themselves.589 A study sponsored by Time showed that companies 
who engage in corporate advertising have a better image. This was especially true of print 
advertising, which was perceived as more believable than television.590 According to 
Inger Stole, this onslaught of advocacy advertising “worked to counter the anti-corporate 
attitude that business claimed to have detected in the mass media.”591 As the previous 
chapters demonstrated, this new type of ideologically driven advertising was as effective 
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as it was controversial. The regulation of advertising content and the proposals to apply 
the Fairness Doctrine to issue-orientated advertising posed a threat to this growing trend 
toward business-sponsored advocacy advertising. This did not sit well for newspapers, 
which were beginning to profit more from creating privileged space for institutional 
advertising. Not only did the growth in ideologically driven advertising by corporations 
work to change public opinion, but it also aligned newspapers other more powerful 
interests in opposition to the FTC. 
 Although institutional advertising had drawn flak from advocacy groups and 
public officials in broadcasting, these types of ads were unregulated in print. Starting in 
1972, the New York Times began trying to profit from this trend by experimenting with 
creating privileged space for businesses to run institutional advertising on the lower right 
corner of the op-ed page. Texaco and Mobil Oil were among the first advertisers to buy 
up this space. Fred Thompson, the New York Times VP of advertising, decided, “we have 
been so successful in the opinion ad hole that we decided to open up another area of the 
paper for this type of advertising.” On March 15, 1977, the Times made this permanent 
by establishing the “corporate corner”—a space devoted to corporate institutional ads—
on the lower left corner of the first national news page. The cost of the premium space 
would be 75 cents per line in addition to the $5.68–$6.68 rate on weekdays and Sundays, 
respectively.592 Walter Annenberg, the publisher of Triangle Publications and former 
ambassador to the UK, ran the first ad in this space: a letter, urging the citizens of New 
York to create a third Annenberg School of Communications. Citing the letter, the same 
issue of the Times ran a story on the controversy over Annenberg’s proposal to join the 
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Metropolitan Museum of Art with the Annenberg School.593 Texaco ran an ad the next 
day urging citizens to support “a workable national energy policy.”594 In another not-so-
surprising coincidence, the same issue of the Times featured two articles criticizing the 
Carter’s plans to close tax loopholes for energy firms and establish a cabinet-level 
Department of Energy.595 In an interview with Editor and Publisher, a spokesperson for 
Texaco was surprisingly candid about the company’s goal to “disseminate our point of 
view prior to President Carter disseminating his point of view on the energy situation.”596  
Broadcasters and Newspapers: Uniting over a Common Cause 
 Broadcasters had been divided over the Public Service Announcement 
controversy, but they began to organize among themselves, and with newspapers, during 
the late 1970s. Newspapers, unlike broadcasters, were not subject to the rules of equal 
time under the Fairness Doctrine. During its annual meeting in March of 1977, the 
National Association of Broadcasters created a “First Amendment Survival Kit” to 
distribute to newspapers. This packet included a mock newspaper from 1984 with the 
slogan “All the news we’re fit to print.” The front-page article was titled “Congress 
Created Newspaper Commission.” The mock paper was meant to inspire fear that 
newspapers would be subject to the same rules of fairness as broadcasters. According to 
this logic, newspapers would be subjected to government licensing, limits in space 
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devoted to advertising, educational features for children without ads, and space allocated 
to groups who opposed controversial advertising. The NAB’s messages drew parallels 
with the FTC’s consumer protection enforcement in its prediction that in FCC newspaper 
licensing decisions, “the federal government will pay for groups which attack newspaper 
performances.”597 Much more united in their opposition to proposals for 
counteradvertising, broadcasters clearly hoped to sound alarm bells for newspapers. It is 
perhaps not coincidental that major newspapers had limited coverage of debates that 
continued to ensue over the Fairness Doctrine’s application to counteradvertising.  
Aiming for Journalists’ Weak Spot: Professional Integrity 
 The Advertising Council’s American Economic System campaign had helped 
organize the various public relations programs on behalf of businesses, but this campaign, 
according some businesses, was not enough. A new rising star of the neoconservative 
movement, Irving Kristol, saw the campaigns for economic education as limiting because 
advertising is precisely the wrong vehicle for any type of education. 
Education, properly understood, induces a growing comprehension of 
abstract ideas and concepts: advertising, properly understood, aims to 
move people to do something definite and unambiguous. Education is 
always raising questions; advertising is always giving answers. These are 
two radically different modes of communication, and their admixture is 
corrupting to both.  
 
The attitudes of “less learned folks” and “young people,” Kristol observed, were shaped 
by “songs, the books they read, the movies and TV programs they see, the paintings they 
admire, and the schooling they receive.” Influencing the wide array of these cultural 
factors shaping “value formation” was an “alien territory where they [corporations] are 
not likely to encounter much hospitality, and into which they best not intrude.” Kristol 
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did, however, see one potential area in the struggle to influence value formation—the 
news media, which he said was biased against the business community. Kristol observed 
that most journalists “don’t give a damn about what the business community thinks of 
them,” but they cared “very much about what kind of professional reputation they have 
among their peers.” Kristol called upon businesses to go on the offensive by targeting 
journalists’ weak spot: “When they [journalists] commit a flagrant error they are at least 
mildly disturbed; when they are publicly exposed as having committed such an error they 
are embarrassed; and when the public exposure occurs repeatedly they feel humiliated.” 
Instead of the type of “issue-oriented advertising” that corporations had employed in the 
past, Kristol called upon corporations to challenge journalists’ integrity in the form of 
paid advertising in newspapers with national standing that “the reporter and his 
colleagues read.” This strategy would “persuade the public that, where one situation was 
able to generate so much smoke, there must also be fire.”598 
 Kristol’s plan to influence journalists came to fruition in 1976 with the 
establishment of The Media Institute, which was organized by major corporations to 
monitor media coverage. The Media Institute published summaries of reporting on 
business practices and the economy, and complaints over a journalistic bias grew. David 
Vogel concludes that the favorable coverage did less “to have shaped changing public 
attitudes” than it did in reflecting them. As the last chapter demonstrated, the Ad Council 
took credit for changing public attitudes by 1977. Combined with changing public 
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attitudes, greater influence by businesses over mass media resulted in more favorable 
coverage of businesses during the late 1970s.599 
The FTC’s Policy Agenda 
First Amendment Considerations 
 As discussed in Chapter 3, policy changes between 1973 and 1976 situated the 
FTC in a policy paradox. On one hand, Congress granted the FTC an unprecedented level 
of power. Riders to the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline Act of 1973 gave the agency some 
additional powers to protect consumers, and the Magnuson-Moss FTC Improvements Act 
(FTCIA) of 1975 in many ways gave the FTC carte blanche to regulate businesses in the 
consumer interests, allowing the agency to represent consumers in lawsuits for consumer 
abuses, gave the agency the power to preemptively issue cease-and-desist orders, and 
broadened the FTC’s powers to order restitution. This jurisdiction went well beyond 
specific instances of consumer abuses. The FTC, for the first time in its history, was 
given power to implement structural changes in entire industry segments in order to 
protect consumers and restore competition.600  
On the other hand, the Supreme Court Virginia Pharmacy decision in 1976, had, 
for the first time, granted First Amendment protection to purely commercial speech. The 
constitutionality of sweeping trade regulation rules (TRRs) in advertising had not been 
tested, but it threw a wrench in the FTC’s plans to pass TRRs. More important, the 
passage of Virginia Pharmacy handed advertisers a trump card in opposition to the FTC’s 
regulation of advertising content. The First Amendment protection of commercial speech 
was an important rhetorical and legal maneuver used by advertisers during the late 1970s.  
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 As the FTC moved on unsettled cases after 1977, advertisers became more 
assertive about their First Amendment rights, both in public statements and in the courts. 
Relying on the Virginia Pharmacy decision, Warner Lambert appealed its right to run 
corrective ads for Listerine’s deceptive cold fighting claims. Although consumer activists 
initiated the 1976 Virginia Pharmacy decision, an AAF exec saw nothing dissimilar 
between the Listerine case and Virginia Pharmacy. The AAF and ANA joined Warner 
Lambert in its appeal to the U.S. Circuit Court. The Circuit Court upheld the FTC’s 
order. Although the consumer protection rationale was used in Virginia Pharmacy, the 
FTC’s ongoing cases would have to withstand greater judicial scrutiny. The recent shifts 
in First Amendment protection, according to Advertising Age, would have “major 
implications for other cases still in the FTC pipeline.”601  
Antitrust Cases 
 The constitutional limits of Virginia Pharmacy applied to the regulation of 
advertising content, but not to the regulation of anticompetitive structural arrangements. 
Along with the FTCIA, the Hart–Scott–Rodino Act helped secure the FTC’s power over 
preventing and mitigating concentrations of corporate power. The new leadership in the 
FTC suggested that the agency would follow through with its antitrust cases, which had 
been in the FTC’s pipeline since the first years following the FTC’s revitalization. 
Pertschuk publicly voiced opposition to mergers and acquisitions that led to “huge 
concentrations of power.” Like his predecessors in the FTC, Pertschuk insisted that his 
job was to protect consumers by promoting “open competition, with informed buyers 
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acting as regulators.”602 Convinced that the “current antitrust policies lack clarity and 
conviction,” Pertschuk promised to “bring the structure and behavior of major industries 
and indeed, the economy itself, more in line with the nation’s democratic, political, and 
social ideals.”603 
 At Pertschuk’s lead, the FTC continued hearings on the Big-4 Cereal Makers, a 
controversial case that began eight years prior. As Chapter 2 demonstrated, this case 
broke new ground because the FTC had called into question the legality of the 
concentrated oligopolistic structure in major industry segments. Although a judge refused 
to dismiss the cereal case, Pertschuk did not receive unanimous support from the 
commissioners to continue with the antitrust allegations against the big four. Pertschuk 
admitted that his expertise was not in antitrust violations, and as a result, he paid less 
attention to activities within the FTC’s Bureau of Competition.604 In 1977, the FTC 
announced plans to narrow its four-year-old monopolization investigation into the oil 
industry. A year later, the FTC announced that it that it had ended a study of whether 
IBM had monopolized the typewriter industry.605 For the case against the oil industry, the 
FTC submitted a truncated version of a previous a subpoena for evidence, which meant 
that it would abandon 499 allegations in the original investigation. 
 Rather than pursue breaking up “shared monopolies,” the FTC’s bureau of 
competition changed course and decided to make better use of industry-wide trade 
regulation rules granted by the FTCIA. Passing trade regulation rules within concentrated 
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industries, the FTC hoped, would help it move on lengthy unsettled cases.606 Those cases 
included probes into several industries: insurance, funeral, over-the-counter drugs, and 
vocational schools. The FTC had President Carter’s support for these investigations, 
particularly its far-reaching, but short-lived, probe into the dominance of Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield. Pertschuk recalled his conversations with Carter about the insurance industry 
investigations: 
I got one phone call from Carter, he called and said he had read an article 
in the Washington Post that we were investigating the dominance of Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield, for their ability to fix prices and avoid competition. He 
said “I am very glad you are doing that,” and wished me good luck.  
 
Something like six months later he invited each of the consumer 
protectors, the agency people, to report on what they had done and what 
issues were pursuing. He asked me, “What happened to the investigation 
of Blue Cross/Blue Shield?  What happened was it had dragged along, the 
staff had not done much. So that was his frustration. He was committed to 
consumer protection and the independence of the agency.607 
 
Indeed, these antitrust cases had dragged on, and by 1978 they were outshined by the 
FTC’s notorious kidvid rulemaking proposal. Although Pertschuk paid little attention to 
the FTC’s Bureau of Competition, he was unequivocally committed to consumer 
protection. This was particularly true for preventing consumer abuses against what he 
considered to the most vulnerable groups: the poor, the elderly, and children. 
The Gray Panther Awakens 
 By 1978, it was clear that the FTC was committed to consumer protection through 
the regulation of advertising. In 1978, Pertschuk announced that he was not satisfied with 
the pace of the FTC during his first year because he had “erred on the side of the riding 
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herd in every case.” He hoped for a better year in 1978, insisting, “We’re trying to turn 
the gray lady into a gray panther. We will be doing some tough things.”608 Pertschuk 
wanted to take full advantage of the FTC’s new powers to regulate “unfair” advertising. 
Margery Waxman Smith, the FTC’s executive director, hoped the commission could 
make a case against a campaign that “encourages materialism” by convincing consumers 
to buy products that they do not necessarily need. This broad interpretation of unfair, 
according to Business Week, would go “far beyond anything that Washington regulators 
have tried in the past.”609  Major targets of this type of unfairness were cigarettes and 
junk foods, which Pertschuk felt targeted vulnerable groups like the elderly, the poor, 
children, and the non-English speaking.610 Pertschuk’s commitment to protecting 
vulnerable audiences culminated in a decision to significantly limit advertising to 
children. The FTC’s set of kidvid rulemaking would embroil the FTC in an 
unprecedented level of public controversy for the rest of the decade. Despite its notoriety, 
the FTC’s kidvid proposals were not new. They were merely a culmination of what had 
been a controversial topic for nearly a decade. 
Children’s Advertising: A Decade-Long Debate 
 During the 1960s, the three networks began to concentrate children’s 
programming on Saturday morning, which resulted in more time devoted to commercials 
along with more aggressive hard-sell tactics. During the late-1960s, researchers, through 
the direction of Congress, began to study the effects of television violence. As mentioned 
earlier, although the main objective was not to study the effects of television advertising, 
                                                
608 “Pertschuk Wants the FTC to Be a Gray Panther,” The Washington Post, March 6, 1978, 
A6. 
609 “The FTC Broadens its Attack on Ads,” Business Week, June 20, 1977, 27. 
610 Shabecoff, “Washington & Business.”  
 212 
the findings showed that children under the age of eight had difficultly distinguishing 
programming from commercials, and did not understand the persuasive intent of 
commercials.611 Although children’s advertising had been around since the early days of 
commercial radio, it was mostly ignored by researchers and policymakers. Because this 
intensified commercialization was derived mostly from the broadcast television networks, 
it made sense for public interest groups like ACT to focus their efforts on persuading the 
FCC to pass specific guidelines for advertising to children.  
 Thus, prior to the FTC’s kidvid proposals for children’s advertising, advocacy 
groups like Action for Children’s Television (ACT) mostly focused on regulations of 
commercials directed at children through the FCC. The FTC and FCC had overlapping 
power to regulate commercial media, but the specific jurisdiction of the two regulatory 
agencies differed in important ways. The FCC is broadly responsible for regulating media 
structure and content in the public interest, whereas the FTC is responsible for regulating 
advertising content. Pressured by Congress and advocacy groups, the FCC, in 1974, 
established two policies for advertising for child audiences. First, the FCC adopted 
limitations on the number of commercials—9.5 minutes per hour on weekends and 12 
minutes per hour on weekdays. These rules did not change the status quo, as they were 
already in place through the self-regulatory standards created by the networks. Relying 
on the empirical data, the FCC also adopted a “separation rule” to help children 
distinguish regular programming from commercials. This rule consisted of three parts. 
First, broadcasters were required to create “bumpers” between programming and 
commercials. Second, characters on shows were prohibited from promoting products 
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related to the programming during the shows. This would mean, for example, that a G.I. 
Joe cartoon could not show a commercial for a G.I. Joe toy during the program. Finally, 
the separation rule prohibited program-length commercials (product pitches that were 
weaved into the entertainment content).612 The FCC endorsed these regulations rather 
than all-out bans because it reasoned that significant restrictions would lead to a decline 
in children’s programming. Although these rules were relatively mild compared to 
complete bans on advertising to children, it signified an inclination on behalf of 
policymakers to consider the empirical data on advertising to children and impose 
guidelines to protect children as a special audience.613  
Kidvid: FTC Announces Rulemaking for Children’s Advertising 
 By comparison to the FCC, which is responsible for regulating broadcasting in the 
public interest, the FTC had authority to regulate advertising that it found to be unfair or 
deceptive. This was particularly salient in 1977, not only because of Pertschuk’s 
commitment to the issue, but also because the FTC’s powers over unfair advertising had 
been cemented by Congress a few years prior. Although ACT had been disenchanted by 
the children’s advertising regulations by the FCC, ACT had a new ally in Pertschuk’s 
FTC. ACT had been gaining membership for a decade and had a formidable presence by 
1978. Its membership had increased six fold since 1975. In addition to its membership of 
12,000, ACT had united a coalition of groups concerned with children’s advertising, 
which included labor unions, organizations representing 30,000 health professionals, and 
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the support from over 20 million concerned parents.614 In 1977, ACT petitioned the FTC 
to promulgate trade regulation rules for children’s advertising. The petition was 
supported by a broad coalition of groups, including the American Parents’ Committee, 
the Dental Health Association of America, the Public Health Association, the Association 
for Childhood Education, the Black Child Development Institute, Head Start, the 
National Council of Negro Women, and the National Women’s Political Caucus.615 The 
effort seemed to have the support of the Senate Appropriations Committee, which in 
1977 had stated that it “shares the Commission’s growing concern about the effects of 
advertising to children” and expressed interest in funding “a viable program in this 
critical area.”616  
 On February 28, 1978, the FTC voted unanimously to initiate a trade regulation 
rulemaking proceeding to investigate all television advertising to children.617 With over 
300 pages of research, the FTC made a straightforward case that advertising directed to 
children was unfair because children do not understand the persuasive intent of 
advertising.618 The arguments made to support the restrictions were simple. First, children 
were heavy television viewers and targets of numerous commercials, and these 
commercials influenced children’s preferences. Thus, television was an important source 
of information for children, especially in terms of nutrition. According to the FTC’s 
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compilation of studies, the average child from the ages of two through eleven saw about 
20,000 TV commercials per year. More than half of these commercials were for heavily 
sugared food products with little nutritional value. These ads were problematic because 
studies showed that obesity was on the rise, and sugar consumption “has given a rise to 
pandemic tooth decay.” Unlike ads for sugary products for adults, the FTC reasoned, 
children did not understand the persuasive intent of advertising, a fact that was supported 
by numerous studies.619 The majority of children in the two- to eleven-year-old market 
were particularly vulnerable because they lacked the sophistication “necessary to evaluate 
either the fantasy or morality characteristics of advertising practices.”620  
 The FTC’s proposals would later come to be nicknamed “kidvid.” In its Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (NPR), the Commission proposed three areas for consideration: 
1. Ban all television advertising for any product, which is directed to, or 
seen by, audiences with a significant proportion of children too young to 
understand the selling purpose of advertising; 
2. Ban television advertising for food products posing the most serious 
dental health risks, which is directed to, or seen by, audiences with a 
significant proportion of older children; and 
3. Require that television advertising for sugared food products not 
included in the ban, but directed to, or seen by, audiences with a 
significant proportion of older children, be balanced by nutritional or 
health disclosures funded by advertisers.621 
 
Pertschuk assumed that these proposals would receive broad bipartisan support. For one 
thing, President Carter consistently supported FTC’s mission to propose rulemaking for 
children’s advertising. In addition, even some of most conservative Republican members 
of Congress expressed support for kidvid. Pertschuk recalled a letter of support he had 
                                                
619 Federal Trade Commission, “Children’s Advertising Proceeding Fact Sheet,” date unknown. 
Folder 6, Box 1-47, Michael Pertschuk’s Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 
620 Action for Children’s Television, “Testimony before the Federal Trade Commission,” date 
unknown. Carton 1, Box 2, The Action for Children’s Television Collection, Gutman Library 
Special Collections, Harvard University.  
621 FTC, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,967; 17,968 (Apr. 27, 1978). 
 216 
received from Republican senator Strom Thurmond: 
I got a letter from him [Senator Thurmond], shortly after we proposed 
kidvid, urging me to go ahead with it, he was recently married to a woman 
with two young children, and he was very upset about the bad cereals that 
children wanted to eat after watching the television ad. 
 
About six months later, Pertschuk got a corrective letter from Senator Thurmond, stating 
that kidvid was an overreach of federal power and ultimately a state’s rights issue. “So 
obviously the lobbies got to him,” Pertschuk concluded.622 
Stop the FTC Movement 
 The aggressive and organized lobbies against kidvid were most likely a factor for 
Thurmond’s change of heart. Pertschuk observed that the opposition to kidvid was far 
broader than he expected: “it wasn’t just food or toy advertisers, it was everyone who 
advertised, looking at it as a threat to their freedom.”623 Much was at stake for the 
industries affected by the FTC’s kidvid proposals. The Television Bureau of Advertising 
reported that advertising expenditures for sweets and soft drinks alone were estimated to 
be $500–600 million.624 Within a month after the announcement of the hearings, 
Broadcasting reported that the manufacturers, broadcasters, and advertisers had a closed-
door meeting to swiftly raise $30 million to oppose the FTC’s rulemaking.625 This 
coalition of business interests hired Burston-Martseller, the nation’s largest PR firm, 
which organized a massive public campaign effort before the hearings even started.626 
The publisher of the toy manufacturers trade magazine Playthings issued a letter urging 
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“every industry affected by a potential ban on TV advertising of its products to marshal 
its men and money—and document the disaster which would follow a ban.”627  
 Many of these sentiments were featured in pages of major newspapers. Jean 
Carper, a writer for the Washington Post and a long-time consumer advocate, described 
the new “stop the FTC” movement:  
Businessmen, who used to cozy up to the agency, now find it about as 
approachable as an unleashed tiger. Some in Congress have begun to call 
it a runaway agency that needs its powers trimmed. After a watch-and-
wait period, a definite “stop the FTC” movement is erupting and into the 
open. Though it is still a small backlash, it is vigorous and deserves 
notice.628 
 
As Carper keenly detected, the watch and wait period for businesses was over. A speaker 
at the annual 4As convention in 1978 told the audience not to go to Washington as 
“supplicants,” but instead as “militants: equals, demanding equal rights in the free 
enterprise systems.” The head of McCann-Erikson described the FTC as “comparable to 
a swarm of locusts converging on a swarm of golden crop . . . they have unfettered power 
to control the marketplace.”629 In public, advertisers were less pugnacious. In a series of 
press releases, the coalition of business interests who opposed the FTC made a series of 
arguments to undermine the FTC’s kidvid proposals. 
The First Amendment and Children’s Programming 
 To no surprise, the coalition of industries made the case that the FTC’s 
rulemaking for children’s ads violated the First Amendment. In October 1978, the Toy 
Manufacturers of America organized a press conference in Boston. They argued that the 
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proposed ban would be a violation of the First Amendment because it was a “sweeping 
indictment against truthful advertising of a legitimate product.” Lawyers from the 
National Association of Broadcasters armed themselves with lawyers to fight restrictions 
on children’s advertising based on the First Amendment.630 In addition to allegations of 
First Amendment violations, broadcasters made the case that curbing the $600 million 
would result in a loss of children’s programming altogether. This argument appeared 
prominently in a New York Times article titled “TV Faces Dim Future.” Quoting industry 
spokespersons throughout, the article featured smiling images of Scooby Doo characters 
with the caption: “Scooby Doo . . . and friends: Will they last?”631 Pertschuk pointed out 
the red-herring fallacy in the industry’s arguments: 
All we hear from industry is fierce defense of the First Amendment, the 
nutritional blessings of sugar, the educational benefits of toys and the 
technical complexities which attend any scheme of regulation. But I have 
heard very little talk of the central social and ethical concern which we 
have raised. At what age does a child in our society become a fit subject of 
commercialization?632 
 
 Pertschuk attempted to draw attention back to the main issue of protecting 
children, but businesses were able to capture this argument in an oft-cited article that 
appeared in the Washington Post. 
The National Nanny 
 The most compelling and widely used argument was that the FTC was an 
example of government overreach because it was interfering in the lives of families. In 
the weeks following the FTC’s announcements, the Washington Post published an 
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editorial titled “The FTC as the National Nanny,” which made the case that the FTC’s 
proposals would “turn the agency into a great national nanny” by usurping the decision-
making power by of individuals and “make parents less responsible, not more.”633 The 
derogative “National Nanny” was born, and it was repeated in op-eds in major 
newspapers across the country. Pertschuk later wrote that the Post editorial was a major 
turning point for the Federal Trade Commission:  
It would have been damaging enough if the Post had raised sober 
questions about the implications of the contemplated advertising ban, but 
to trivialize the children’s advertising issue was devastating—a sign to the 
broadcast, grocery manufacturing, and advertising industry that the 
Federal Trade Commission’s proceeding was fair political game—and to 
any congressmen tempted to legislatively abort the proceeding, a sign that 
the political risks would be minimal. 634 
 
Most fundamental to Pertschuk, the National Nanny symbol “ceded to the opponents of 
such a rule making the single most powerful political symbol upon which we had 
depended for our political shield against congressional interference—the defense of the 
family.”635 Shaun Sheehan of the NAB said that the fundamental question was “who 
controls the media?” If the FTC was successful, it would result in a dangerous 
government intrusion into “how parents should conduct family life.”636 Vincent 
Wasilewski echoed this sentiment when he said “the ultimate responsibility and decision 
to purchase products rests on parents.”637 
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 With new ammunition, the coalition of businesses launched vituperative assaults 
on Pertschuk himself. In one of these attacks, broadcasters distributed a facetious “Letter 
to George Orwell”: 
Well, George, you would be pleased to know that you’ve got some 
converts here on Spaceship Earth diligently working out the details of 
your fondest expectations. There is a fellow at the FTC, one Mike 
Pertschuk, who labors under the title of Chairman of the Federal Trade 
Commission. When you wrote your book, only the Soviet Union had a 
Chairman. Not so any more. Well Mike hasn’t quite organized the 
children yet but he has the beginnings of a real thing going.  
 
The letter went on to pronounce that Pertschuk was treating people like “dumfoundies” 
who “may not realize that all this health for their kids is being worked out in 
Washington.”638  
Pertschuk Disqualified 
 This direct attack on Pertschuk went well beyond op-eds in major newspapers. 
The AAF, 4As, ANA, the Toy Manufacturers of America, and Kellogg Corporation filed 
a lawsuit against Pertschuk in district court. The groups, armed with numerous public 
statements by Pertschuk, charged him with prejudging the issue of children’s advertising. 
One piece of evidence was a letter by Pertschuk to FDA commissioner Donald Kennedy, 
which included Pertschuk’s statement:  
Setting legal theory aside, the truth is that we’ve been drawn into this issue 
because of the conviction, which I know you share, that one of the evils 
flowing from the unfairness of children’s advertising is the resulting 
distortion of children’s perceptions of nutritional values. I see, at this 
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point, our logical process as follows: Children’s advertising is inherently 
unfair.639 
 
The petitioners also included a number of vitriolic statements that Pertschuk had made to 
the press, including, “Advertisers seize on the child’s trust and exploit it” and “Children 
lack the judgment to see that something that looks good to them in the short run can hurt 
them in the long run . . . they cannot protect themselves against adults who exploit their 
present-mindedness.”640 
 On November 6, 1978, U.S. district Judge Gerhard Gesell disqualified Pertschuk 
from participating in any FTC proceedings related to children’s advertising. Gesell 
concluded that because of Pertschuk’s “emotional use of derogatory terms and 
characterizations,” his “affirmative efforts to propagate his settled views made his further 
participation improper.”641 This case set a bold precedent. Following the decision, other 
groups under scrutiny by the FTC, including the National Funeral Directors and the 
American Medical Association, moved for Pertschuk’s recusal from participating in the 
commission’s rulemaking decisions.642 
  Later, a court of appeals reversed the decision and allowed Pertschuk to 
participate in the proceedings. Pertschuk, however, reluctantly resigned from the kidvid 
proceedings, reasoning that it would be in the best interests of the FTC: 
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I am concerned that that continuing controversy regarding my 
participation could become the focus of the debate, instead of the far more 
important issue—whether the proceeding itself should be allowed to 
continue. This is a painful decision, perhaps the most difficult decision I 
will make as a member of the FTC. However, I believe the public interest 
is better served if I remove any issue of my personal participation from the 
legislative debate.643 
 
 From February to March of 1979, the FTC began public hearings on the 
children’s advertising proposals with only three FTC commissioners present. 
Commissioner Robert Pitofsky disqualified himself because of his experience in a public 
interest law firm, which represented a conflict of interest. The three remaining 
commissioners—Paul Rand Dixon, David Clayton, and Elizabeth Hanford Dole—were 
all leftovers from Republican administrations.644 Dixon and Clayton in particular were 
not expected to be strong advocates for the kidvid rules because they had indicated 
concerns of First Amendment violations.645 ACT brought in thirteen witnesses to testify 
at the hearings, which took place in San Francisco and Washington.646 Testimony and 
arguments from the hearings were a replay of debates in the press. Proponents of 
children’s advertising relied on research studies demonstrating connections between 
sugary products and health problems, like obesity and tooth decay. While the relationship 
between heavy advertising of sugary foods and health problems might have been 
common sense, it was easy to cast doubt in a direct causal relationship by raising the host 
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of other mitigating variables. To undermine the validity studies, business interests were 
armed with their own lavishly funded studies. For example, one study showed that tooth 
brushing was a more important factor in preventing tooth decay than abstinence from 
sugary foods. Another study showed that dried fruits contributed more to dental decay 
than heavily advertised foods. Proponents of regulations also argued that advertising to 
children was inherently unfair, citing studies clearly demonstrating children’s lack of 
capacity to understand the persuasive intent of commercial advertising. This argument 
was not as easily challenged, but businesses nonetheless argued that limitations on 
children’s advertising were a constitutional violation, a problem of government 
overreach, and a matter best dealt with by individual parents and families. The debates 
from these legislative hearings produced hearing transcripts of more than 6,000 pages.647 
The hearings, however, were overshadowed by numerous legislative debates, which put 
into question the FTC’s continued existence.  
The FTC Appropriations Crisis 
Public relations efforts to discredit the FTC were starting to pay off, as members of 
Congress were increasingly hostile toward the FTC. On April 27, 1978, Senator Lowell 
Weicker (R-CT) lambasted Pertschuk for the children’s advertising rulemaking, stating, 
“I think this preoccupation with what children hear . . . is a waste of taxpayers’ money. . . 
I’m not going to have a bunch of idiots going around trying to discover the sugar content 
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of cereal.”648 Weicker was a member of the Senate’s appropriations committee, and he 
pushed for reduced appropriations for the FTC. 
 Republican members of House echoed Weicker’s anti-FTC sentiments. On May 
2, 1978, Republican Mark Andrews of North Dakota convinced the House 
Appropriations Subcommittee in a 5-4 vote to pass an FTC appropriations bill that would 
prevent the Commission from spending resources on trade regulation rules for the 
advertising of any food product that contains ingredients determined safe by the FDA.649 
This, of course, would include sugar. It would also restrict the FTC from bringing 
antitrust allegations against agricultural cooperatives.650 A significant constituency of 
sugar beet growers from North Dakota pressured Andrews to include these riders, and his 
amendment was passed through subcommittee quietly and no transcripts were preserved. 
On May 24, the full Appropriations Committee passed the Andrews Amendment with an 
additional setback: the FTC’s jurisdiction would be limited to “false and deceptive” 
rather than simply “unfair.” 651  
 A month later, in June, the full House struck down the entire FTC budget on 
procedural grounds. The Senate also passed resolutions to reduce the FTC’s funding by 
25 percent. These delays in appropriations meant that Congress commenced with regular 
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funding of the FTC and required the agency to “live hand to mouth on temporary 
appropriations.”652  
The Authorizations Bill 
 In November of 1979, the House formalized an authorizations bill that included 
amendments to end a number of the FTC’s ongoing investigations and proposals, 
including the funeral industry regulations, as well as those on used cars, hearing aids, and 
mobile homes. It also gave the Congress the ability to veto any proposed rulemaking of 
an entire industry by the FTC.653  The bill sailed through the House by a 5-1 margin, with 
many Democrats on board. Democratic representative Elliot Levitas of Georgia was a 
strong advocate of the legislative veto, saying, “it sends a signal to the bureaucracy and to 
the American people that the trend to more government and less control by the people has 
ended.”654 Pertschuk, alarmed by the congressional assault, wrote an urgent letter to 
Carter asking for his support. Carter responded in solidarity: “Standing up for common 
sense is sometimes difficult in these times, but we must persevere nevertheless.”655  
 In February of 1980, sixty-seven senators voted to support a similar bill with a 
veto provision for both houses of Congress and the president. Senator Wendell Ford (D-
KY), who spearheaded the bill, said that the only way to make the FTC accountable was 
through congressional oversight. The Senate’s version was more far-reaching because it 
would terminate the children’s advertising proceedings; stop the commission from 
prescribing trade regulation rules in antitrust cases; restrict the FTC from using subpoena 
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power; remove the FTC’s authority to reimburse participants who could not afford legal 
costs; force the agency to give one week notice and hold a public meeting for any 
rulemaking; and forbid the commission from investigating any profession regulated at the 
state level.656 The latter amendment would “insulate doctors, lawyers, dentists, as well as 
used car salesmen, hearing aid dealers and others from enforcement of consumer 
protection and antitrust laws.”657 The FTC argued that the requirement for a one-week 
notice followed by a public hearing was a way to tame the FTC’s staff members, who 
were seen by industry as activists who had “unfairly influenced the commission.” 
Responding to the notice/public hearing amendment, the FTC drew parallels to 
lawmaking procedures: 
The easiest way to visualize what difficulties this will create is simply to 
consider what would happen if Congressmen were required when drafting 
a law to hold every discussion with their staff experts in public, with one 
week’s advance notice. The resulting loss of both candid advice and 
flexibility will cause long delays in rulemaking, which is already a very 
lengthy process.658 
 
 In an exhaustive and earnest letter to Senator Ford, the FTC outlined its concerns over 
the bill and asked the senator to consider the ways in which “unprecedented limitations 
on its statutory authority and methods of operation . . . could, for years to come, impair 
the agency’s ability to protect competition and the consuming public.”659  Pertschuk later 
                                                
656 A.O. Sulzberger Jr., “Senate Panel Backs Curbs on F.T.C.,” New York Times, November 21, 
1979, ProQuest Historical Newspapers. 
657 Federal Trade Commission, “Fact Sheet: Senator Ford’s FTC Proposal,” date unknown. 
Folder 6, Box 147, Michael Pertschuk’s Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 
658 Federal Trade Commission, “Notes on Procedural Changes from S. 1991,” date unknown. 
Folder 6, Box 147, Michael Pertschuk’s Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 
659 Federal Trade Commission to Wendell H. Ford, 13 November 1979. 
 227 
referred to the Senate’s bill as a “legislative prefrontal lobotomy.”660 Much like the 
House, many leading Democrats in the Senate supported amendments to limit the FTC’s 
power. During the hearings, Senator John Durkin (D-NH) commended the appropriations 
crisis as a “shock therapy for bureaucrats.”661  
 All of the proposals would significantly cripple the ongoing investigations by the 
FTC, and it was unclear whether Carter would sign the bill into the law. The final version 
of the House bill included veto power from either House, and the Senate’s bill required a 
veto by the House, Senate, and President. In initial conference proceedings over the 
House and Senate bills, Carter indicated that he would veto any bill that would make the 
FTC subject to a “veto by one or two houses of Congress.” In a press conference on 
January 21, 1980, Carter condemned the congressional attack on the FTC: 
This last year has seen Congress besieged by assaults on various important 
regulatory statutes, especially the Federal Trade Commission Act, seeking 
groundless exemptions, crippling loopholes, and unprecedented 
Congressional interference with ongoing proceedings. I will resist 
strenuously all such efforts to confuse special interest pressure with 
regulatory reform.662 
 
The FTC Fights Back on Primetime  
 Carter maintained his conviction, but there was not broad public knowledge about 
the FTC’s predicaments. This began to change when the drama of congressional debates 
over kidvid and the future of the FTC caught the attention of the television news 
divisions. From January through March of 1980, Pertschuk spoke out publicly about the 
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congressional proposals. In early 1980, the Phil Donahue Show aired a show devoted to 
the kidvid controversy with Pertschuk as a guest. The program, with a sizable audience of 
mothers at home, inspired thousands of letters of support for the FTC. Pertschuk’s 
appearance on Bill Moyers’ Journal followed, with a probing analysis of the kidvid 
crusade and the ensuing crisis on PBS. Initially, Moyers was prepared to run a negative 
piece on the FTC after his local druggist on Long Island complained to him about the 
over regulation of the pharmaceutical industry. When Moyers interviewed Pertschuk and 
began to understand the scope of the issue, he became interested in what was happening 
to the FTC.663 The show was sympathetic to the FTC and Moyers concluded the episode 
by stating, “The Federal Trade Commission itself isn’t likely to be an issue in this 
election year. It ought to be. What happens to it will touch us all.”664 In February of 1980, 
60 Minutes covered the story. The 60 Minutes episode, according to Pertschuk’s account, 
“had a truly transformative impact. . . . The commission was not seen as the ‘National 
Nanny,’ but as the honest cop on the consumer beat, punished for daring to question 
powerful economic interests.”665 In addition to television appearances, the FTC began to 
disseminate an avalanche of press releases and editorials to major newspapers and White 
House staff members. This media blitz was beginning to resonate more with the White 
House. The day after the 60 Minutes appearance, political affairs counselor Ann Wexler 
commented on the appearance: “When the president speaks about the FTC, forty million 
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people will know what he is talking about, who until this week had barely heard of the 
FTC.”666 
A Bottom Line in the Eleventh Hour  
By March of 1980, the FTC’s funding had run out, and the House adjourned without 
acting on an emergency appropriations bill.667 Carter was under pressure, and he brought 
Pertschuk into his office for an urgent meeting on April 24. The president affirmed his 
earlier promise to Pertschuk: he was prepared to veto any bill which would limit the 
FTC’s power, but he forewarned Pertschuk that a veto might mean the agency would go 
out of business. Carter said to Pertschuk, “you have to tell what your bottom line is.” 
Pertschuk contemplated the consequences of continued legislative gridlock, and finally 
divulged that he would accept a compromise on veto powers over the FTC, as long as the 
agency could maintain its robust rulemaking powers under the FTCIA.668 Carter 
promised unity with Pertschuk, but the president was distracted by other pressing matters. 
The same day as the meeting with Pertschuk, Carter covertly sent eight helicopters into 
Iran to rescue the American hostages. Due to a sandstorm, the mission failed and eight 
service members lost their lives in a helicopter crash. The fact that Carter made time to 
meet with Pertschuk on that important day was a strong indication of Carter’s concern 
about the FTC. The tragedy of the mission captivated the news media and the public, and 
this overshadowed the FTC’s continued struggles. 
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 On May 1, 1980, the FTC’s funding had officially run out, and it was directed to 
take steps to close down shop.669 The New York Times ran a story which began “At 12:01 
this morning the unimaginable happed in this town: The Federal Trade Commission, one 
of the nation’s major agencies, went out of business.” It was the first time in U.S. history 
that a federal agency officially closed its doors due to a lack of funding. Federal agencies 
had gone into the red before, but none had ever shut down completely. What made this 
case different was the use of a long forgotten law from 1870 called the Antideficiency 
Act. Invoked by Attorney General Civiletti, the law required the shutdown of any federal 
agency without sufficient funds except to “to bring about the orderly termination of an 
agency’s function.” Court appearances were cancelled, traveling employees were called 
home, and the FTC’s library was dark and empty. Long-time commissioner Paul Rand 
Dixon sat in his office, surrounded by boxes, and smoked a cigar. Finally, on May 2, 
through emergency funds from the State Department, the FTC was back in business, but 
the funds would run out in thirty days.670 
The FTC Improvements Act 
 On May 21, only a few weeks before the funding was set to expire again, the 
House and Senate reached a compromise on a three-year authorizations bill. The final 
legislation included a two-house veto on any industry-wide trade regulation rules.671 A 
defeated Carter signed the ironically titled “Federal Trade Commission Improvements 
Act” into law on May 28, expressing his dissatisfaction with some aspects of legislation, 
                                                
669 A.O. Sulzberger Jr., “Conferees Back Funds for F.T.C.,” New York Times, May 1, 1980, 
ProQuest Historical Newspapers. 
670 A.O. Sulzberger Jr., “After Brief Shutdown, F.T.C. Gets More Funds: Temporary Funding 
Approved Long Ignored Act Enforced,” New York Times, May 2, 1980, D1, ProQuest Historical 
Newspapers. 
671 A.O. Sulzberger Jr., “House, in Compromise, Votes to Restrain F.T.C.,” Special to the New 
York Times, May 21, 1980, ProQuest Historical Newspapers. 
 231 
including the two-house congressional veto of FTC rules. Carter was clearly under 
pressure; he signed the “bill despite the congressional veto provision, because the very 
existence of this agency is at stake.” Carter lightened his averseness with some praise: 
This bill contains some valuable features patterned after my program to 
eliminate excessive regulation. It requires that FTC rules be based on 
sound economic analysis. Another provision directs the agency to find the 
least burdensome way of achieving its goals. 672 
 
Although it did not explicitly halt ongoing investigations per se, the law essentially 
restricted the FTC from regulating advertising on the basis of “unfairness,” and instead 
limited advertising regulations to tactics deemed explicitly deceptive. Because unfairness 
to children was the chief rationale for the kidvid proposals, the FTC, a year later, 
abandoned the kidvid proposal.673 The final termination report stated: 
While the rulemaking record establishes that child-oriented television 
advertising is a legitimate cause for public concern, there do not appear to 
be, at the present time, workable solutions which the Commission can 
implement through rulemaking in response to the problems articulated 
during the course of the proceeding.674 
 
The lack of the agency’s authority to regulate unfair advertising made the passage of 
kidvid rules impossible. During the remainder of the kidvid hearings, industry leaders 
called into question research studies showing that children’s advertising posed a serious 
health risk. Unconvinced of research studies showing links between certain food 
advertising and health problems, the FTC concluded, “there currently exists no scientific 
methodology for determining the cariogenicity of individual food products which is 
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sufficiently scientifically accepted to justify formulation of a government-mandated 
rule.” Restrictions for children’s advertising, based on unfairness to the audience, or the 
consequences for children’s health, were officially off the table.  
Conclusion 
 
Gary Cross refers to the defeat of kidvid as “a turning point in the consumer rights 
movement.” This spectacular turn of events leading to the FTC’s legislative slaughter 
sent a chilling message to other government agencies, and as a result, members of several 
agencies dramatically toned down their regulatory philosophy.675 Thus, in a much 
broader sense, the confrontations over the FTC signify a major pivot toward 
neoliberalism in general. Although businesses had been organizing a counterattack since 
the mid-1970s, their assemblage of power was finally revealed in 1978.  
 The intense debates following the FTC’s kidvid proposals reveal the extent to 
which debates over how to make businesses better serve the public interest did not end 
with the demise of legislation to establish the Consumer Protection Agency. The FTC’s 
regulatory powers had been extended during the 1970s to make it the most powerful 
consumer protection and public interest agency in Washington. Congress, however, still 
had influence over the agency through authorizations and appropriations, and the scene in 
Washington had changed dramatically by the end of the decade. The kidvid initiative did 
not fail merely because of the political ascendance of the New Right, just as it cannot be 
blamed entirely on a fractured left and a disillusioned consumer movement. Kidvid was 
not a radical proposal by an agency gone rogue. Since the mid-1960s, lawmakers on both 
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sides of the political isle were sympathetic to critiques of commercial advertising directed 
at children. Reforms for children’s advertising had been proposed, and supported to some 
extent, by all of the Republican and Democratic commissioners during the 1970s. As late 
as 1977, the FTC appeared to have the support of Congress, the president, and the public 
for its kidvid proposals. In many ways, the kidvid proposals were less radical than the 
FTC’s earlier initiatives, including investigations of industrial concentration and its 
relationship with advertising puffery. Plus, the FTC had not ordered an all-out ban on 
advertising to children; kidvid was among an array of proposals for children’s advertising 
that would be considered in public hearings, with advertisers and businesses present.  
 The major difference was that kidvid was proposed in a very different political 
climate. More than any other factor, the organized and well-funded campaign launched 
by major corporations put the nail in kidvid’s coffin. Businesses were so poised to 
respond that they captured the political debate before the FTC could hold open, public 
hearings on the issue. As soon as the possibility of rulemaking was announced, business 
interests swiftly organized, pooling resources to discredit Pertschuk and demonize the 
FTC. The lack of key allies in Congress, which the FTC had enjoyed for most of the 
decade, made this victory easier. Another crucial ally—the print news media—was 
mostly absent by 1978. Anti-government reporting replaced the pro-labor and pro-
consumer reporting of the early part of the decade due to more aggressive public relations 
aimed at influencing news content, structural changes within the newspaper industry, and 
a greater collusion between newspapers and commercial interests. Pressured by the potent 
cadre of private interests who opposed the FTC, Congress created a storm over what were 
formally humdrum and routine agency authorizations. By holding the agency hostage, 
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Congress forced into law measures that completely defanged the FTC, resurrecting the 
little old lady of Pennsylvania Avenue.  
 By the time the hearings were finally held, the thousands of pages of testimony, 
including opinions, arguments, and research gathered and presented on children’s 
advertising, were irrelevant and extraneous. The agency, by 1980, was too crippled to 
proceed. For a few months in early 1980, the kidvid cause and the FTC’s decimation by 
Congress captivated the White House and the public through the FTC’s media offensive. 
Although fallout from the kidvid proposals was devastating, this story can teach 
reformers important political lessons. More important than his lack of attention to 
garnering media attention, Pertschuk regrets that he did not begin his rulemaking of 
kidvid by first building support from members of Congress through authorizations. He 
recollected, “None of them had a stake in defending the FTC. It wasn’t their problem. If 
they had supported it, I would have been in a much stronger position. That was the most 
serious mistake.”676 Whether or not a tactical effort by Pertschuk to build congressional 
and public support would have changed the outcome will never be known. What is clear 
is that there was still a window of opportunity, however slim, for a change to the status 
quo in 1977. As the conclusion of this dissertation will illustrate, that window closed after 
Reagan was elected. 
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CONCLUSION: RETHINKING THE LEGACY OF THE FTC 
 
 
The congressional revolt unleashed on the FTC in 1980 led to a downfall of a 
number of its initiatives, which the agency first began during the early part of the 1970s. 
This regulatory revolution, which congealed during the 1980s, remains with us in a new 
millennium. This study of the battles between the FTC and businesses challenges the 
myth that these changes were natural and inevitable. By looking at the FTC, it becomes 
very clear that there was a possibility for far-reaching alternatives to the status quo during 
the 1970s. From our vantage point today, the FTC’s initial revitalization was remarkable. 
Ralph Nader, through a single work of investigative scholarship, changed the course of 
the nation’s most powerful regulatory agency. The consumer rights constituency was so 
influential that Nixon was forced to revitalize the FTC. Nixon’s appointees, who shared 
Nader’s conviction, broke new ground in advertising reform in a number of ways. If 
continued, corrective advertising for deceptive practices would have changed the entire 
advertising industry. Furthermore, this narrow focus on deceptive advertising was greatly 
expanded when the FTC began to consider advertising puffery, a common tactic in 
concentrated markets. The FTC also drew attention to ways that advertising is 
inextricably linked with oligopolistic markets in its antitrust cases. Through both its 
advertising and antitrust policies, the FTC called into question this symbiotic and 
structural relationship.  
 This study does not suggest that corporate power was not formidable during the 
early 1970s. In fact, this study answers how and why corporations were able to recapture 
the politics in their favor. Existing scholarship has minimized this point by focusing too 
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heavily on the slow unraveling of the left and ascendance of the New Right during the 
1970s. Following a Gramscian approach, hegemony can only be understood by looking at 
resistance. The rise of neoliberalism was not a slow evolution, but instead a rupture in the 
politics of marketplace regulation, one that came to life largely through the U.S. Federal 
Trade Commission. The very reason business trade groups relocated to Washington and 
created concerted public relations campaigns was the wave of regulatory reform during 
the 1970s. If progressive reform was on the run by 1968, this massive undertaking would 
not have been necessary. As this dissertation has demonstrated, the FTC proposed 
alternatives to the sweeping political and economic changes that took place during the 
1980s. Through this lens of resistance, the often clandestine and complex public relations 
tactics on behalf of business becomes more transparent. During the 1970s, sharp 
hegemonic currents began to crest, and business trade groups worked together to arm 
themselves with new political strategies.  
 Thus, this study reveals that the dismantling of the New Deal order during the 
1970s was fought on primarily ideological turf. The rise of neoliberalism and the New 
Right was not a simple matter of political cynicism in the wake of Watergate. Nor was it 
purely an opportunistic political response to the economic crisis during the 1970s, 
although these political and economic crises certainly greased the wheels of a hegemonic 
victory. Rather than merely suggest that what took place was a massive conspiracy, this 
dissertation describes the ways in which multifaceted elements of hegemonic forces 
congealed together, some decisively, and others by chance. The great migration of trade 
groups to Washington was part of a broader trend in treetops propaganda. Advertising 
trade associations and the nation’s top advertisers, like Proctor and Gamble, paved the 
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roads for this migration—they were among the first generation of trade groups to open 
offices in Washington, largely in response to the advertising reform offered by the FTC’s 
initial revitalization. Lobbying, as effective as it may have been to squelch the long battle 
for the Consumer Protection Agency, did not stop the FTC. Massive grassroots efforts 
were necessary. As early as 1971, Lewis Powell, a prominent corporate lawyer, and later 
a Supreme Court justice, understood this when he mapped out a long-term plan for 
hegemonic power in his memo to the Chamber of Commerce. The ad industry and 
powerful trade groups were still in disarray during the first few years of the 1970s, and 
Powell’s strategy would not be fulfilled until the later in the decade, when the corporate-
sponsored programs for conservative economic education were employed on an 
unprecedented scale. Leading the way was the U.S. Advertising Council, which through 
its massive campaign for economics education, united businesses around neoliberal ideals 
and popularized the Chicago School’s economic trend. Political cynicism and economic 
woe provided an opportunity for corporate interests to recapture the symbol of individual 
freedom and prosperity from progressive forces. President Ford began to espouse this 
anti-regulatory creed in speeches and surrounded himself with a new generation of so-
called free market Mohicans. However, when Ford left office, the FTC’s powers to 
regulate unfair business practices were stronger than at any other point in the agency’s 
history. The FTC, and the consumer movement in general, lost key allies in 1977 through 
changes in the news media and in Congress. A shortage of opposition, along with the 
consolidation of power, allowed for business leaders and their political allies in Congress 
to attack the FTC more directly. With the neologism of the “national nanny,” the enemy 
to this liberty was the FTC as the epitome of government regulation. When a reluctant 
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Carter signed into law measures to eviscerate the FTC, his hands were tied. The 
buzzword “nanny state,” born out of the crisis over the FTC’s kidvid controversy, is still 
used by politicians today to attack government bureaucracy and contest government 
regulations.  
 I now to turn to changes to the political economy that took place during the 1980s 
and in the decades that followed: industrial concentration, the demise of the Fairness 
Doctrine, and further protection for commercial speech. These events bring to light the 
path not taken by the FTC. Businesses during the 1980s continued to have success by 
marching to the beat of the same drum. The principles of conservative economics 
espoused by Ad Council were infused into the educational system during the 1980s, and 
political candidates began to rely more on corporate money from political action 
committees. This dissertation ends with a discussion of this study’s contemporary 
relevance. Unresolved issues from the 1970s provide entry points for reformers to 
challenge the contradictions inherent in intellectual and ideological ascendancy of 
neoliberalism.  
The FTC after 1980 
 President Reagan, within his first days in office, launched an all-out assault on the 
FTC. For Reagan, the agency was the quintessence of big intrusive government that 
interfered too much with private enterprise. As the FTC’s chair, Reagan appointed James 
Miller, a free-market fundamentalist straight from the American Enterprise Institute think 
tank. Miller lobbied aggressively for senior staff members who shared his free market 
philosophy. As a result of its leadership, the FTC’s resources were cut in half, and it 
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closed down a number of regional offices during the 1980s.677 In a speech before 
members of the Association of National Advertisers, Miller praised advertising for its 
“important role in the economy” as the “key element in maintaining competition and 
assuring an efficient allocation of the nation’s resources.” He went on to explain that: 
Advertising benefits producers as well, for it enables them to match their 
own unique offerings with those consumers who find their particular 
services most attractive. Of especial importance is the role of advertising 
in facilitating the emergence of new competitors, and thus the 
maintenance of a viable competitive environment. Although serious 
debate within the economics profession continues, there is substantial and 
increasing evidence that advertising facilitates the entry of new firms and 
products. Even advertising’s harshest critics would probably agree that 
without advertising there would be a slowing of the rate of entry of new 
firms and the rate of introduction of new innovative products.678  
 
 Miller’s statements on advertising were a far cry from the views of the previous heads of 
the FTC during the 1970s, even those appointed by Ford. Pertschuk remained as a 
commissioner on the FTC until 1984, and he was a strong voice of dissent during these 
years. The differing philosophies of Miller and Pertschuk are clearly evident in 
Pertschuk’s congressional testimony on the performance of the Federal Trade 
Commission in 1984. Saddened by the FTC’s decay under Miller, Pertschuk stated “we 
expected ideology; we did not expect incompetence. We got both.” He lambasted Miller 
for his “single minded determination to undo the past—not just the immediate past—but 
the very foundations of antitrust and consumer protection law laid down by Congress in 
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1914, in 1938, and in 1975, laws forcefully implemented by bipartisan commission.” 
Pertschuk went on to describe the FTC’s major regulatory shift during the 1980s: 
The Nixon/Ford/Carter Commissions sought to enforce the antitrust 
laws—including the laws against anticompetitive mergers, monopolizing 
and retail price fixing—vigorously and consistently. This commission has 
encouraged and facilitated the largest mergers between competitors in 
history. It has refused to enforce the law against retail price fixing. It has 
abandoned challenges to predatory price-fixing. It has substituted 
ideologically driven economic debate for clear and forceful law 
enforcement policies.  
 
 During the years between 1980–1984, the commission did not bring a single case 
against a product defect, even in an instance when fatal flaws were found in playground 
equipment. For advertising deception, Miller stated that the agency could only pursue 
cases in which “consumers had been hurt—cases where consumers relied on something 
in the ad and suffered because of it.”679 In lieu of the strict advertising substantiation 
criteria of the FTC of the past decade, Miller championed “industry’s own self-
regulation” as the “most significant inducements to truthful advertising.”680 A number of 
state-level agencies complained to the FTC about the increase in false and deceptive 
advertising, including tobacco ads targeted to children, with little interest from the FTC.  
 Miller, along with FCC chair Mark Fowler, adopted a hands-off approach when it 
came to children’s advertising. As a result, program-length television commercials for 
toys like He-Man, The Care Bears, The Transformers, and My Little Pony blossomed 
during the 1980s. During the years between 1983 and 1988, the number of program 
length commercials increased from thirteen to over seventeen, and the sales associated 
with these commercials were a whopping $64.6 billion. Advertisers, manufacturers, and 
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broadcasters had united over opposition to the kidvid proposal. This collusion was 
cemented when Fowler’s FCC passed a rule permitting stations to share profits with 
manufacturers for toy sales.681 In addition to this increased commercialization during the 
1980s, the Reagan Revolution left its mark on broader structural elements of U.S. 
political economy in the decades that followed.  
A Wave of Conglomeration 
The FTC’s most radical initiative—its attempt to redefine antitrust through a theory of 
shared monopoly in the cereal industry—officially came to a halt in 1982.682 If the FTC 
had succeeded, the shared monopoly doctrine might have been used in a number of 
concentrated industries, including autos, health insurance, banks, and 
telecommunications. The ending of the cereal case was a prime example of Reagan’s 
antitrust philosophy. The FTC’s probe into the oil industry case, which began in 1972, 
was dismissed in 1981.683 Although the FTC still has the power to block proposed 
mergers, it could not break apart existing firms based on the monopoly competition 
theories used during the 1970s. Reagan’s appointees to the Justice Department and the 
FTC shared his lax antitrust enforcement. Miller insisted “we’ve got to understand that 
some mergers are conductive to economic efficiency, result in lower prices and better 
products to consumers.”684 As a result this hands-off approach, the U.S. economy 
experienced a wave of mergers and acquisitions not seen since the turn of the 
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century.685This was particularly true in conglomeration, whereby unrelated businesses 
merge together.686  
Antitrust polices were even more lenient during the 1990s. Under President 
Clinton, massive consolidations took place. In the oil industry, mergers included Exxon 
with Mobil, and BP with Amoco. This restored a concentration of power in the energy 
industry not seen since the days of Standard Oil, which ironically had provoked the 
establishment of the FTC in 1914. During the late 1990s, the world’s largest financial 
service was created when Citicorp merged with Travelers Group. By 2007, the big banks 
were too big to fail. This was true in the pharmaceutical industry as well: in 1999, Pfizer 
and Warner Lambert merged to create the largest pharmaceutical company.687 
 Nowhere was this trend more evident than in the telecommunications market, a 
change well documented by existing scholarship. Ben Bagdikian was troubled by this 
concentration when he wrote Media Monopoly in 1983. At the time of his writing, fifty 
firms controlled nearly all telecommunications in the United States. Seven years later, 
this number reduced to less than half that. By the end of the 1980s, this was number nine, 
which inspired the Herman and Chomsky’s publication of Manufacturing Consent. 
Herman and Chomsky created a theoretical model to explain the ways in which media 
content largely reflect corporate and conglomerate interests through five filters. Reliance 
on advertising not only fueled structural concentration, but it also influences content 
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because advertisers yield tremendous power in determining the nature of media content. 
The proposed restrictions on advertising during the 1970s would have likely mitigated 
this collusion. Herman and Chomsky go into detail on what they call “flak machines”—
think tanks designed to produce flak to curb a perceived “liberal bias” in the media. As 
this dissertation demonstrated, many of these strategies were initiated during the 1970s, 
and influencing journalists through their professional obligations continues to be a 
rallying cry for conservatives. Robert W. McChesney has also documented the impact of 
this structural change in the media industry. In 2004, when McChesney published The 
Problem of the Media, there were only six companies controlling the telecommunications 
market. This concentration continues to take its toll on U.S. journalism. While business 
trade groups and PR firms have sent more and more lobbyists to Washington, the number 
of reporters in Washington has been dwindling rapidly since the late 1970s. There was a 
relative balance between public relations specialists and journalists in 1970. In 1980, 
public relations specialists outnumbered journalists for the first time. By 2008, there were 
almost four times as many PR specialists as journalists. These changes together have 
resulted in more and more reliance by newspapers on corporate press releases.688 As this 
study has documented, the enormous growth in corporate public relations and its 
influence on journalistic practices can be traced to a great extent to businesses’ reaction 
to the FTC. Although it the FTC was not the only threat to businesses during the 1970s, it 
was certainly the most alarming, not only for commercial media, but also for the 
oligopoly structure more broadly.  
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The Fairness Doctrine’s Demise 
As this dissertation has demonstrated, the Fairness Doctrine served as a basis for the 
FTC’s advertising regulations during the 1970s. Until 1980, there was some degree of 
protection for progressive points of view through the U.S. Fairness Doctrine. In addition, 
the Fairness Doctrine’s application to advertising was initially inspired during the late 
1960s, when John Banzhaf convinced policymakers of the problems associated with 
cigarette advertising, which eventually drove them off the air. Inspired by this policy, the 
FTC supported counteradvertising and ordered corrective advertising as a remedy for 
deception. The fairness policies for advertising were used throughout the decade, finally 
invoked for the last time when the FTC proposed counteradvertising for sugary products 
advertised to children. The Fairness Doctrine was exercised by the Public Media Center 
and a broad coalition of progressives who argued for their right to rebut the Advertising 
Council’s AES campaign. The FCC continued to consider the Public Media’s case until 
September of 1980, when it finally terminated the proceedings. Broader debates over the 
Fairness Doctrine would continue throughout the 1980s, when Congress sought to codify 
the FCC policy into law. It narrowly came close to passing.  
 Reagan voiced strong opposition to the Fairness Doctrine, which helped unite 
conservatives over a formerly bipartisan issue. In 1982, Senator Packwood held hearings 
about the both the constitutionality and practicality of the Fairness Doctrine. Dan Rather 
and Bill Monroe testified that the doctrine reinforced a “chilling effect” and also allowed 
for certain groups to intimidate news anchors with fairness complaints. In 1982, 
broadcasters, advertising trade groups, and major manufacturers formed a front group 
called “The Freedom of Expression Foundation.” The well-funded organization hired 
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lobbyists and think tanks to garner public support for the repeal. By the time hearings 
began in 1984, the Freedom of Expression Foundation had provided countless numbers 
of articles to new outlets to lend credibility to the cause. The FCC finally suspended the 
Fairness Doctrine on August 4, 1987. This decision outraged consumer activists like 
Ralph Nader, and proponents of the Fairness Doctrine had some support from members 
of Congress. Democratic senators sought to codify the Fairness Doctrine into law with 
the Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1987. The bill received overwhelming support in the 
Senate with a vote of 59-31, and in the House, 302-102.689 Regan vetoed the bill, and the 
Senate did not have enough votes to override the veto. After the decision, the editors of 
Broadcasting issued a twenty-page insert titled, “The Decline and Fall of the Fairness 
Doctrine.” The demise of the Fairness Doctrine indicted an entirely new market of 
advertising for broadcasters, which they called “advocacy advertising.” Broadcasters in 
1987 predicted that issue-oriented advertising by private organizations “could ultimately 
become a $100 million-a-year business.” Despite the possibility, broadcasters were timid 
about testing the waters by opening up the airwaves to advocacy ads during the 1980s. 
This reticence would slowly evaporate as the Supreme Court continued to validate 
commercial speech. 
Continued Protection for Commercial Speech  
Both in rhetoric and in the courts, businesses relied again and again on the First 
Amendment to protect commercial speech during the 1980s. As this dissertation 
demonstrated, we can partly attribute responsibility for this trend to consumer activists. In 
a shortsighted effort to get pharmacists to post prices for prescription drugs, the Supreme 
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Court protected advertising under the scope of the First Amendment in the landmark 
Virginia Pharmacy decision. This decision made advertisers more assertive and 
regulators more timid.  
 Virginia Pharmacy has had implications for direct-to-consumer pharmaceutical 
advertising. Today, the United States is one of two countries in the world that allow 
direct-to-consumer prescription drug advertising on television. The influx in advertising 
was initiated by a decision in 1997 to allow prescription drug advertising on television.690 
These advertisements rarely include information on pricing or alternative, less-expensive 
generics. Instead, they often rely on emotional appeals; happiness from relief of 
symptoms, success in the workplace, and acceptance from peers are but few examples of 
such advertising tropes. This growth in pharmaceutical advertising has resulted in a shift 
from research and development to the repackaging of existing drugs with multimillion 
dollar marketing campaigns. If the FTC had succeeded in regulating prescription drug 
advertising without the constitutional limits from Virginia Pharmacy, these direct-to-
consumer ads on television would likely not exist.  
 After 1976, with few exceptions, the court continued to protect commercial 
advertising under the First Amendment. In 2001, in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. 
Reilly/Altadis U.S.A. Inc. v. Reilly, the Supreme Court ruled that Massachusetts’s 
restrictions on tobacco advertising were unconstitutional even though the state insisted 
that its regulations would deter underage smoking.691 Beyond its dramatic consequences 
for advertising regulation, the Virginia Pharmacy decision served as justification for 
reinterpretations of other forms of corporate speech. In 1978, a Massachusetts statute was 
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challenged that prohibited corporations from making contributions to influence state 
referenda. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the Supreme Court ruled that such 
expression—even on behalf of corporations motivated by financial self-interest—was 
fully protected by the First Amendment. The Wall Street Journal reported that the Bellotti 
decision went beyond Virginia Pharmacy and “greatly broadened First Amendment 
protections for commercial speech.”692  Critics referred to the Bellotti decision as one that 
allowed the already privileged greater freedom to wield influence at the expense of the 
less privileged. Labor groups, for instance, condemned the decision for giving unneeded 
clout to corporations. Ironically, the AFL-CIO opened the door to the Bellotti decision by 
supporting First Amendment protection for advertisers in Virginia Pharmacy.  
 The final blow was delivered on January 21, 2010, when a bitterly divided 
Supreme Court ruled that it is unconstitutional for government to limit the amount of 
money corporations can spend on political advertising. The ruling in Citizens United 
dismantled years of campaign finance reform laws, and has had dramatic consequences 
for U.S. elections.693 The Court was not alone in its division over the ruling. President 
Obama called it “a major victory for big oil, Wall Street banks, health insurance 
companies and the other powerful interests that marshal their power every day in 
Washington to drown out the voices of everyday Americans.”694 The major advertising 
trade publication Advertising Age projected that the ruling would “put political ad 
spending on steroids.”695 And it certainly has. The 2012 presidential election is predicted 
to be the most expensive in history because of the amount spent by super PACs. 
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Conservative Economics Reigns Supreme 
The Advertising Council’s campaign for American Economics helped popularize the 
Chicago School economic trends and unite businesses around libertarian principals. As 
Chapter 4 demonstrated, the Ad Council relied on a strategy called the “multiplier 
effect,” whereby it tried to infuse its campaign into the news media and educational 
institutions. During the 1980s, this brand of conservative economics became more 
pervasive within major institutions, including mass media, education, and in the highest 
levels of government.  
  The labor beats—once a hallmark of U.S. newspapers—has nearly ceased to exist, 
a trend that began during the late 1970s. Replacing coverage of workers has been 
supplanted with trend toward “business journalism.”696 With constant updates on the 
stock market, this new type of journalism caters to the upper classes, without fully 
contextualizing the economic crises, unemployment, and the competitive effects of 
mergers and acquisitions.  
 Starting in the late 1970s, the Chicago School trend began to gain more 
legitimacy in the courts, a change documented by legal scholar William Kovacic. 
Friedman simplified his economic theories in a book, Free to Choose, which would serve 
as the basis of a new television series in the United States and the UK during the 
1980s.697 During the 1980s, the courts relied heavily on scholarly work from the Chicago 
School, which resulted greater permissiveness for industrial concentration. Competition, 
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once the basis for antitrust enforcement, was steadily supplanted by theories resting on 
the argument that greater profits would lead to more efficiency and lower prices.698  
 The ascendance of conservative economics is also evident in higher education. 
For the first time, in 1980, business majors outnumbered majors in all the liberal arts 
combined. By the mid-1980s, smaller colleges began to form more partnerships with 
think tanks, where they “did virtually no research but did undertake considerable 
corporate fund-raising and advocacy.” During the late 1970s, corporate-funded Small 
Business Development Centers (SBDCs) formed closer ties with schools like the 
University of Georgia and Cal-Poly. In 1981, Congress institutionalized this practice, 
appropriating $20 million for SBDCs.699   
 Since the 1980s, public expenditure on research and development has been 
declining rapidly, while industry investment in research has soared. In 1975, there was a 
relative balance between public and private investment for research. In 2008, industry 
investment in research was $350 billion, compared to $100 billion through public 
grants.700 The type of research conducted is undoubtedly influenced by the unprecedented 
amount of private investment in research. Research projects that delve into controversial 
topics—from the effects of children’s advertising to the impact of industrial emissions on 
global warming—are less likely to be funded by these private grants.  
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Entry Points 
From the progressive perspective, the political and economic changes during the years 
following the 1970s are discouraging. Although each period of industrial consolidation 
since the turn of century was followed by a wave of reform, there did not appear to be the 
same progressive energy after the 1980s (although this period is a fruitful area for 
continued research). This brings us to an important question: How does this study of the 
FTC inform the present? In light of the amount of special interest money in politics, 
several activists and scholars argue that little can be addressed until the money is taken 
out of politics. While this is true, money in politics is a symptom of a root cause, one that 
was part of vigorous policy debate in the 1970s: corporate consolidation of power. How 
do we put this back on the table? The story of the FTC illuminates a number of 
unresolved contradictions in neoliberalism. This study ends with more questions than it 
answers, but the following contradictions, born but unresolved since the 1970s, can 
provide future reformers with points of entry. 
Protecting Children: The Paradox of Conservatism 
 Most existing scholarship on consumer culture mentions the FTC’s proposed ban 
on advertising to children as the height of advertising reform during this period. This 
study’s detailed account of the kidvid crusade adds a layer of complexity to existing 
scholarship. The eventual demise of the FTC was not a result of idealistic activists on the 
FTC, but instead an organized response by businesses, which had gained considerable 
power and influence by 1978. Much can be learned from this imbroglio. Businesses were 
able to capture the argument that it was defending family values from a big and intrusive 
government. By the time the FTC initiated the kidvid rulemaking, it was too late, but the 
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victory was narrow. Solidified during the Reagan years, the preservation of family values 
has become the mantra for conservatives. Although effective at the time, it has its weak 
spots. With more commercialization directed to children today than ever before, how can 
businesses continue to claim to be proponents of family values? The unparalleled level of 
childhood obesity and illness due to consumption of high-calorie and heavily advertised 
foods conflicts with the core arguments by the New Right.  
 Recently, debates over advertising and marketing to children have resurfaced, 
when Michelle Obama made childhood obesity her primary cause. In 2010, the First 
Lady spoke to the Grocery Manufacturers Association conference and said: 
So it’s just gotten to the point where we as parents know that things have 
gotten out of balance. And we know that many of our kids aren’t as 
healthy and active as they should be. And we desperately want to do the 
right things. But we’re inundated with conflicting information. Our kids 
sometimes are bombarded by ads for unhealthy products. And many folks 
in this country are struggling to find foods that are both healthy for their 
kids but affordable for their families.701   
 
Michelle Obama, perhaps unknowingly, was resurrecting a provocative issue. In response 
to her initiatives, Obama has been called “the first nanny,” but she is certainly not the 
first to be labeled with this derogative. The question remains as to whether this 
accusation works as well as it did during the 1970s. For example, the Washington Post 
ran an editorial on the First Lady’s cause, but with a much different tone than the 
“National Nanny” piece three decades before. In fact, the 2010 editorial in the Post cited 
its earlier piece and concluded that the failure of kidvid instigated “30 years of expanding 
                                                




waistlines, decaying teeth and skyrocketing rates of diabetes.”702 Michael Pertschuk sees 
hope in this editorial, and said when he read the piece, “all I could really think of was that 
the writers of the story and some editor wanted to stick to the publisher, so consumerism 
isn’t entirely dead.” Pertschuk is optimistic because new initiatives to regulate children’s 
advertising have congressional and interagency support (something he regrets not having 
prearranged before he announced the FTC’s kidvid rulemaking).703 
 Through direction from the White House, Congress in 2010 created an 
interagency task force with the FDA, FTC, USDA, and CDC to develop industry-wide 
guidelines for child marketing and advertising.704 Representative Lynn Woolsey, a 
Democrat from California, recently introduced legislation to remove junk food from 
schools by creating guidelines for nutritional standards for foods not included in regular 
school lunch programs.705 Whether these efforts will succeed is unknown, but the FTC’s 
failure to pass kidvid rulemaking can teach reformers important political lessons. 
Balancing Power: The Paradox of Patriotism  
 More than any other creed, the New Right has been able to capture the ideological 
symbol of American freedom. Although this happened over the course of many decades, 
starting during the McCarthy era with anti-Communist rhetoric, it has persisted and was 
resurrected in new ways during the 1970s. The recent Tea Party Movement used these 
same principles to bolster conservatism during the midterm elections. The Advertising 
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Council’s AES booklet, its cover adorned with stars and stripes, made a case that 
American freedom is inextricably linked with the free market. The continued reliance on 
the First Amendment by corporate interests, from Virginia Pharmacy to Citizens United, 
has been infused into the collective consciousness of America. The core principle 
imbedded in the U.S. Constitution is individual liberty, which corporations have used to 
argue against regulations by big government. There is an element of truth here. The 
framers were concerned about government overreach, but more than anything else, they 
were concerned about concentrations of power. The recent Supreme Court cases that 
treated corporations as people and money as speech subvert these core values. There is an 
opportunity for progressives to recapture this symbol of patriotism, in a bipartisan way, 
by highlighting the skewed balance of power following the Citizens United decision. 
John McCain and President Obama have both criticized Citizens United. Much like the 
Virginia Pharmacy decision, policymakers have been timid in how to deal with the 
avalanche of super pak political advertising. Citizens United has deflated these efforts. 
But the there is room to remind that the Constitution, above all, wanted to strike a balance 
of powers. If the Supreme Court was infallible, its most repugnant decisions—from 
Dredd Scott to Plessy v. Ferguson—would still be the law of the land today.  
Biting Its Own Tail: The Paradox of the Free Market  
 Another contradiction, unresolved since the 1970s, rests on anti-government, free-
market rhetoric of neoliberalism. Businesses were able to simplify complex regulatory 
schemes into a false dichotomy of “free market versus government regulation.” Pertschuk 
captured this paradox in his 1984 report when he said: “hatred of government in a 
democracy is self-hatred. And government which makes itself its own enemy is as 
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effective and responsive as a dog ferociously pursuing and biting its own tail.”706  The 
rhetoric of free market fundamentalism contradicts with the fact that favorable policies 
for businesses often hinge on a host of government projects, including subsidies, tax 
incentives, and government contracts for large infrastructural projects.  
 Gramsci identified this false dichotomy between “political society and civil 
society” in which “it is asserted that economic activity belongs to the civil society and the 
State are one in the same.” Here, Gramsci makes clear that notion of the free trade is a: 
a deliberate policy, conscious of its own ends, and to the spontaneous, 
automatic expression of economic facts. Consequently, laissez-faire 
liberalism is a political programme, designed to change—in so far as it is 
victorious—the State’s leading personnel, and to change the economic 
program of the State itself—in other words the distribution of national 
income.707 
 
Elizabeth Warren also captured this paradox of the free market when she famously said: 
There is nobody in this country who got rich on their own. Nobody. You 
built a factory out there—good for you. But I want to be clear. You moved 
your goods to market on roads the rest of us paid for. You hired workers 
the rest of us paid to educate. You were safe in your factory because of 
police forces and fire forces that the rest of us paid for. You didn't have to 
worry that marauding bands would come and seize everything at your 
factory. . . . Now look. You built a factory and it turned into something 
terrific or a great idea—God bless! Keep a hunk of it. But part of the 
underlying social contract is you take a hunk of that and pay forward for 
the next kid who comes along.708 
 
The very existence of successful start-ups championed by conservatives— Google, 
Amazon, and Facebook—would not have been possible if it were not for the massive 
public undertaking to establish the World Wide Web. In many respects, businesses 
benefit from government regulations, even those that impose limits. Drawing attention to 
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ways in which businesses benefit from public investment is a way to highlight a 
fundamental contradiction in free market fundamentalism.  
A Rational Economy: The Paradox of Neoclassical Economics 
 This leads to another major entry point: the paradox of neoclassical economics. 
Friedman’s economic arguments were seductive, but the analysis underlying those 
arguments is unconvincing. The free market ideology of the Chicago School, which is 
very much with us today, hinges on two arguments found in neoclassical economic 
theory: first, prices, and the economy in general, are regulated by supply and demand; 
and second, rational consumer preferences determine the outcomes of what a firm 
produces. By freeing these forces from government regulation, the economy will 
continue to grow. This view does not explain the current economic crisis, which is based 
largely on a bubble in the housing industry. Neoclassical economics also assumes that the 
power rests on the individual consumer, who has agency and choice. Firms therefore 
compete by catering to consumer preferences on the basis of price. The barrage of 
affordable consumer products, which line the superstore shelves, beguiles the 
concentration of power underlying the production of consumer goods. Proctor and 
Gamble, the nation’s largest advertiser, owns around half of the market share for razors, 
laundry detergent, diapers, shampoo, and batteries.709 Highlighting issues of labor and 
environment, Annie Leonard’s The Story of Stuff project illuminates a host of ecological 
and labor problems associated with modern consumer society. Leonard’s documentary 
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continues to be one of the most-watched environmental-themed online movies of all 
time.710 
 More than anything else, the current state of industrial concentration contradicts 
the logic of conservative economics. If the very existence of a firm depends on consumer 
preferences, why were banks too big to fail? Why was it necessary to bail out the auto 
industry? The recent collusion between business and government is also apparent in the 
recent health care law, in which the most controversial provisions added were to preserve 
the health insurance industry giants. These changes in corporate power and its partnership 
with government resonate with both sides of the political isle, but for different reasons. 
Thus, this unlevel playing field provides reformers with a point of entry, one that is 
informed by the story of the FTC during the 1970s. 
Contemporary Relevance of the FTC 
 A recent wave of political activism has surged again, with a Democratic president 
in the White House. The hundreds of thousands of demonstrators, who ascended on 
Wisconsin to protest the governor’s stripping of collective bargaining, and the Occupy 
Wall Street movement, indicate the continued spirit of activism, despite the legislative 
setbacks in Wisconsin. Just as they did after final blow to the CPA in 1977, some 
political leaders are quick to trivialize these movements as ephemeral. But as this study 
shows, Pertschuk, and the FTC, stayed on course during the last few years of the 1970s. 
The popularity of Elizabeth Warren and her fierce battle for the Consumer Protection 
Agency is another hopeful sign. Obama in some ways distanced himself from these 
movements, remaining silent during Wisconsin recall election, and acquiescing to the 
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powerful interests who opposed Elizabeth Warren’s appointment to the CPA. In the latter 
case, Obama’s hands were tied, and he needed to make an appointment to preserve the 
agency. The story of the FTC during the 1970s reveals the extent to which the power of a 
regulatory agency depends on its leaders, budget, and congressional powers. During the 
late 1970s, the lack of political unity over the establishment of a CPA and the FTC’s 
continued strength contributed greatly to the fracturing of the consumer movement and 
the regulations it generated. Businesses, however, were more united than ever. The new 
CPA’s clout remains to be seen, as is whether this ball is still in Obama’s court. 
 This story of the FTC during the 1970s is also relevant for the present-day media 
reform movement. During the 1970s, the FTC took steps to make advertisers accountable 
for their claims through its advertising substantiation programs and its policy of 
corrective advertising for false advertising claims. The policies initiated to limit 
advertising to children were a result of vigorous debates about how the U.S. media should 
serve in public interest. The rationale was simple: Children represent a vulnerable 
audience, and public policies should be in place to protect this vulnerable audience from 
advertisers. Ralph Nader and the broader consumer movement he represented were 
narrowly focused on creating a new consumer advocacy agency in the federal 
government, but this narrow focus drew attention and resources away from the fact that 
such an agency already existed.  
 Over the course of the last decade, media reform activism has surged again, 
calling into question the logic of the commercial media system. The public participation 
and advocacy in the most recent wave of media reform has focused its energy on media 
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reform through the FCC, and has mostly ignored the FTC.711 Unfortunately, the FCC’s 
jurisdiction over new forms of media has been limited, but the FTC’s oversight over 
digital media offers some hope.712  It is clear that companies like Google are no longer 
just search engines, but also major media content providers.713 In failing to comply with 
the FTC’s standards for online advertising and marketing standards, Google enabled the 
advertising company DoubleClick to track and gather information from users online. The 
FTC has recently taken steps to hold Google accountable. In August of 2012, the FTC 
fined Google $22.5 million for misrepresenting its privacy policies, which was the largest 
fine ever for a company failing to comply with an FTC settlement.714 The FTC’s 
settlement also requires Google to disable all the surreptitious tracking cookies on 
consumers’ computers and mobile devices. Consumer groups have taken notice of the 
FTC, and are currently pressuring the FTC to block Google’s proposed acquisition of the 
travel company Frommers.715 In October of 2012, the FTC announced a formal 
endorsement of an antitrust lawsuit against Google for the anticompetitive nature of its 
search policies, which favors its own products, making it harder for competitors to appear 
as highly on the search results page. If perused, it would represent the most sweeping 
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antitrust case since Microsoft in the 1990s.716 With the transformation of Google as a 
major content provider and advertiser, media reformers who hope to shape new media in 
the public interest would be wise to maintain pressure and attention on the appointments 
and congressional actions surrounding the FTC. Despite the legislative setback for the 
FTC in 1980, it is still the nation’s most powerful regulatory agency. 
 The other important lesson from the 1970s is the significance of the intellectual. 
Peggy Charren, Ralph Nader, and Mike Pertschuk, to name only a few, all helped to build 
a formidable coalition of progressive organizations who were committed to the consumer 
cause. Even as late as 1977, Nader was still an important leader: Carter consulted him on 
his appointments to regulatory and top cabinet-level positions. The power of progressive 
forces during the 1970s is truly remarkable from our vantage point today. Through the 
course of the decade, businesses began to grasp the importance of public intellectuals and 
produced an impressive intellectual assembly of their own. Businesses have not forgotten 
the importance of this point, and neither should those who engage in intellectual work. 
The lesson critical scholars can take from this study is that their work actually matters in 
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